of mesg! 2-13-
56)
Transmit the following in
AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL (Priority or Method of Mailing) | fe eee ee ee 5 TO DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) yee zh yo FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) y - aes L i 3 ς aul
of a pamphlet entitled, "Apologists of Neo-Colonialisn, Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU," issued by the Foreign Language Press, Peking. He noted that for a number of years he had been receiving from the CP of China mailings of a similar nature and that the CP of China had always mailed such material to him at the following drop address:
furnished to representatives of the International Department, CP of China, a number of years ago during the course of a visit to the Peoples Republic of China.
he desired to point out here to the Bureau was that the latest item he received, while mailed to the SCHOLDERS' address, had not been like the others which had previously been mailed from | Peking: C65 Ἰξ. [6
1-Chicago RV: MDW
Bureau CR: Cae AEC 322. αὐ YR τῷ Tl 35) [| @ Bar York a ae 4637) (Info) (RM) }
(5)
Approved:
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ἐπὶ}
In
ἰδ
ἘΣ cral Agent in Charge te 4 Lo
FBI
Date: 12/19/63
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(Type in plain text or code)
On 12/12/63 CG 5824-S* advised he was in receipt
Se π-πππ
aust? JOHN SCHOLDERS it 144 c/o Modern EBook Store ?
56 East Chicago Avenue Chicago 11, Illinois USA
-"»" ῃ
a
The source noted that this was the address he had
In regard to the above, CG 5824-S* stated that what les ee of China. This particular item had /
ee mya \ rhe *
pent
2 ee \u- su ρος UWS 8
at
CG 134-46 Sub B
been railed from Great Britain and bore ἃ London, Sngzland address, Fron this he felt it nust be concluded that the CP of China apparently had set up nev mailing facilities
in Great Britain or perhaps had hired cone individual or organization to mail such material for them. Since this waterial originated in Great Britain instead of the Peoples Republic of China, such material naturally would not cone under the inspection or reception by either U.S. Custos
or postal officials as would be the case with printed matter originating in socialist countrics, Thus, there would be apparently in the view of the C2 of China a better chance of such material setting to its recipient. It was further noted thet 11 this was the situation existines with bin, the CP of China is undoubtedly now muiling to other individuals in the U.S. CP of China naterial via the Sane channel, He felt it was desirable to call this information to the Bureau's attention to show the extent to which the CP of China will go in order to disseminate its naterial.
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ἥ ππ- ----- Ὀ TTT Tg π--- π---- 1 Ks ev. 12+13-56) . ἢ I |
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FBI |
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Date: 12/19/63
Transmit the following in
(Type in plain text or code)
Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL (Priority or Method of Mailing) eee ee ee ee οὐ ee Lee εἰ ἢ j 7 TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) . a Ἂν ἢ ῇ a FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) , .
(- . ἢ Ws SOLO. ἊΝ “Is"- c λ ἡ ρα
In accordance with Bureau instructions set forth in Bureau airtel dated 5/14/63 captioned as above, there are enclosed herewith for the Bureau the original and three copies of a letterhead memorandum entitled, "Communist Party of Chile." One copy of the above is also enclosed for New York,
The information appearing in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/10/63 to SAs WALTER A. BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN.
Information set forth in the enclosed letterhead memorandum was developed through conversation with ZENICK WAGNER held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, 11/28/63. f y
a
The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been ὁ bagi: fied * " since it sets forth information furnished by CG 5824-S*, a most highly placed sensitive source who is fur- nishing information on the highest level concerning the
international communist movement, the disclosure of which would tend to identify this source and thus adversely affect the national defense interest. ἡ γα Raven, (3)-Bureau (Enc 5:4} (RID , ἢ l-New York (100-13463%) (inc. 1) Ginfo) (RM) | pan, 35} iho 1-Chicago 4 »“ τ." "“"΄-Ρ -"-" af .. ( REC 38, ΄---- - δῶν ἘΜῈ : LDV Eig! (5) . . υ
AM ppprovstt Ὁ cy?
ἢ δῖ ἌΝ : eer (8 ee it arges, ᾿ ΜΝ *. A Btn 7 iar an
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CG 184-45 sub S
4,
ye enclosed Letterhead wecorandiua has been shown a5 navins been mace at wachineton, D.C., in orter to vurtrer protect this source.
τη
METH Lef-se-24011
i /ECLASSTIPICMMEON ATITHORTTY DERIVED FROM: . FEL AUTOMATWEEPDECLASSIFICATION GUIDE ; 3 L¢
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
In Reply, Please Refer to Washington, D. Ὁ, File No. December 19, 1963
AE space
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE
In mid-December, 1963, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised as follows:
--- ee --
Prague, Czechoslovakia... in late November, 1963, this indi- vidual noted that he had recently traveled to Chile and
in connection with this visit had the following observa- tions;
In Chile there is an intensive election campaign presently going on and the Communist Party of Chile is having a tough time. While the Communist Party plays an important role in the coalition party, the¥fopular Action _ Front (FRAP), and although the FRAP may win the election, αν, ° thexChristian_Democratic Party is making gains. He then a noted that the big problem in Chile in regard to the Christian ‘ Democratic Party is that it has been using tactics and demands Similar to those being projected by the Communist Party and the FRAP. This bourgeois party in Chile is even documenting their demands in order to show that they can do a better job than either the Communist Party or FRAP, They have also come out for peace but refuse to attack the United States; however, they say openly they will fight the United States if the United States begins to act like an imperialist power.
---
COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE De pater
The Christian Democratic Party has even gone so far as to quote the Communist Party of China in order to show that the Communist Party of Chile is opportunistic,
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Mr, W. Ὁ. Sullivan Dacenber 18, 1963
My. F. de Baumgardner.
1 « Hr, Belmont
af Kolobashkin, an identified GB (Committee of State Security) τ, employee, has requested NY 694-S* to furnish him the names of 3 af andividuats to work with the Soviets, We propose NY 69408¢ furnish ἐ Kolebashkin the identity ef ah individual within our contre) but to of WY 694+8% from any evontuality, a “cut out’ wk will brief] —s_——s regarding the background
ED
protect the security
Ὁ the evebt of an inquiry .°. πο Party (CP) representative. Theregfitor, 694-58. —
: matructions, will obtain the identity of from ΝΣ
and will refer the name to EKelebashkin meaty idual
mo hac 1 recommended by “a reliable source.” NY 694«3#, to ἡ further protect and enlarge the operation, will alse furnish Kolobaahkin the nane of a “legitimate” yecruit; which name informant will request from Lom Harris oy some other ΟΝ member within the infermant's apparatus, Thus, we will have complete. contrel of ; ene likely Soviet recruit and knowledge of the identity of 8. i second possible recruiti ᾿ τς
DETAILS: | | | ΝΕ ΕὟ ~
᾿ Recently Aleksey Μι Kolebashiiu, 3rd Secretary, Soviet ” Mipeion te the United Nations, an identified MOB employee wha id the Soviet. contact of NY 694-8, reqiested the latter to furnieh hin the identities of 3 progressive Americans not desocinted with the GP to “work with us (Soviets}.* Thie request presents & . unique opportunity for us to refer individuaig within our control . © to the Soviets for espionage aseiguments. but such an operation must be wost circumspect to avoid any pessibility of compromise of Ἦν 694.9%, an informant of exceptional value who operates ag a cP agparatus mas 47 ν ligison capacity between the Communist Party, 183A, leadership and the Ἀσίδι j
᾿ red sper 42£09/- 4
QT RECQRDED '
UPLICATE YELLOW, 88 pac 20 1963
, —_—
BOG»
pa:bee (8; jé iat
aw
cae) er anes .. ᾿ Θ᾽ 4DEC 9. 0 1068. " - ἐς
Rererindn te τ, Onlbivon teat) ΡΩΝ τὰ, ROLORARICT
SOLO σύνθεο 00 051
Ὁ ΟΣ; han xoco. conde co 2 σον te bo τοῦτα Ἐ | Ὁ
i Queopt toneliy tntei bic sid stable and hag nooporatod τον York Office since is bachcround 45 such ag
to male hin atiractive to the cdviote ag ἢ xocerult vor ospiouars
mts. Lew York De TAPOSSS ta bries and toe make bknown to that the Cos tins an individual with his qualifications.
+ ὙΠῸ Gnd tia, an infourantr of icssor value to tho iow Yori: Οὐ σα woo has bean nog: 2 ¥ comtactod by WY δα. 1121 be auvadcneid bacheround on vo cnoble lan to ἥηῦσ ἀλη σον a tho latter τον ho io TBUTAMontly contacted by V2 σύ ἢ bie 1 advise NY COd-D* he is not personally acquainted TD
2G : Φ 130, tuvench “roaliable sources," Iv δα
ae "ὦ avdling tuo ΠΟΙ fo atone he,
in turn, Wild Ce a ane of the Ξ στ 4 σον by hin th SOUT “oe polidsbic courco.” Lo > τ: nover questioned GY Coda ve: τακᾶλτς ὕπο Ingoroancts “nansarntec"
and 2¢ if now Litoly bo τ 1 action | Ly OF4ehe nogarding informant! sources, En this ui casion to imow ether TY θά or os owledge
ΩΣ wureau's rolat: p With we
Cee ova Gubscaucntiy sucneeted by the δον ΣΙ
cut out" would be the iorsical Scapecoat, _ thors oy Dro
the ceeurlty and fature offeetivences of TY Οὐ,
ecting
Yo further protest mad oningrge this Ding, it 1a provosed
LX G26 ‘ate pequoot Lea λα (trusted Of eames and associate
of UY OOd¢deS* dn Darty sinancial ταῦ ον, to furnish hin the adontiiy of & "Logitimate: individual to ba raz soxred to the vovicts, Althouc: ducik on individual would not bea Ὁ 4 vnluablo
an Curean=controlicd vrocrudt of tha foviets, vo road have tho fdvantoc o£ προ οὐ ἃ 2ihely Coviet agent vhanve could COVEY TLVOUcD estabLiched souvees ond opocinl investinntion where Viera.
Bolobachiin has rcoquccted 3 ntico from We σλυῖρει HG thio theo, Wo believe he should onty b ho surnished tha moves ΟΥ̓́ 4 Cevonuecombyolied voeerult"” and of a "Losivinsce™
ἘΝ
omorandun to Ur. Snlliven Tar ἜΤ ΩΤ I. COMO
DOLo 4 G@ FOU
LOD MARI οι,
voowulh, Wo will ainctruct Tes York to ba λον sor anovher individasd wao nay bo woserved toe tho Covicws but boLere Anstituting « third reforrai, we will careiwily analyze the
he
prolininayy offectivencig of tho oporaeion,
{t is anticinated the referral of our goures and the VYorlyireso® voerult to the Coviots will ba offested carly in January, LOCA, waon WY δώσ ds nomt achoduled to noob with “sinbgashiin,. Thico onosatbion wlll bo cerofelly Zoliowed and enalyced to incure cominun reculis concictomt with tha basic consideration, woieh ig the orotection of IY 0oi-0%,
REC TEI REO
Sane tho abtached gietol bo fexrvarded arthoricios Wow Yor: to indidate the eporstion outlined abova by having fr Cte yokes to tho Sovlota o Uneoo-comtrozlod individaal and ἃ ‘locitinete’ erorul: fer poosabio coplonace ἀπο: Tow Yorl: vlEL bo enuittoned toe imcuse the soourdty οὐ MY Golde ist ig pyotestod ond will be instructed to oubnit thoir recommendations as to ἢ thicd Duroanecontrolicd individaal whe way bo considered for suture voverral to tha Coviots.
Sectuber 18, 1963.
Aketek i = Mr. Belmont i ~ ir. Sullivan 1» δὰ, Ὁ, ἘΠῚ στὸ 1 = a. Branigan
ite: aac, Kew York ἐλυδιϑό θῶ) ἀδθαλ 8469) 1 ~ He. Baumgardner
i, - Hy. Ryan
EBNAL GROURTEY - ὃ
Lif & ADEC ΣΙ 4
ΒΟ 68 12/12/65 outlining :% pian to have HY 694.8" conply with the séniest of big Sovict contact by referring ἐδ the Sovicts panes oF individuals to work with the Russdéans.
ive Anthorised τὸ jnnodiatety initict a x ot] ______|to the Soviets utiliz a 2
cut Op H The Sanur outiined in reiet, ‘Bear im ΓΙ hint the... iC prime consideration in this operation is the seaurdty οἵ bID HY θά 9 and insure gach phase coordinated
δ your plan is aud executed to preclude the morsibiiity of compromise of this most valuahiec tn forsiant .
thie . paretion. ae thes erat paler ; unayaaiable ox oe to make such a recommendsticn, informant chould aeek the iddntity of such an individusk from ancther ef his closes contacts.
This operation mist. he eerefuliy foliowed and and the Boréan advided of 511 pertinent dovelognents by the mast axpeditious meats watranted. At the éarliest
‘peisable dxte you should submit. to the Bugenu the identity
of a third posgible Bureau-coutrolied candidate for referral
to the Soviats.
5. Ἢ um Baumgardner to Sullivan, 12/18/63; same caption, ipee,
DE: bee {11}
aes Boat oe
| 22» =e by
= ere LP sm
ORIGINAL FILED IN a
ὃς
‘DIRECTOR, FBI 12/18/63
100746094)
SAC, NEW YORK Seana -}
ALEKSEY M. KOLOBASHKIN _. 1S=8.- SMUN “ “ “A . f “SOLO +” “seme oo ESC
whereby NY 694-S* could furnish to the Soviets, without jeopardizing his own security, the names of individuals to be employed in the Soviet apparatus.
ne fo ReBulet, dated 11/29/63, suggesting metheds ‘ ] . yor
Re also NY airtel, dated 12/7/63, captioned, "SOLO; IS-C", reflecting on page 3, that ALEKSEY KOLCBASHKIN, on 12/6/63, Inquired whether NY 694-9 coula furnish him yet with the names of the "three young people" to ywork with the Soviets, and he expressed the desire that NY 694-S* "handle this soon.” The NYO agrees with the Bureau that, to insure the security of the informant, "cut-outs" should be used to recruit individuals for referral to the Soviets. In this . regard, following the telephone conference on 11/19/63, between Mr. FRED BAUMGARDNER of the Bureau and Assistant special Agent in Charge DONALD E. RONEY of the NYO, mentioned in reBulet, the NYO, pursuant to Mr. BAUMGARDNER's suggestion, qiestional NY 694-5* concerning whom among his CP contacts he would consider approaching as "cut-outs" in this operation. The informant advised that he would prefer to contact LEM HARRIS, the latter being the most reliable for this kind of assignment.
3- BUR eau (105-78927) (ἘΠῚ
ate 100-2809! } ) 10 1 - = M) ( 1 - aby (42) i τὶ ᾿ " 7" κ, " ἢ a "ἢ | 1 - ἣν 105..-36 8} 02 JG 97: of oi & of ff
| NOT RECORDED
a 98 DEC 16 1963
eee eee
ee ee ee ee:
ORIGINAL FILED IN / ὦ...
a ee
ἊΣ ΣΝ “ NY 100~134637 105 -36402 The NYO considers excellent the Bureau Ὡς suggestions with respect to placi : the 0070 "cut-out" the recommenddd recruit 70 Since, however, KOLOBASHKIN on 12 » State at he
wanted the informant to "handle this soon," and since the informant's failure to do so could result very likely in the Soviets' taking the matter out of the informant's hands, it seems that the Bureau cannot afford to engage in a time-consuming operation to effect contact between the recruit and a “cut-out”.
In view of the emergency nature of t Li on, the NYO suggests the following with respect to
That, as the Bureau sungested,|__| be used as a “cute this operation; that, w Pumtshtng[ pete detalls of the nature of the operation, be informed that it is known that the 5 CP is looking for an individual with certain qualifications, ©’
including non-member ommunist Party; that the fo Party has noted that contacts are outside the Party and that he ve ould be of assistance in
suggesting a desireable individuak that very likely either en HARRIS or some other CP funetionary known
to may contact him in this immediate ure; that if such person ἃ after considerable deliberation, sugges
ἢ accordance with this plan, NY 694.~S* could
id be furnishe with ficient for to
with NY 694-S% -85, ἰδ ἕο as questions of except = P/U
| pe woul be prepared to answer, Lest
be concermmed about NY 694-s*' subsequently
about the latter's acquaintance with
ould tell NY 694-S* that_he and personally acquainted, but vat πασσααααα hn σῃ "'neiiable sources,” NYOO4-
maT would no regarding these "“rellab " and could indics at as understandable that for his own security, would not wish to involve hi
in this matter.
- «
NY 100~134637 105-36} 02
[ in accordance with would have no oecasion to know elther or NY 694-s*,
When submitting|__]name to KOLOBASHKIN “ΔῈ could inform KOLOBASHKIN that he did not know but that the latter had been recommended by a TellapLe source," Since the Soviets respect the need for secrecy in such operations and since in the past they have never asked specific qiestions regarding the informant's
cpparatus, | it is not likely that KOLOBASHKIN would question NY
94 .5* source of. the latter's information regarding,
The NYO also is in accord with the Bureau's suggestion that the name of one “legitimate” recruit be submitted to the Soviets. In this regard, it 18 suggested that N¥ 694-S* request LEM HARRIS to furnish him the name of a potential recruit for the Soviets. |
For the information of the Bureau, NY 594-9, on 12/12/63, advised, that in his opinion, KOLOBASHKIN would expect him to furnish the names of potential recruits at the next meeting of KOLOBASHKIN and the informant, which is scheduled for 176 fol,
The NYO is of the opinion that initially only two names should be submitted by NY 694.S* to KOLOBASHKIN, one of a "legitimate" recruit, and the other of a Bureau- controlled recruit. In the event that, as a resuit of Soviet investigation, the Bureau-controlled recruit should become suspect, NY 694-8* position would not be jeopardized to the extent that it would be if two out of three recruits should become suspect.
The NYO believes that, should the Bureau approve the plan suggested above, subsequent discussion with NY 694.S* would result in specific refinements with respect to execution of said plan.
6 ΤῸ Ὁ 70
FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56) . , γ a q K, #
FBI
Date: 12/19/63
Transmit the following in
(Type in plain text or code)
Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MATL | (Priority or Method of Mailing) |
me en ee ee ee re ee ee re ea ea es eae a ee -Ό-..
LS TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
|’, FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) »»Ὲ
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are three copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's Statement captioned, "Meeting with Representative of Security Department, Intelligence Division, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, November, 1963."
The information appearing in the enclosed informant/s statement was furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/3, 911/63 to 5 WALTER A, BOYLE and RICHARD W. HANSEN.
}an § GARY Zé δ ᾿ "
i (BrBuréawl@ ἘΣ (RM) | 1-New York (100-134637) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM) | 1-Chicago { |.
ial pn ag_co- 2707 B95 13 Hos a “Houses ΠΥ ἀν 2105 " eet itH\\ WK ye VEGF po DECRG 1951 ESN,
WES EMS | rors ee ae | 7 τ es Approved: Sent sss eC Peer LT
omy cid nd in ar Bag Neb aie Bey τς
HEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVE OF SECURITY DEPART~ MENT, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE, COMMUTE IE PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, NOVEMBER,
¥ os Kipertov
During the week/of November 18, 1963, an individual dentified b only as "Paul who is, in fact, actually Pavel vi fe the 8 y_Deg rt ntelligence Division, ttee : ty..of- the-Soviet-Union..(CPS) , contacted Morris Childs, Communist Party, USA (CP, USA), representative who was then in Moscow, USSR. This meeting took place in Childs' suite in the Central Comittee, CPSU apartment building in Moscow. Arrangements for the meeting had been set up by the North and South American Section of the International Department, Central Committee, CPSU, in order that Childs and a representative of the Security Department would have an opportunity to raise any existing problem or offer suggestions regarding the apparatus which has been set up to serve the CPSU and the CP, USA in the United States.
The meeting which took place was cordial but quite brief. Lukianov opened by noting that they were very happy with the work being performed by Jack Childs in New York City and he stated that they “had nothing but praise for his work.” Morris Childs then noted that Jack Childs had asked that he advise the Russians that if the quality of hie work in connection with certain matters was on occasions bad, this must be entirely attributed to the technical equipment which had been made available to him. Therefore, if there was any desire on the part of the Russians to improve the technical quality of such work, the Russians should consider sending Jack Childs any new equipment available which they might now possess or any information as to how he could secure such equipment in the United States. In this connection, Lukianov noted that apparently Jack Childs had the latest technical equipment available and they had nothing new to supply or recommend to hin.
Morris Childs then raised with Lukianov a complaint regarding the method which had been used to transmit to the CP, USA last September the contents of a confidential letter from the CPSU. Childs noted that in this particular case the contents of the letter had been placed on tape and from this tape Jack Childs was expected, on one hearing, to make sufficient
SBO WF LGEOFG lo ENCLOSURE 4 S13
-᾿Ἕ | «=
.--........-.-.- . SS
notes from which he could convey the full text to the American Party.. To. complicate matters, the meeting at which they arranged for Jack Childs to hear this tape was set up in a public place which made the entire situation much more difficult and almost impossible. Morris Childs remarked that it was only because he had actually seen this confidential letter and made some notes from it personally while previously in Moscow
that it was possible for the. Party to have the benefit .of the full text of this letter. Childs stated it was ridiculous to have expected Jack Childs under the condi- tions he enceuntered at the time to have gotten the complete text.
In view of the . foregoing, Childs suggested that some new different nethods of meetings between Jack Childs and his Russian contact be set up in New York. He inquired as to why it could not be arranged to have such meetings set up in a. motel or hotel room rather than in parks, subways, .ete. If motels or hotels. were used, it would be poselble at certain tines. to sit down.and talk matters over which cannot be done under. the present setup. Lukianov agreed to raise this matter with hia superiors and was also in agreement that some new arrangements had to. be made concerning meetings in New York. lukianov also agreed that in the future they. would not attempt to put the content of. such things as the confidential letter on tape but would instead consider the preparation of a document containing the summary or essence of such material which could be transmitted during personal contacts by micro- film or otherwise. ον
δε Childs then brought up for discussion a request of Hall, General Secretary of the CP, USA, as to the possi bility of the Bu ν USA with information concerning recently developed methods for detection of listening devices and other types of electronic devices and similar equipment which are utilized in connection with surveillances. Lukianov noted that they had nothing that could be sent to
the CP, USA but that it might be advantageous for Childs to
be. pirriefed by an expert on the matter of electronic devices. and their detection. He then suggested that on the following. Monday or Tuesday, November 25 or 26, 1963,. they could set up .. a couple of briefing sessions for hin with: an expert from
this field who would demonstrate what was new and discuss with “ἢ him the means for detection of electronic devices. | ?
Childs also brought up the fact that Qus Hall had Ὁ informed tha tly discussed electronic listening | devices with from Chicago, an electronics expert,
ee ig Ὁ ae Ib7c - 3-
ee ee a
and that Gus is now convineed:that it is impossible te pick up sound waves through glass by electronic devices... Childs noted that he had told Hall that the Russians had demonstrated the feasibility. of. such a technique when he was in. the Soviet Union a year age but Hall was not convinced and wanted it - verified again: Lukianov in response noted that. this could. be done and that when the expert he previously mentioned cane in, a demonstration in this connection. could be arranged.
μύλον next noted. that an regard to- the alternate channel of communication, that:1is the conminication. route through Mexico, it was still operative and the addresses
remained ¥ hid. r passe
eo regard to visdinioCerkovety: Lukianov noted that on this individual's return to the Soviet Union he had becone 111 and indicated that he may be eick ones again. He temzrkdd that he bad been having a hard-time since his return and by implication gave the impression that they might ὍΘ᾽ βολαϊτξ hin partially responsible for Sone of the arrests in the Kew York area.
Upon terminating this brief meeting, Lukianev indi- eated he would see Childs again when they: would meet for the digcufiaion on-electronic devices. At this point, Childs, Since Lukianov had always éxpressed an interest in new gadgets or gimmicks, gave that individuei a pack of stainless steel] razor blades which αὔθ now in common use in the United ‘States.
Although Lukianov had sugested at the above necting that there would be gone follow-up briefing sessions on the following Monday or Tue@day dealing. with the topic of electronic devices and also indicated he would see Childa again at. that time, such meetings never did occur... According to: Le represéntat ive ( of the International Department, Central Comaitted, . cP these meetings had been canceled because of the turmoil resulting fron the intervening assassination of President John F.. Kennedy in the United States and a need to reassess the direction of the Party's activity. The representative of the International Department stated that for the time being they must be most eautious and discreet in any matters involving the cP, USA,
᾿ στε τεξξε------ ----Ξ-ϑ’ π΄ ---τ----------------.--- --- -------- ---.-... ... .........--ἙὁἙ-.-Ἑ.-.-᾽.-.-.
ap UO ee ΙΝ ENVELOPE
sl Belmont VECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: Sullivan FEI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION CUIDE Baumgardner . DATE 12-Z9-2Q11L. ἢ. ἢ, Smith Liaison shaw
Becenheor 24, 1963 BY LIAISON
“,
=
μι μι μεμὴ μή μη
nO
' ᾿ om “3
Honorable Dean Rusk ι{3 ΠΤ ἘΞ The Secretary of State . 4 | 2 " mo Vashingtorn, BD. .C. ΝΞ : ἧς | Prove? os 7 Dear Mr, Busk: : a . yy B s "Ἔ
. The following information was supplied πὸ x 2
December, 1963, by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past,
According to an official of the Central Committee, Communiat Party of Czechoslovakie, the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia is greatly impreved. Milliona of dollars’ worth of consumer goods have been purchased and stores are
now completely stocked with these goods. As a result, there are no longer “lines or queves* outside stores as has heen the case in the past.
The sbove official stated, however, that the political situation is a "sess." He described the bureauc-~ racy in the Government as "gigantic," Ὁ but indicated that steps were being taken te improve this situation, He stated that the Party leddership ie “cleaning house" and bringing new people into the leaderehip. Ae,
In regard to Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cacchoslovakia and Pregident,of the: : Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia, the shove-neitioned a: Czech official stated that Novotny’s position is not secure ahd he is, in οὗ fects, on probation, ~“c° too 2909/-SG yp |
Nake “We 7 REC 33
j 100-428091 ¥ ς so πὶ Δ. Cale SEE NOTE PAGE TWO | Gale - WGS:kmj, lem ὃ;
OS -
ot 108 Tele. orl NZ (mn ἐς TELETYPE UNIT L_|
oP : “δή Spon Honorable Dean Rusk
In regard to the United States, the Czech official atated that efforts are being made to establish better relations with that country.
Because of the senazitive netur of our, Gqurede, wo have classified thia communication “ This inferuation is boing furnished to other | ested officials
of the Governnent. | | _ Bineorely yours,
.
NOTE: |
cracttien sg Bee because unauthorized dis- closure of this infor nm could reveal‘ the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionsliy grave damage to. the Nation. Source is CG 5824-5¢, who is referred to in letter 8' ᾿. “gources" in order to further protect his identity, See Chicago snirtel 12/17/63 captioned "Golo, 18.-0} with enclosed letterhead menorandum entitled “Comments of Representatives
,. of the International ‘Department, Central Comittee, Communist Party of Czechozlovakia, ‘on Domestic Situation in Peoples
' Republic of: Czechoslovakia," ‘CG 5@24-5+ obtained this infor- matien while on Sole Mission 14 from (First name unknown) Chernik, Deputy to the Head of the ‘International Departacnt, Central Committees Communist | Party ΟΣ. Czechoslovakia.”
yo ) ἊΣ ὃ wD Ψ ΒΒ ὦ et # as ΤΊ ΓΝ AITHo BR wu ᾿Ξ BIVED FRO: * ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
ΞΒῚ ΑΘΤΌΒΑΤΤΟ PECIASS FICATION GUIDE 1. - Liaison SATE 1 1 - Mr, Wannall
(1) 1oo-200a01
wf ‘ate: — Boecner 27, 1908
a Toe Director
Durenu ox Entelliponce and Research Dopartnont of State
Prout John Edgar Hoover, Director
Subjcet: FORRIGN BOLTTICAL NATTONS ὦ ca
The folloving infermetion was > Bupstica by a couree which hag furnished rolinble information in the past,
According to an oxficinl of the Central Comnitice, Comuunict Party (CP) of Cxccheslovalsia, who rccontly visited Chile, the CP of Chilo is heving a digricult tino in the cLection canooign presently toting piace in Chile, The CP of Chilo plays an innortant role in the coslition party, the Populor Action Front (TRAP), ond althourh the FRAP nay win the election, the Christian Denseratic Party (CDP) is naking eoins, Fhe Csech official noted that the big problen in Chile in regard to the CDP is that it hes beon using tactics and denands similar to those being projected by the “CP and ERAD, The CDP is even documenting its demands in order to (7 " choy that it can do a botter job than cithor the OP ov FRAP, Ὁ Although the COP is campaigning for pence, it has stated LO openly. it will Zicht the United Staucs ἀξ the United States begins to act like an inporialist power, fhe ΟἿ has even / gene co for oo to quote the CP of China in order to show ἢ shod! the OP of Chilc is opportunistic,
τῇ Bcenuse of the consitive ngtuye of our source, wo ὃ} havo οἹοσυζλοα this comiuicntion “ky;
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| 1 ~ Director χφΦθῶ- Central InteLLigoneo Axoney ” REC
i Talson Belmont Mohr Casper Callahan
Avecntion: Bopuaty Dincots ‘Plens vss . SEE NOTE PAGE TWO oe
Conrad DeLocch τς Evans Gale Rosen
Sullivan Tavel
Trotter ;
TeifRoom AS om - Lh Fi Moey ἡ. Ho Imest
Gandy
MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT εἰ Ἴ
" ὃ » HE See
Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State
NOTE:
Classified " ‘Seersi!" because unauthorized dis- closure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation, Source is CG 5824-S*, who obtained this data from Zenick Wagner during a confidential discussion held in Prague, Czechoslovakia, on 11/28/63. See Chicago airtel 12/19/63, "Solo, IS-C," enclosing letterhead memorandum captioned "Communist Party of Chile," The Popular Action Front is a coalition party consisting mainly of elements of the Communist and Socialist Parties, It is commonly known as FRAP.
we ET
—————_<—— ὉΠ. οὃὦΦὩἕΨΛτοττσοΠὺῆ τ ἀτοοο ττ τς
ae ' ἊΨ
ΠΕ τὰ ENVELOPE
ἹΕΠΙΙΑΞΞΙΤΕΤΠΑΤΙΟΝ AUTHORITY DERIVED ἘΒΠΗ:
ἜΣ AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE 1 = DeLoach
VATE LZ-Z9-£011 1 - Sullivan’ Ὁ 1 = Baumgardner 1 -- RK. W. Snith 1 - Shaw
Docember 24, 1969
BY LIALsON
“" Honorable Walter Ἦ, Jenkins ἢ =
75 Special Assistant to the President a The Waite House De = Tashington, Dp, Ge Zz a=
Ξ δας Hear ur, Jonkina: ΝΕ ξ ΞΞ The following information was supplicd in eo
Yocember, 1063, by sources which heve furnished reliabie information in the pest.
according to an official of the Central Comittee, Communist Perty of Czechoslevakia, the domestic situation an Cuochosiovatia is greatly improved. Willios of ἀρ λον" worth of consumer goods have heen purchased and stores are now completely stocked with these goods, | ΑΒ ἃ result, there are no longer “lines or queues" outside stores as haa been the ease in the past.
The above official stated, however, that the political situation ie a “seas.” He described the bureauc- racy in the Covernment as “gigantic,” but indicated that atepa were being talten to improve thig situation, He stated that the Party leadership is “eleaning house” and bringing new poople into the leadership. — ὌΝ ΕΝ : ὔ WV
. In regard to Antonin Hoyotny, First Secretary of ἐ $ the Communist Party of Caechoslevakia and President of the Peoples Republic of Caechoslovakie, the ahove~-nentioned
Czech official stated that Novotay's position is aot to epee) secure and he is, in effect "85 probation.”70 ~ δεν, ον. aan ἀπο ROAD τ ἢ Tolecn | 100-428091 |! oe w/e eT Mobr . πα camper SEE NOTE PAGE -‘TWO // Conrad ta Oe DeLioach a 5 Gale WGS;kmj sullivan. | (Ἃ9 Tavel : ᾿ της ‘ ἔτ» ‘i
“
Honerabie Halter , Jenkins
En regard to the pnited ‘gtates, the Csech official steted that efforts are: being aada. to establish botter relations with thet country.
Because af the ‘sensitive matune,or our Sources, we have classified this commnication Sprecf., "
. Sincerely γοῦσρ,:
Classified 1 — because unauthorized dis ‘closure of this inf Mm could reveal the identity ofr the source, who is of continuing. value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave ‘damage td the Nation, Source .is CG 5824-5%, who ia referpod to in letter as “sources” in order to further prot/ a6 Chicago airtel 12/17/63 captioned ("Gol letterhead memornndua entitled " ohmertts of ftepresentatives of the International Bepartment, Central Committes, Communist Party: of Czechoslovakia, on Bonestic Situation’ in Peoples’ | ‘Republic. of Czechoslovakia.” CG 58.24.85 obtained this infor- mation while of Solo Mission 14 from (First name unknown)’ ‘Chernik, Deputy to the Head of the Intarnatioaal Department, Central Committee, Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, .
Ὅς) ἃ “INTERNAL SECURITY - C
é 12/23/63
1 - Mr. Shaw AIRTEL
To: SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B) Frou: Director, FBI (100-428091)
SOLO’ ἱ
Reurairtel 12/16/63.
Referenced airtel discloses that CG 5824-S* has a copy of the book “Das Programa der KPd SU und der Westen" ("The Program of the CPSU and the West") which he will retain for a short period prior to presenting it to Peggy Uchnis. Referenced airtel further discloses that in the event the Burcau desires the temporary use of this book, Chicago will forward it to the Bureau upon request.
The Bureau would like to review this book. It is requested that you forward same to the Bureau, You should indicate how long a period the Bureau will be able to retain this book before it is to be returned to CG 5824-S*.
Tolson ΝᾺ Belmont ΔῸΣ Mohr > 4 Gasper - «ἂς Callahan * RS Conrad oa ee Deleach WGS: rj h , , a y yarns (4) ἢ , Ἂ [ 7 ; f Gele ΗΝ Rosen yh fi 4 ‘ ae er 8 a Sullivan tt ony ya ᾿ \ i- οἱ To DEG 24. 1963 Taovel a . i . ἴοι eee EG BOIS Tele. Room — eal Holmes Gandy MAIL ROOM TELETYPE unit L_
a
τι —_ aed ~GPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 5010-104 ", ts Agast 1982 EDITION : GSA GEN. REG, NO, 27 ' Tolson
TO
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Belmaxt ζαᾶρι. Iiahon Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE Gale = Mr. We C. sonsveh, DATE: December 10, 1963 Sis aS 1 = Mr. Belmont Trotter FROM : Mr, F, J. Baumgardper i- Mr, Evans Holmes e 1 = Mr, DeLoach Gandy —__4 ~) & 1... Mr. Sullivan f. ἢ φοιο) 1 — Mr. Baumgardner tn Pty INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST i - Mr. Bland an 1 - Liaison ut
This memorandum recommends forwarding attached letter to the Honorable Walter W, Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, setting forth an evaluation of President Johnson for the Soviets by Gus Hail, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA),
It is recalled that by letter 11/29/63 to Jenkins we supplied
have Calvin Benham (Beanie) Baldwin contacted for the purpose of having
nave Gaivin received by NY 694-S* 11/25/63 that Hall had taken steps to
BEF wed
Baldwin provide a personal and political evaluation of the President,
On 12/6/63 NY 694-S* furnished our New York Office a docu- ment dated 12/5/63 which he had received from Hall for transmittal 12/6/63 to the Soviets, Among other things, this document set forth Hall's evaluation of President Johnson as follows. The CPUSA does have some basis of judging the possible course of this Administration although much about United States politics is unpredictable, It is ‘our view that Johnson has been in that section of "our" political spectrum that takes a more sane view of the relationship of world forces and will reflect this in his policies and attitudes, It is also "οὐ feeling that he may be even more responsive to the movements, pressures and moods of the masses than was Kennedy, Johnson is a man more moved ΄ towards the solution of the immediate problems and has less of an ey¢ for history and long-range viewpoints, He has a much broader viewpoint | of political struggles than Truman because Truman had the mentality and Ὁ outlook of a village political hack, Johnson has throughout the years retained a close personal friendship with many of the old New Deal core like Beanie Baldwin and Aubrey Williams and this may have some signifi- cance in the coming period of the Administration,’
Johnson will continue in the direction of the policies of the Kennedy administration, Johnson may try to utilize the newness of his Administration to get around some difficulties and binds into which the Kennedy administration had worked itself, i ΝΞ
"We" are proceeding on the premise that this Administration, ~
the
be influenced’by mass struggles and mass movements,
42299/- GSB
Vas ae ype |
EE gr [pe Le fephesen: ing American capitalism and “imperialist interests, can
Enc. acct, 12 ~id~ 63 Βέ £220°" 100: 4280 97 1 1 LEG: kin ἘΣ
or ἊΝ
tres κα στα
Memorandum to Mr, Sullivan RE: SOLO 100—428091
On 12/4/63 Hall advised NY 694-S* that in connection with "a broad electoral effort for 1964," Hall intends to give an individual in the Democratic Party the sum of $3,000 as a down payment for this person's working full time in the Democratic Party in 1964, Hall made no mention of this individual by name, It is possible that Baldwin could be the individual to whom Hall has reference as regards working within the Democratic Party and New Haven has been instructed to advise whether any information is available indicating that Baldwin might be
pe ame
said individual . This ma will be followed closely, we eninge? aabeue? Abia Bie ΑἹ ἀνά was employed by the pepartnent of Agriculture and
Foreign Economic Administration from 5/23/33 to 4/11/44, at which time he resigned to enter private business, He was formerly Executive Secretary of the Progressive Party and campaign manager £67 Henry Wallace in the 1948 presidential campaign, He is reported as having been a member of the CPUSA-in-the.1940's, as well as having been a wénber of or associated with communist front organizations in the . 1940's and 1950's. In late 1962*he was_placed on the pay roll of the_c:s, Party in view of his important contacts with "liberal and progressive people.” His job was to mold various “political alliances” designed
to influence the direction of foreign policy in the United States and the Party considered that to be the most important activity it had ndertaken in some time,,. *kaccording to Gus Hall
EUG Peesaee se
Calvin B, Baidwin, Jx., is an Executive Officer, National Institutes of Health, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, A full-field Security of Government Employees (SGE) investigation was conducted on him in 1951 based on his father’s connection with numerous Communist Party front organizations, Civil Service Commission advised in 1952 that he was "eligible on loyalty" and "retained." A supple- ental SGE investigation on Baldwin, Jr., Moen being conducted,
—
Between 1933 and 1943 Aubrey Will1iS Williams was employed by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, Works Progress Administra- tion and the National Youth Administration, Williams is President Emeritus of the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Incorporated __ (SCEF), the successor organization of the Southern Conference for Human Welfare which was cited by the House Committee on Un-American Activi- ties aS a communist front, SCEF is an interracial group in the South composed of communists and noncommunists, It is currently under inves- tigation as a suspected communist front, Williams has been associated
ith a number of communist fronts in the past,
“Eee tsabes
RECOMMENDATION: That the attached letter be forwarded to the Honorable Walter W, Jenkins, Special As ant to the President, ,
A “ἢ ΨΩ |
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AUTOMATIC
DECLASSTEICATION GOIDE
BY COURIER SYC, 2 1DEG2 9 COMM. EBI
Talson Belmont
Mehr Casper Callahan Conrad DeLoach Evans Gale Rosen Sullivan Tavel Trotter Tale, Room
Holmes 5 Gandy ἔς L.A RE ΝΑΙ nog fl TELETYPE UNIT | yo! ‘ ςς ἈΝ aNd £
i
ATE 12-23-2021
1 ὦ Liaison 1 =~ Mr. Kleinkauf
(IS) 100-423092 1... Hr. Shaw
Date: December 18, 1965
Toa: Director Bureau of Intellicence and Research Department of State
Front debn Edgar Hoover, Dircetor
Subject: INTERNATIONAL INSTIPUTE FOR peace [Ὁ ὁ VIENNA, AUSTRIA d Sele — TREOEMATION CONCERRENG os
CINTERNAL SECURITY)
The following information was Supplied by a source which has furnished reliable information in the past.
Misha Altoan, a former member of the Communist
Party, USA {CPUSA), from Hollywood, California, who is currently associated with the International Institate for Peace €2IP} in Vienna, Austrin, recently forwarded to the CPUSA for review a document ke had prepared entitied ᾿ ‘"Homorandum on Seme Problems of Work at the iInternational=: institute for Peace." There is set forth below a summary .. ΟΣ Altman's menorandum.
einjepecific region before they are exanined collectively.( The absence of democratic procedure is ἃ
=,
ave
ar ᾿ a oo
Bureau of Intelligence and Research Dopariment of State
7 Altman indicated that the following suggestions, Δ acted upon, would serve to stimulate the Tip's activitics.
Peace Organizations
in every country outside the “socialist camp” there is ἃ great vushrooming of a variety of peace organizations, By exploring the possibilitios of gome joint or parallel activities the ΤΙΡ could bronden dts direct contacts in many countries, especially the United States. An exchange of ideas with thess organizations would influence their pattern of thinking and ‘at the same tine establish the TIP as an organization actively interested in each and avery problem related to peace. The reservations existing in the minds of many gincere peacesconcerned people regarding the iP make 2 inperative thet the LIP demonstrate in practice its. willingness to participate in every valid sphere of peace activity,
Negro Movenent in the United States
The American Negre siovement has accepted the principle that injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere, The growing consciousrmess of his African horitage makes the American Negro ἃ natural aily οὐ tho African liberation movenent, In ordez to take advantaze of this altuation, the LIP should publish a series of reports on Aftien bringing inte focug the interderendence of thelr welfare and progress with disarmament and peace. Thareatter, the TIP should get these raports into the hands of organizations an. the United States where they can do the most good.
Labor
_ Organized lebor's involvement in tho peace movenent da the United States would be decisive in influencing United States foreign policy. The ITIP must endeavor to involve American workers and their unions in a free exchange of opinions and ideas. The reduction of intérnatioagi tengion produced by the test-ban agreenent gives the JIP an opportunity to undertake bold stéps in thie dixection, Small mectings of
ame
we Bom
φ φ
nfo Br
Divector Bureau of Intelladsonce and Research Department of State
second echelon union officlais organized by the TIP would denonstrate that Le is dinceroly occupies with the probiens of labor and 16 not using those problena as a canoufinco for some ultorlor notive.
Lobin Anerien ond the United States
Wore and more Americans are becening aware of tha drcadiul conditions oxioting in oll of Latin America. Tho TIP must seok tho cooperation of pcoples of North and Sonth Amorica who can mako a valuable contribution to tho success of Latin America's straccle araingst Anerican idopordaliss.
The most valuable armument in favor of such cooperation should bo sont to peace comittecs in Latin Anerica, Waterdal fron the JP showid alse be sent to peace groups in the United States which ara most likely to be intorcsted in the probiens of
Latin Anerica, Yt should show tha oxisting conditions in
Latin 4nerico and point out how these conditions endanrer
peace, using Cuba as a cleax exanpie,
Cultura and Peacs
fho invaluable role of culture is woll recorded by past history as a powerful mediw: for evoking in man an abhorrence of destruction, Severol cultural procvrans for peace were submitted to the TIP over the past two years but wore not adopted mainly by reason of tha lack of finances. Shroo of tho many projects submitted included "Music for Poaco," dosirmod to briny a moscane ef Iricnadship inte Anerican honda without uttering a word that could bo conctrucd aS pronpamanda fos ony particular govornnont; “Berlin Now," ἃ Elin providins a dramatic presentation of the dannorc inhoront in the Berlin probiens and “World with War προ, ἢ designed to give peace workers a potent arguucat for disaxuancat and poaca.
nove classified this communication ' .
1 = Director Central TIntallicence Agcnucy
Attention; Denuty Director, Plans
Heceuse of the sensitive nature of cur soures, wo Op Seed."
Γ
. . a
Bureau of Intelliscneo and Research Department of State
Director
NOTE:
‘Clacoificd 2@ Spi" because unauthorized disclosuro of this ingorhation could veveal the identity ox the couree, who is of continuins valuc, and such revelation could result in excoptionaily crave danage to the Nobtien. Soureo is CG 5324-S* who obtained this material in carly Decenber, 1963, while on Sole Mission 14, Seo Chicago nirtel 12/9/68 captioned "Solo, IS ~ 0," which enclosed a 39=pace cony of Altman's menorandun,
ihe ck
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yy
a
r OPTIOHAL FQRM HO. τὸ ᾿ = ©} ᾿" Re. ὦ Tolsoa
UNITED STATES GOV: Belmont
Memoran ‘tum KUUTE IN ENViwUPE 2
Daten TO - Mr. W. C, sui DATE: December 20, 1963 ree 1 - Mr, Belmont Tan aes 1. Mr. Sullivan Trotter FROM : Mr. F. J, Baumgardner 1. Mr, Baumgardner Holmes xy 1 ~ Mr. Branigan Gandy " ΜῈΝ 1 ~ Mr, Shaw λ BJECT: te in foot “INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST Qe Ee»
I thought you would be interested in learning that the Soviets "ran for cover" when CG 5824.S* endeavored to obtain information concerning former Soviet Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, who was executed by the Soviets in April, 1963, for his alleged spying activities,
You will recall that CG 5824-S* was in the Soviet Union while on Solo Mission 14, 11/1/63 to 12/2/63, Prior to informant's departure on this mission he was given a target of attempting to determine whether Colonel Penkovsky in fact was tried; whether the trial was a hoax, and whether or not he may still be alive, Informant advised that during his confidential discussion with Soviet officials he had raised the matter of Colonel Penkovsky, but at the mere mention of his name, “they allran for cover," Informant noted that Soviet officials and citizens alike denounce Penkovsky and have stated that they cannot understand such an action in view of the fact that he was a native-born Russian, Among the officials, this is a subject which they do not wish to discuss in view of the fact there is a certain amount of fear involved in this matter. The Penkovsky case resulted in the removal of some persons in high places, mainly in the military and security forces, who had vouched for him.
fy. For Information, Since informant was not successful in obtaining any pertinent information concerning 1060-428091 Penkovsky no dissemination is being made, WES ich , «ὦ (6) if i
rd
uf Ae ng fe é JPET
| " 0b - 2 ROR - 3520 | Sal eee a . -REGS4 see pee 27,1983
΄ , ΡΞ αν τοῦ ΣΙΝ 7 4 1
Mohr
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE == TO : Mr. Conrad Oley DATE: December 23, 1963 =
Taye] Trotter Tele, Room
. Downing Holmes \we
: - OPTIONAL FORM ND, 10 S010—106 _ MAY 1942 EDITION 1 ΓΝ ht GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27 son } -*SUNITED STATES , se hee. SL
iil
Gandy —— ——__—. a
0) SINTRRNAL SECURITY - C B afb pia Ste . Bx. ΠΥ
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable Poof thes informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.
}
4 | | {
On 12/23/63, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland on scheduled times and frequencies at which time a message was sent.
The plain text of the message is set forth below. The cipher text is attached.
NR 759 GR 28
IN ACCORDANCE WITH BIRCH'S (Gus Hall) REQUEST YOU WILL BE ,
GIVEN THIRTY COLOUR PRINTS ($30, 000) IN THE FIRST HALF OF ἦ
JANUARY. {: Ἵ - ACTION:
For information.
art 1
Eaclosure
1 - Mr. Belmont 2- Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A, Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
δὺ WP:drv “ ὌΝ »- 3.52 Γ΄. ν ΝΣ , an - GO SA Gf om 95 <f i ye ἢ ἘΠῚ Cer Bel
- Pa wa . .
82782 64570 59191 93676 79327 47833 08413 17502 24339 68879 59110 83271 08301 56295 T1477 51848 11424 544380 T6736 05584 57136 29030 57174 98962 96818 47911 12464 64550
7 yoo v2 408! — 35 Af ENCLOSURE
---θ. --- .---......- .......,.---- .ς...- ee
----..--..-.......
“αν -ι--» οὐ a as Ba Ἢ . | ~ ROUTE IN.ENVELOPE — oa yee Ἂν ¢ ΕἸΣΒΡΩ͂Σ Ἂν TECLASSTFICATION AUTHORITY DRETVED FRON: ) FEI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION CUIDE 1 = Belmont DATE 12-78-2011 1 - Sullivan 1 - Mr, Baumgardner 1 - R, W. Smith 1 - Liaison 1 = Shaw Decenbeor 24, 1963 BY an ae a , WE - re Honorable John A, McCone κω PO Vv Director ° . \. big Ue 24. Central Intelligence Agepey— iyi ge me = Vashington, Ὁ. C, 0 Y pnd xz ὦ ἐ me Dear Hr, UcCone: Sore = =e The following ioformation was supplied in a
Decenber, 1863, by cources which have furdishad relisbie information in the past.
| According to an official of the Central Committec, Communist Party ef Czechoslovakia, the domestic situation in Czechoslovakia te greatly improved. Hillions of dollars’ worth of consweer goods have been purchased and ateres are now completely stecked with these goods. 4s a result,
there are no longer “lines or queues" outside stores as
has been the case in the past,
The above official stated, however, that the political situation 19 a.“mess.” He described the bureauc~- racy in the Geverament ac “gigantic,” but indicated that steps were being taken to icprove this situation. He atated that the Party leadership is “cleaning house" and bringing new people into the leaderahip.
In regard te Antonin Novotny, First Secretary of the Communiat Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Peoples Republic of Czechoslovakia, the above-mentioned Czech official stated that Nevotny's position is hot too secure and he is, in effect, on probation. ,
oe
ΓᾺΡ
Tolson Belmont
Casper [τ 11 Cenpad DaLoach Evane
Rowen WGS:kmy) WA
Teed yt. * 1B) YP Vee tole Rope Ven NR ΝΟ. rae CIN, noid
Pigs ἢ
Ἐν λα ΕΝ υκασασρσα
= $$ - ———_——
Η obing
FDS4 (Rév, 10-13-58) Date oben 3630. To ΠΣ Ἰρενθοῦου BU FILE # 10028091... Att. .. ΜΝ ᾿ USA ι . P, [I sac Title οὐ ΕΠ ΤΑ TONAT Γ-- ἸΑβΑΟ sevens κε vasacsesensenessasens Re LAL TONS [ls - [] toe , ReBULet to ‘Legat, ‘Paris, 12-11-59, Pe +S ΘΙ ΘΟ of Security-Type. Informetion L_ISE 4¢-Popetma-Agencies." (Ice . [—Isteno L_Iclerk
ACTION DESIRED
[| Acknowledge
Assign........Reassign.......... [_|Bring file
Call me [| Correct [| Deadline... sesesssssescsseeceeeseens |__| Deadline passed [| Delinquent [| Discontinue
— Expedite File
For information [J Initial & return
Leads need attention
Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.
On 12-23-63, the »riginal and one copy, of THM dated 12-19-63, at WDC,
forwarded with 301let 12- ed matter, were furnished t SAG... UEEAt, AWE. so sseseees See reverse side ΟΥ̓ οΘ....μμκμενν ccassene se censtsnenesrerensesarecy saaesnaes
Aa
[J Open Case
Prepare lead cards Prepare tickler Recharge serials
[_] Return assignment ς
[|__| Return file
[|__| Return serials
|__| Search and return
[ | See me
L___] Send Serials..............
TO wreceee
[| Submit new w charge-2 out
[1 Submit report by ... Type
captioned “Norman Fread
ἘΠῚ
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-~ te ey νη Nf
Honorable Join 4, lcCone τσ
In regard to the. United States, the Cgech official stated that efferte are being asde te establish hetter relations with that country, ;
Becauge of the sensitive nature we have classified this communication “fy information is being furnished to, other “inte of the ‘Moveramant.
" pinicorely jours,
Cleseizied “ig pers" because unauthorised dis- closure of this information could reveal the identity of
the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation, Source ‘is CG 6824-5¢, whe is referred te in'‘letter as ; "gources"” in erder τὸ. further pretect his identity. See: Chicago airtel 12/17/63 captioned "Solo, I8S-C" with enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled “Comments of Representatives
_ o£ ‘the International - Department, Central Committee, ‘Communist Party of Czechoslovakix, on Bonestic ‘Situation in Peoples
Republic of Czechoslovakia," CG 5824-8* obtained this infor- mation while on Sole Mission 14 from (First name unknown) . Chernik,. Deputy to the Head of the International Department, Central Committee, Communist: Party of Ceechasiovakia,
FD-36 (Rev, 12-13-56) "πὰ
aap - ᾿ δι 6
FBI
Date: 12/16/63 |
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ν. AEREEL REGISTERED ! (Priority or Method of Mailing) ii * a ee ~~ κέν... οὕ, ie a TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) ἤν 97) ine ee Ah FROM: (e NEW YORK (100-134637) μ᾽ gs Ἢ Tip. : A oN . Ν ia ἢ 2. SUBJECT: ' SOLO Ν᾿ ἀκ ὁ “ES-C yw A if! © pytte’
wel ix +
- ἢ ἃ Τῇ
᾿ς Ὁ
1-8 κἀς " (3/7 πυβεὰῦ (100-428091) (RM) . op 2225 ~ CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) (AM RM QOS yy v2 ΚΦ UBS A
ἢ ὍΝ ReNYairtel, 12/6/63, captioned, "SOLO; IS-C; ie ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, which enclose letter of GUS HALL, CPUSA, General Secretary, dated 12/5/63,
and NY airtel, 12/9/63, page 5 of which sets forth a message sent by GUS HALL regarding a suggested procedure for the organization of a delegation offNégro leaders to visit the Soviet Union. .
—
On 12/16/63, NY 694-S* received from the Soviets 7 two ciphered-coded radio messages. The first message advises’U/,’ NY 694-S* that his Soviet contact desired to meet him at the_- / "Armstrong" rendezvous on 12/17/63, at the usual time (6:00 p.m.) The message noted that the Soviets would then advise the informant of the opinion of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union regarding GUS HALL's letter of 12/5/63.
i
- NY 134-91 (inv) (41) - gay =
NY 100-84994 (GUS-HALL) (414) ἼΩΝ NY 105-36402 (ALEKSEI KOLOBASHKIN) [321) ἡ
- ΝΥ 100-134637 (41)
iL. 1 L 1 L 1
WGC:mfd (#41) (9)
if ‘Special Agent in Charge
NY 100-134637
The second message, which was addressed to GUS HALL, is set forth in plain text form as follows:
"Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations Ls sending to Rev. Galamison an invitation for seven persons, It is pointed in the invitation that the delegation will have a possibility to visit different places in the U.S.S.R. (not only in Uzbekistan) and to acqua&t itself in detail with the life of the Soviet people, Please take into account that Uzbek Society for Friendship and Cultural Relations which is instructed to receive the delegation may accept only seven persons as you were informed by us earlier, Our Washington Embassy have all instructions. In order to avoid any misunderstanding or complications with the meeting of the group, please inform us in advance oi the date of its departure and its itinerary,!'
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 Φ Φ
@NIZED STATES GOVERNMENT
“ Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE WE |
Casper
Evans
το : Mr. We. C. Sullivanyjc3, . pare: 12/19/63. .- W we sail dn 1 - Mr. Belmont aie From : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner L~ Mr, Sullivan Tele. Room A ἢ oe 1 ~ Mr. Baumgardner se lL - Mr. Branigan supyEcT: \SOLO Ll = Mr. Shaw φ a ERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST Ων }
officials have refused to acknowledge the presence in Moscow, Russia, of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster.
I thought you would be interested in learning that Soviet
You will recall that the late Elizabeth Terrill Bentley, | former Soviet espionage courier, identified Silvermaster as a Soviet agent who headed an underground espionage group of Government employees in the Washington, Ὁ, C. ~ New York City area in the late 1930's and early 1940's,
CG-5824-S*, while on Solo Mission 14 in the Soviet Union during November, 1963, learned that Silvermaster was visiting Moscow on a tourist visa. While in Moscow, Silvermaster attempted to arrange an appointment and hold some discussions with responsible officials in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). However, CPSU officials would not meet with him or even acknowledge his . presence in Moscow, Silvermaster contacted Henry Winston, Vice- i Chairman, Communist Party, USA, who is temporarily residing in ἔ Moscow,..for the_purpose of having Winston utilize his influence in. ~/ arranging a meeting for him with CPSU officials. Winston. attempted / to arrange such a meeting but met with no success. Winston was unable to.understand how a man like Silvermaster who had devoted much of his life to the Communist Party could not even see a CPSU official when visiting Moscow,
CG 5824-S* was of the opinion that the action of CPSU officials in refusing to meet with Silvermaster was‘ part of the Soviets’ total effort not to take any action which might jeopardize the continuing development of better reiations between the Sovset Union and the United States. | iy’ Ν
OBSERVATION: REC 38 pga- F Ὁ gods BS au
We have previously advised the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency of the fact that Silvermaster was
scheduled to visit the Soviet Union. ποόστ κπάντον ἀκκρασκοιυο ba, ENC yt-teet ce — Dy bP | 4 DEC 80 1961 Wey 100-428091 | | .
WGS:erc Vv
65 ARN ? ἢ δὲ
---
RECOMMENDATION :
τ
Memorandum to Mr. W. ©. Sullivan RE: SOLO 100~-428091
That the attached letter containing information concerning the refusal of Soviet officials to meet with Silvermaster be sent to Newark, which is office of origin in the Silvermaster case, for its information looking toward a possible interview of Silvermaster when he returns to the United States. ΜΕ “AF 70 ΦΆΘ, 2.7 RACOMMAMOATLIANMS +
A
ae ie ἥ a 4 head ἣ»
t ¥ That the attached letter to Department of State with copy to the Central Intelligence Agency go forward to advise those agencies of the fact that Silvermaster was known to have been in
Moscow during November, 1963. W& are not disseminating information
re Silvermaster's activities in Moscow as to do so would jeopardize security of our informant.
FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-568)
I | Φ @ | |
FBI 7
|
Date: 12/23/63 |
|
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᾿ AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
Vi (Priority or Method of Mailing) Ι ἂῳὧο--- ee ee ee a ee ee Lee ..... 4 HY TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) ( {i} FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) , {0 SUBJECT: | SOLO =C
ReNY airtel to Bureau, captioned as above, dated 12/9/63, reflecting on page four thereof that GUS HALL had sent a message to Moscow advising that circumstances compelled him to request that an emergency amount of $50,000 be sent to the CPUSA before the first of
the year. /
On 12/23/63, NY 694-S* received, via radio from Moscow, a ciphered coded message, the plain text of which { | is as follows: " :
"In accordance with Gus Hall's request you will be given $30,000 in the first half of January."
γὰδν μὰ 3 Bureau (100-428091) (ray ΓΔ = Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (RM)
1 - NY 234-91 (Inv) (41) ar a
),, a ag lm J igh Ὶ 1 ~ NY 100-134637 038 700 nee BIAS ACB:mm1 20 (7) ι τ SEE
as ΩΝ ) ἰῪ ΩΣ ἊΣ Pa Approved: _.-_-_ ee —“(té‘CSeent NN Μ Ρεῖ
er ray SyeGiel Agent in Charge EE JAW ὁ ue
OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 Φ ©
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE 3 --
an
Evans TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan I pare: December 24, 1963 ΞΕΞῚ ἢ Sullivan
Tavel
Va : Mr, Ἐς J, Baumgardn Tel. Room Gandy Oo ὃς Ἐ TERNAL es
an
SECURITY - COMMUNIST
This is to advise of contact made by CG 5824-S* with the First Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Moscow, Russia, during Solo Mission 14, This contact resulted in the setting up of liaison petween the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and the Polish United Workers Party (PuwPy* through the Polish Consulate in Chicago, Illinois,
Fe Conmumwmer~ tune δ GPlowp i ΣΝ
CG 5824-5*, in November, 1963, while in Moscow, had occasion to make contact with the Polish Embassy. He spoke with the First Secretary of the Embassy concerning liaison activities between the CPUSA and the PUWP, Informant pointed out that the PUWP representa- tive who had been carrying on liaison activities with the CPUSA through the Polish Consulate in Chicago had recently been called back to Poland for reassignment, The First Secretary stated that this was correct and that this individual was presently assigned to the Foreign Ministry Oifice in Warsaw, Poland, Informant pointed out that the CPUSA was hesitant concerning who at the Consulate should now be contacted: on Party matters, The First Secretary indicated that the new replacement in Chicago would be the proper person, and further agreed that Jack Kling, a functionary of the CPUSA Illinois District, would be a satis-/ factory person to carry on liaison activities at the Consulate, | ἢ
ACTION: «
For information. No dissemination is being made of this information since it pertains to the administration of the highly clandestine Solo apparatus controlled by our informant,
ae ω or
\ 100-428091 Adi
1 —- Mr. Belmont ‘ - ΝΣ. Sullivan
Me. Baungardner Mr, Re Ws ‘Smith ᾿ Mr, Shaw αι ὙΠ}
bet ped bet Jd it ot
-
22 DEC 30.1969
WGS;: km i ed OU τς σελ (Go JA ᾿
”
,. _ ‘ROUTE IN ENVELOP.
Date: 12/16/63
- , 13-1 3688 FO Pad δον J2 1386}
κι a?
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νι... ATRTER δ τ᾿ REGISTERED MAIL (Priority or Method of Mailing)
mm se ee ee ee eee ee eee ee ee eee ee eS .-- -..-
A το: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
} ᾿ as SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) 6 O Ἵ ΤΣ
In accordance with Bureau instructions set forth in Buairtel dated 5/14/63 captioned as above, there are enclosed herewith for the Bureau the original and three copies of a letterhead memorandum entitled "MISCHA ALTMAN." One copy of above is also enclosed for New York.
The information set forth in the enclosed letter- head memorandum was furnished by CG 5824-S* on 12/10/63 to 7 SAs WALTER A, BOYLE and RICHARD ἢ, HANSEN, a 4
The information in the enclosed letterhead ΐ | memorandum was obtained by the source during the period 11/20-22/63 in conversation with HENRY WINSTON, a Vice Chairman of the Communist Party, USA temporarily residing in Moscow, USSR,
classified " TY since it sets forth information furnished hb 24.5*, a most highly placed sensitive
source who is furnishing information on the highest level concerning the international communist movement, the dis- a closure of which would tend to identify this source and wa thus adversely affect the national defense interest.
. \ sna Kody τὸ {CLOSURE ον. ΒΕ 33 “296 ~ fen 5.’ oa B52] 3 Bureau (inc, 4) (RMD “ 1 - New York (100-134637) (Enc. 8} (Info) (RM)
1 - Chicago 22 BEC 80 196
The enclosed Letterhead memorandum has been pee
eer Geeendchiant
μὰς ῃ . 6
WAB: b11 ἢ ΣῊΝ rn ἰὼ 6 4 , Jp Os 1 Gy (le
ΓᾺ f\ | Ἶ μὰν ' κα i \ Wane ΑἹ Approveds,, 3% Sent MOP SEMAINE: a EE Be wf
whee
CG 134-46 Sub B
The enclosed letterhead memorandum has been shown as having been made at vashington, D.C., in order to further protect this source,
Bh AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE DATE 123-2011 .
Φ Φ ᾿ ~
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
In Reply, Please Refer to Washington, D.C,
ΤΉ Ne,
December 16, 1963
τὸν Seca MISCHA ALTMAN
During December, 1963, a sayrce, who has furnished
reliable information in the past, advised as follows: δ᾿ ΝΠ bw
During November, 1963, Henry! Winston, a_Vice__ Chairman of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA) temporarily residing in Moscow, USSR, furnished the following information:
Misch# Altman, a former member of the CPUSA, Holly- wood, California, currently associated with the World institute
in the United States,
According to Winston, Altman had a heart attack, is now recovering, and at present he is unemployed. He has indicated to Winston that he wants some recognition for the work that he has done, Winston noted that Altman will be going home soon (presumably to the United States) and will meet Winston in Prague, Czechoslovakia, during December, 1963,
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
ee ἢ,
' 4 act ΓῚ ᾿
DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: :
FEI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE 1 - Liaison DATE 12-29-2011 1 - Mr, Wannall
4 1... Plecetor REC, 5, τ γὼ 22 ~~ ep» “ ~ E eo al Ccntral Entelligonee L5enecy 2 / Oo one “4 fo ὦ ἢ . E uz Attention: Doputy Dixceter, Plans ,, peg 2718S | 3 29 NOTE: ——— a Classified "Comfttenttet" because disclosuré of this information to unauthorized persons would jeopardize the source, who is furnishing information on a top-level Telson basis concerning the, international communist movement, Belmont Source is CG 5824-S*, See Chicago airtel 12/19/63 “Solo, Caspar eget ce TNE “oe ΕΝ : “ΗΝ Callahan NOTE CONTINUED eee pee : Dele PAGE TWO cule + “7 Rosen ν ‘ns and ἧι. ᾿ Sullivan WGS : mj Ὑ} (Ne ee NO Holmes ᾿
Gandy
1 - Mr, Shaw
(35) 1006320091
Dates Decesber 27, 1963 GOs Bircevor Yuvean of Zntclligenee and Kecearch Ropericont of Peate ae OD Soo ΤΟΣ: john Tdenar σόν, Diroctor Ne
Subject; ΟΣ, ΤΣ ΠΣ PROPAGANDA VALLES
= mer Bp ἢ aay 30 hits Ui ban Hey Van eee
fe followine information was supplied by 2
couveo wao hes furniched rollablio informvtion in the "Ὁ PLS. f Chincos Communist proparendn iccued by the f
Foveion Loncmarc Bross, Posing, Caine, whieh wat foriarly | noticed to the Waited States dircetly zron Pohiag, is | currently boinc voeclved in the Unitod Otates bearing
tho postmav: of London, England, Tac Chincso Communists
have apparently set uo mailing seeiidiics in Grout Britain
in ovder that they can havo ἃ botter chaneo of cotting
thely propaganda to recipients in the United Statcs, 4 6. 2 Ξ
i MAIL ROOM L_} revetype unit Ll
a e e
co TAL
Director Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State
NOTE (Continued):
IS-C" which discloses that Chinese Communist propaganda being received from a drop operated by CG 5824-5S* is Mow postmarked London, England, whereas this propaganda had formerly been mailed directly from Peking, China,
ὶ
| from Solo Mission 14 to the Honorable Walter W. Jenkins, Special
| eat
Mohr Cas Memorandum ome DeLoac Evans ale rs TO ‘ Mr. W. C. sulin DATE: December 20, 1963 ae oy Boe FRO F. J. Baumgardne te} La “ef 1 Ν ἢ... Gandy t " : | Accysen x β ERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST e
ἀπ - a , -
x +h OPTIONAL FRM NO, 10 3010-108 "νιν ¥ MAY 1942 EDITION “ "Gia GEN. REG. NO. 27 Ἐ- Tolson
- UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Belmont
The attached memorandum, F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan dated 12-18-63, sets forth information concerning some of the admin- istrative activities of CG 5824-S* while abroad on Solo Mission 14, 11-1-63 to 12-2-63, including informant's request of the Soviets that the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), be given the sum of $1,295,000 to cover an expected deficit of that amount in its 1964 budget. The Director noted, "Have we sent Jenkins a memo on above?"
W ¢ have diss eminated select items_of an.intelligence nature
Assistait<to the Presidents Further, we included the information o which the Director referred in the brief which.he used recently
to talk to President Johnson. Normally, we do not disseminate details pertaining-to the administration of this extremely clandestine Solo apparatus ‘as it would jxoxirdie the security of this valuable operation. If the Director believes that we should go beyond what he said in his conversation with President Johnson to disseminate the referred to financial transaction to Mr. Jenkins, it is suggested that it may be well to have it done orally through Assistant Director DeLoach. However, if the present dissemination of the material is sufficient, no further action feed be taken.
ACTION: For the information of the Director. i
Enc. ih Cd: 100-428091 44) ff } f
1 - Mr. Belmont ia ᾧ f if 5}, 1 - Mr. Sullivan tt a 23% ’ al 1 - Mr. Baumgardner fl0-¢ 2295 g | hy 1... Mr. Shaw ΠΕ. 13 παν σσανον πτ ΄ ἐ a 22 pec 82,1969 ἵ ‘a WGS skmj :pwdel" ἴ ι
(5) Ϊ Yee me eS Jan 7 1sR°
"te
1-Mr, Be lnont Trotter FROM : Mr, F, J, Baumgardner ΩΣ 1-Mr, Sullivan ieee Ae Δι Baumgardner .. Gandy i-Mr , Shaw \ SUBJECT: SOLO \ bi Ww INTERNAL SECURITY — COMMUNIST .
yr
ΡῈ πο
__ OPTIONAL FORM KO, 10 © Δ olson on UNITED STATES GOVERNM®NT ᾿
bt.
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE 2
TO ' Mr. W. Ὁ, sur fSyen PATE: December 18, 1963 ἘΞΞ ἘΠ -6“ἷ ¢
° ‘This is to advise of some of the activities of CG 5824-S* while abroad on Solo Mission 14, 11-1-63 to 12-2-63, and in particu- lar informant's request of the Soviets that the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), be given the sum of $1,295,000 to cover an expected deficit of that amount in its 1964 budget.
-
ποπάοῃ,. England
Informant arrived in London on 11-2.63 and proceeded directly to the Czech Embassy to obtain his visa, The Embassy was closed, and it took considerable time before informant was able to attract the attention of some clerks inside the Embassy. However, Czech officials quickly came to the Embassy and issued a visa to informant, On departure from London on 11-4-63, informant noted that British Customs now on a regular basis checks departures from Great Britain in compliance with a new regulation which forbids the ‘taking from the country an excess of 50 English pounds, This checking” ‘procedure caused informant some concern because it repre- sented ἃ dual checking by British authorities both on arrival and departure: from the country,
~Prague, Czechoslovakia
τ Informant arrived in Prague on 11-~4-63 and was greeted ” by Czech officials, who discussed political matters in Czecho-
slovakia, Informant also had an occasion to contact Norman Freed,
* Cahadian CP representative to the "World Marxist Review," theoretical
organ of the international communist movement, who furnished details relating to difficulties existing on the staff of the "World
win CLOSURE
* Marxist Review," rl
Ga Moscow, Russia pec 8 DO - “τοῦ, mm 25 ἢ
Informant was warmly greeted by Soviet officials upon his arrival in Moscow on 11-6~63, He was given lodging in a new
pee ot ς..
of the Soviet Union (CBSt) ;'for the housing of special guests, At this Location he was provided with an apartment containing a short- wave radio, a safe, library, television as well as full-time attendants.
100 .-428091
WGS: Wi 5)
|
Ϊ
Memorandum to W,C,Sullivan RE: SOLO 100428091
Shortly after his arrival, informant was told that he was to be a special guest at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU scheduled for that evening, However, due to his late arrival this would not be possible, (This meeting is one held annually on the eve of the November 7 celebration at which a main CPSU policy address is given.)
On the following day, informant was taken to Red Square to review a parade in celebration of the Russian revolution, It was arranged for the protection of informant that he be assigned to view the parade with a group of Soviet nationals a short distance from the reviewing stand occupied by Soviet Premier Khrushchev, Informant advised that the military portion of this parade was extremely brief, possibly not in excess of ten minutes, According to the Soviet official who accompanied informant, the only new military item displayed in the parade was an antimissile missile recently reported as having been developed by the Soviet military forces,
Request of Soviets Regarding Financial — Assistance for the CPUSA
Informant prepared and presented to Soviet officials an 8-page document dealing with the request for financial assistance to the CPUSA, This document was addressed to Premier Khrushchev and the CPSU. It pointed out that the CPUSA was not squandering money and the amount being requested was carefully considered, It noted that the legal defense of the CPUSA; the planned establish- ment of a dailypaper; plans related to the forthcoming 1964 election; expanded work in the South; assistance to the CP of Puerto Rico; and other matters would require financial assistance to the CPUSA in the amount of $1,295,000, It was noted that this sum represented only the deficit in the contemplated 1964 CPUSA budget, The document concluded with the comment "We, in the CPUSA, did not want to ask you for this but we have had to do it,"
Soviet officials assured informant that this request would be given serious consideration, but no decision as to how much the CPSU would give the CPUSA could be made until after 12.15.63, which was the deadline by which all fraternal Parties were to submit financial requests, Informant was advised that the CPUSA would be advised through channels as soon as a decision was made on its request for financial aid,
- 2.
ῷ Fa a Ἔν “- - oof τ ~
- Α a. 17 + = ° ° Φ 8 ‘ ‘
Memorandum to W.C,Sullivan RE: SOLO 100-428091
Comment: The CPUSA requested $1,000,000 from the Soviets for 1963, and to date has received $577 ,600, which is the largest amount the CPUSA has received in any one year.
Informant then brought up the urgent need for the CPUSA to be given emergency funds of $25,000 before the end of the year to cover defense expenditures, Informant was advised that this request would be approved and the $25,000 sent to the CPUSA through channels within a very short time,
ACTION:
For information, Appropriate dissemination has been made of pertinent items relating to informant's mission,
[ricer
-
- IBC L
ASSTPICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FEI LATE
AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION CUIDE LE-84-2011
Tolson —_ Belmont Mohr Casper Callahan Conrad DeLoach
Evens
Gale ' Rosen
Sullivan
Pavel
ἣν ΞΕ ae ἐν | Ge A coy { ΜΕ TELETYPE unit L_] »»Ἅ»Ἅ»»Ἅ.....
Pecenber 26, 1063
1 - Mr. Shaw
Airtel
To: SAC, Chicago (134-46 Sub B) rere ὦ 5 . From: Director, FBI αὐδϑαδδοοι) B35 3 Ο
SOLO INTERNAL SECURITY = C
Ro New Yor airtel 12/23/63 (copy to Culearo) which pertains to a documentary film nade in the Soviet Union on the life and death of Willian Z, Yoster,
Roairtel discloses that CG Go2deB% viewed the film on Foster while in the Soviet Union, On the occasion of your next regular contact with CG §524-S*, 1% is requested that you obtein @rom informant oll portinent information por- taining to the film, You ghould cover such itens as Longth of filn; whether black and white or color; and whether the Soviets ave idontified as the producers of the film, You should also obtain informant's assessment of the fiin,
Renirtol alse diselescd that Gua Hall hed ποῦ» tioned thet be bad secon this vilm and considered i¢ “"torrible,"” You should alse endeavor to ascertain fron informant the roason why Hall did not approve of it.
i = New York (100-134637}
NOTE:
CG 5824-S* during his recent Solo Mission learned that two copies of a documentary film prepared in 1961 by the Soviets on the life and death of William Z, Foster, former CPUSA Chairman,
had been transmitted to the CPUSA. New York was instructed on 12/20/68 to determine from CG 5824-S* if informant could obtain
a copy of the film for perusal by the Bureau, Informant contacted
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE TWO
ν \ Ul
oe yr
Airtel to Chicago RE: SOLO 100~428091
NOTE (Continued):
Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, in this regard but could obtain no information except that Hall mentioned he had seen
the film and considered it "terrible." Informant mentioned since he had seen this film while in the Soviet Union he would have no reason now to request that the film be made available to hin, Chicago is being instructed to ascertain from CG 5824-5* per~ tinent details relative to the film,
FBI
FRAC LASS
FEI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICSTION GUI: MATE GL-
FICATION AUTHORITY PERTVED FROM:
Date: 12/23/63
04-2012
Transmit the following in
—— oo
κῶν ΔῊ δὰ ' " , “δῷ " “2.2 232 ΜΝ - ΖΞ βαϊο δι ἴαθο. Δ58ο91) (am ξῦυ τὰ Qa
(Type in plain text or code)
AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing) Ι Ο.Ἂ-,.....................--.-.-᾿-ς................... Lo TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637)
O SUBJECT: \ SOLO =¢
Re telephone call on 12/20/63, from Mr. FRED BAUMGARDNER of the Bureau to ASAC DONALD E, RONEY of the NYO concerning the Bureau's interest in a documentary film made in the Soviet Union on the life and death of WILLIAM Z, FOSTER.
Re also Chicago airtel to Bureau, dated 12/17/63, captioned as above, advising that, according to CG 5824-S*, Pate” a copy of said film had been transmitted to the CPUSA from a the Soviet Union in the late summer or early fall of 1963, i’ by ROSE WEINSTOCK, and that a second copy also had been transmitted to the CPUSA, the time and circumstances of said transmittal being uikknown to CG 5824=8S*,
On 12/21/63, CG 5824-S*, who was in NYC on that ν΄
date, advised SA ALEXANDER C,. BURLINSON that he could furnish ¥»
no further information regarding the aforesaid film except
that GUS HALL had mentioned that he had seen this film andy“: .
considered it "terrible," Ἷ " ἡ
a
- Chicago (134-46 Sub B) (RM) 1 - ΝΥ 66-6989 | 1 ~ NY 100-134637
ΙΝ | | ACB: mm1 a .λ υ Ui a 3 ππν (7) } yA ERY δ ᾿ LA NENG A "ἡ i : , ᾿ ζὰ ΣΝ gk er gee \ ys Clasdhitl καῖ ὶς ονθτ mY) oe ἡ περ ποιοί: ὑπ δ | Pa aac <= yy . wok ON, ε. ᾿ τὴν ον Approved: — Ee Sent .. Μ᾿ Β6ὲ
ΝΕ , Special Agent in Charge , ( \org ma MwA eK χὰ ἙΝ ἘΚΉ
NY 100-134637
CG 5824-S* stated that he has no idea in whose possession the film now is. He said that, having viewed this film while in the Soviet Union, he would have no reason now to request that the film be made available to him especially since it is known in the CPUSA that σα 582i-s* had viewed the film in the past.
At this time, CG 5824.S* stated, he can offer no constructive suggestion regarding how the film might be made available to the Bureau. He mid he would be alert, however, to take advantage of any situation that may arise, as a result of which he may be able to make the film available to the Bureau.
NYO will also be alert to ascertain how the above- mentioned film may be made available to the Bureau,
SRC LARBSIPICAT
FE
OH AUD THORET TS DERIVED FRGAT τ - -- ΜΝ τΞ- ---Ξ Ξῷο -
τὰ
AUTOMATIC
JECLASSIFICATION Guild
Εν
4 13.58.20
Ag
ge 60
| D Rourr ὃ ANVELOPE
BAC, Los Angeles (100-21198) Director, FRE (100-370750)
JOHN EOWARD LAWSON SECURITY MATEER = Ὁ
Information hes been recently received from CG 5924-S° indicating that the Seviets plan te publish a hoak of Clifford Odets, a United States author and play- wright. Since Odets has severed his connections with the Communist Party (CP) and has been attacked as a "stool pigeon," the Soviets do not want to take any action without first receiving the approval of the CP, USA, Therefore, it was requested that this matter be taken up with Jdhn Howard
ὌΞΟΣ,
In view of the above, you should remain alert for any additional information indicating that Layson has been contacted relative to this matter,
The above date received fran CG 5824-86 is being furnished for your information and you are cautioned that extreme care must be exercised with respect to any dis- pemination of this data as the information, by its natura, tends to identify the ingormant, Unless this informaticn is obtained from ἃ source other than CG 5824-86, it should not be included, even in pi ased fora, in the investi- gative section of © report. wee
ORIGINAL FILED ἘΝ oe SO POE TD — 3) G
NOTE:
Subject on Security Index, He has been a Leading CP member in the Cultural Section of the Party in Los Angeles for more than 20 years. He returned to thia country in May, 1963, after a stay of approximately two years in the Soviet Union, where he reportedly wrote a book the film industry for publication in the Soviet Union, {Shortly after his return to the United States, subject met with Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, and gave Hall a complete report on his activities wnile in the Soviet Union. CG 5824-3° obtained information set forth in letter in mid=-Novomber, 1963, from Aleksei Gre- chukhin, an official of the CP of the ee Union, See Chicago Η"
airtel “goons "Solo, 1.0, ἐδ oY 2-40 Fin 8091), (Sol y δ J, eon my
bee: REGORN? =
ν 1963 (8) YY
ἐν, ve —t σι μ΄ ΝΣ ΝΣ .) 7 . | | ‘ , ἕ mi re nyt meng eee ᾿ , fo ROUTE IN ENVELOPE ᾿ -. W. δ. Sullivan * yayeases Ἐν R. Yannali i - felltven 1 - Baungardner AMBA LOUISE STRONG L.= Shaw “4 THYERRAL SECURITY - CHINA 1 - Wannall Ae 1 - Bush!
CG 5824-S*, Bureau's highly placed informant, was advised by YQ Boris WN. Fonomarev, head of International Department, Central Committee, * Communist Party of fovist Union, that subject who prerantly resides in Communist Chiua may have’ been working om bhebalf of Chinese Conmuniets ! spainst Soviets as early as θόρε, 5
ὃς Panomarev prefaced following temarks te informant with “ "You'll never believe iti" Subject was formerly married to Soviet S General Michacl Boredin who in 1923 was sant by Lenta to halp SUN Yat-se organize a Chinese goverment. Borodin and Strong bad a son wha re:ided : in Moscow wider name Borodin. Soviets waste wnavare of identity of young Borodin's mother. He subsequently became a colensl tm Soviet Ν Secret Folice. Upon orders of Stelin, aubject was deported from USSR Ηὶ in 1940's and thereafter, Seviets discovered she maintained secret ἢ apartment in Hoscow which she shared with her son. 4 number of diarier were discovered which disclosed subject*s son was responsible for subjeog obtaining numerous visas enabling her to travel in and out of USSR. Stalin orddre€- rGb}dévas son, Colonel Boredd#l26dbanxecuted. :
ΠΗ͂Σ Ἔκ τὼ ὁ: intrigued by subject's διενβαξφουπέςει in the 1940's precicted as ihavitable the current SinolSevietlipatt. Penonerev
speculated possibly subject was involved in ChidereBanegdgdnerfer more then twenty years. i + Shaw 1 - Yennall
Anna Loulse Strong, a Security Index kubjBuehlis presently 78 years of age. fhe resides in Coumunist Ching and is a prolific writer of pro-Chinese Commmint prepaganda. She has stated her intention - is to spend last ten years cf her life in China. Hex procomsuniet activities date back to 1918, In 1932 by her own adwission she entered inte a common-law marriage with Jool Shubin, e Soviet official now deceased. Data furnished by Panozarev is ‘Pah bgisation of Strong's
100-7888 ( | Sor nEcoRDE® ) ory 1968 ( } 100-428 ΧΑ (sole) ΟΝ
[ἸΏ ARE N δ᾽ 1068 ὍΝ πον ET
ai ἧς ΓΝ \ A Ἵς κ᾽ v
Memorandum to W. ¢. Sullivan Re: ἈΝΑ LOUISE STRONG 106-7866
. there romantic liaison with Borodin bit/is ample evidence subject and Borodin vere closely ezsociated in Soviet Union during 1920's publishing Moscow Baily News." |
Boredin was a Russian revolutionary et an early age. Prior te 1917 he was in U. 8. vhere he married a Russian University student. When the Russian czar was overthrown, Borodin and his family returned.to Russia. In 1923 he ware sent to China to assist Chinese Nationalists in orgaeizing a political party. patterned on Soviet Communist Party. Borodin incurred Stalin's displeasure and wee recalled to USSR in 1927. According to Moscow news service, Berodin died in 1952.
While Panomarevbrevelations ere startling, they could possibly be accurate. Nevertheless, data should not be disseminated outside Bureau as unauthorized disclosure would point inevitably to CG 5824-S* and his life could be forfeited. ‘hile it is true, calculated riske must be taken by disseminating information of vital interest to other agencies obtained from CG 58624-5% when information is of ne practical value to anyone else, it should not be disseminated. Subject ia in Conmunist China and not accessible to efther the Stete Department or Central Intelligence Agency. If she evar returns to Ὁ. 8., which now eeemns doubtful, Buresu would hendle investigetion.
RECOMMENDATION :
Information furnished by Panomarev regarding Serong __ and Borodin not be disseminated. We will:raintain the information in file for possible use then:dnd if subject raturne to U. 3. /
7 DERIVED FRG:
ITOMATEG DECLASSTF CATION GUIDE ; ΝῊ Ν ᾿ | ον ' ᾿ . ἃ. eo, oN ; : spent é #, m= . OAT we ad “ἜΝ «--.... December 8, 1963 BY LIAISon Ἂς Lm Mr, Belmont Low dr, Evang 'Y Honorabte Walter W. Jenking 1 ~ Mr. Deloach 25: ΣΟΘΌΣΩΣ Assistant io tne President ΟἽ = Hr, Sullivan The White House
| Low Mr, Baumgardner Washington, DC 2S Wr, Wannall
| κων aee Bla ~ Mrs Re OH Smith Dear Me. Jenting:-. (bees PR Lm Mr? Stat
ς nr Zendk Wegner’, “al ofeseiaiis the 4 Cepertnent ᾿ pentvad Comaittee, Comm
uxnished sees Comments to most sensitive sources = of this Baroan cohcernt 3 nt
| 1G: FRAIng the caches of. récently Ξ discevered on the beaches of Yenezuole ay 2
The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia hag 6 verified that the arne Shinmontiy discovered on the =
beaches in Yonezueln, were, in fret, Shipped Fron Cuba, This matter Was handled in ἃ clunsy, uncoordin : and, ag αὶ FOBUIE, aiiitons OF dollarg Worth of 4] = - Lost, © Cubans did Not Consult with the Czecha oy the role Russians on these shi Ἐ ᾿ '
| ! POCNES and, as ἢ, natter of fact, ἢ the Coechs aud Russians do no οἰ -» mast . Ming with ; See uetans. The Czechs es “ slang are Very disturbed Concerning the ae \e | handling Of these shipnen 8 of arus by. the Cubans to | \5 ΓΌΩΝ the communiat terrorists in Venezuela sf \ |
ι Becauge of the Sensitive nature of ony Sources, a which have Ὁ ed
| Brnished reliahie tnformatiog in the past, wa
a have classizied this communication ἡ ΩΣ ἱι.- ' z A ς, ε a - “4 ; ; A _ Sincerely y 96 “0 ψᾷ SISA
. Y [200-228001 | xX ,
Belmont . τ ᾿ y " ,
om es SEE NOTE PAGE wo 7 f/ ᾿ ἐξ τ
conted πτπτ WGS sere ἰ a fe! ‘
sme CO) oly’ 3
Rese το τ- Excluded Hon autona ts
fod cowngradihk and οι
τῶ BET) Ε C Ὁ β 1963 declass acdation |
Gandy “ ΠΠ᾿ MAIL ποομΐ τ TELETYPE unrr {_] mee!
Tlonewabis Veltor VW. dentrins
Loss:
Cigsaaziod “Ets γάρ" booms uncsuthorinod dacclesurs of this infornation esuld roveal the identity
οὐ tho Deare), Wao io of eoutinuins valuo, and θοῦ euvolation could rosule in oxeoptiennlly crave demacvsa to
the Ustien, Hoo mene Bourcardner te Vv. GC. Sullivan 12/17/63 enptiencd “Lolo, Internal Security ~ C,” HESrij, and Chicaeyn τὴ οἵ, 12/11/03, also boarins the Cola cantion.
AQ
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Talson Belmont Mohr Casper Callahan Con:
Tele. Room
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Legat, Ottawa
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ROUTE IN ENVELOP..
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Director, PBI (100-428091)
ΟΝ ΒΤ Panty, USA BATION RELATI INTERNAL wepRy OHS
There a: eng) hemorandum classified Freed" which relates t
You may fur to your source in the
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12-18-63
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ROUTE IN ΕΝ ΙΟΡΙΝ
ΕΘ ΙΕ ἘΣΤΟΝ ΤΊΤΟΝ AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: ἨΒῚ AUTOMATIC DECLASS IFICATION GUIDE RATE 1 ἔτ ΣῈ} 1}
Recenber 19, 196
NORMAN FREED
The following information, supplied by sources which have furnished reliable information in the past, is being brought to your attention as a matter of possible interest,
Nornan Frecd continues to serve in Prague, Czechoslovakia, as the Canadian Communist Party repre- sentative to the “World Marxist Review," theoretical organ of the international communist movement. Freed was scheduled to visit Indonesia during December, 1064, for the purpose of giving a lecture on the Canadian Communist Party. Although Freed had planned to return to Canada during October, 1963, it is not anticipated that he will return to Canada until the early part of 1964,
Recause of the sensitive nature of our cources, it is requested that the contents of thic memorandum be afforded careful security and its ἀπὸ restricted to a need-to-knoy hasis.
Orig. and 2 to Legat, Ottawa, by letter 12-19-63 NOTE:
Classificd eo Sperm" because unouthorized disclosure of this inforiation could reveal the identity οἵ the source, who is of continuing valuo, and such revelation could result in oxceptionally grave danse to the Nation, Source ig CG 5824-S*, See Chicaro sirtel 12-7-G3 entitled "Solo, I8-C," enclosing letterhead menorandun captioned “Norman Freed, Communist Party of Canada Representative to ‘World Harxist Review,' Prague, Czechoslovakia,”
Tolson
Belmont Mohr Casper Callahen Conrad DeLoach Evans Gale Rasen Sullivan Tavel Trotter Tele. Room —____. vy Holmes Gandy —____ MAIL ROOM Cc TELETYPE UNIT Γ]
Wi
1 - Foroten Liaison Unit
ae τ | ~ oe By : “} en oe oo COOKE e Yo camer 2 ω ΤΠ ω- ; .
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᾿ hag πω» _ ΜΝ DECLASSTPICATION ΑἸΤΕΈΜΕΒΕΤΕ DPRERBTWED ἘΈΠΕΙ: 1 ΠΑ ΘΑΘΟΣ FRI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE ' - i pas ng - aw [1
DATE 12-23-2031
v (15) 100-422001
Dates Decexbor 80, 1908
Pas Director Luroau of intelligence and Research
opartuent of Stace
Pron: doin πᾶσαν Foover, Dircetor oc ff 4
αι] σε:
| 44
OL . 7 Reference is rede to provicus “gorrespondence ΝΣ in this nattor concerning the intentions of captioned
individual to travel to the Covict πλοῦ in the Fall or 4963 *
A confidenticl] source which has farniched yoliobic int the past advised during Docenher, Less, a τήκαϑ aduitied to the Savict Unien ᾿ς in Septembor, Luvs, eis currently studying Rucsian bic in a scheol in the Soviet Union preparing hersol? for the study of dranatics,
3,
rd You will bo advigcd of any additionnl iniore VE nation rcecived rolnting to this δι. , SU 68 ΟΊ as ν᾽ jt = a 1» hixcetor Wu A w Centrni inte once ποῦς ¥ ΟΣΣ ΣΟ y 9 DEC 30 1963
g 5 a ep at Attention: Boputy Dircetor, Plans
oo eS i ; I ιν Deere Seine = ito τι - Ξ NOTE:
8 oo 8
a ὁ
Subject is the prominent CPUSA member, the Russians to attend school in the sovie
Pittsburgh Office has been instructed by prior communica~
Tolson
Be jront ———_ tion to submit FD-122 placing subject's name on the
Mohr Casper Callahan Conrad DeLoach Evans Gale Rosen
NOTE CONTINUED, PAGE TWO
ΠΩ
Sullivan Tavel Trotter Tele; ; Room Holries
Gandy
= WGS:kmj Δ κα ἘΣ ΟΜΝ,
ΠΝ
“yar. Ἀδὰ [1 τει ετυρε unit L_1
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NOTE (Continued) :
co IAL Director
Bureau of Intelligence and Research Department of State
Security Index, Information in letter obtained by CG 5824-S* during Solo Mission 14 from Aleksei Grechukhin, an official of the CP of the Soviet Union, See Chicago
airtel 12/16/63 captioned =C" enclosing letter- °°. head memorandum entitled DIG
Classified "ConErtesti 2.1" because disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons would jeopardize the source (CG 5824-S*), who is furnishing information on a top-level basis concerning the inter- national communist movement.
τ FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56) é
ἊΝ
Transmit the following in
FBI
Date: 12/ 18/63
(Type in plain text or code)
AIRTEL REG - (Priority or Method of Mailing) -..................................................- Loe. TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100428091) fe | . . ik Ζ ie ( JN FROM: NEW YORK (100-134637) τριὰς : bs | om ἔ [μὴ 7 at SUBJECT: { SOLO Nene FM nm -¢ el Aral high. Mn Gan ἦν LEN AER GAS ReNYairtel captioned "SOLO, IS-C," which states that NY 694-S* had received from the Soviets a coded-ciphered radio message instructing him to meet with his Soviet contact at the vArmstrong" rendezvous on 12/17/63 at the usual time, «+ he Abs κι τε Polo Acton A fT * advised SAS ALEXANDER G. BURLINSON and a ἢ 12/18/63 that pursuant to these instructions e-met and conterred with ALEKSEL _M.}‘KOLOBASHKIN at approximately 6:00 p.m. on the evening of 12717763 in the vicinity of the "Armstrong" rendezvous, NY 694-S* gave KOLOBASHKIN a roll of ν microfilm containing the following messages: 1} 5: ο ἱ oi! Sto Ἂ Ὑ ᾿ fa ἱ 4G ( We Ν "ἡ ζῆ. BUREAU (100-428091) (ΒΜ) ~pAreELe€ ty 1) bee is "» lL - CHICAGO (134-46-Sub-B) (RM~AM) 1 - NY 134-91 (INV) 41) - - ἤτέξεω, pat eee Sf eh pee (GUS HABE} Glebe} 1 = NY 105~36402 (ALEKSEL KOLOBASHKIN) (341) “ΚΣ 6: i osgse 3 1 =~ ΝΥ 100-134637 (41)
Approved:
- pon ¥ eAOU BERRY ἢ ΒΝ SFB — ill 4
WGC :msb ΤῈΣ ! ἢ "" Hf
A ae “yee ny
Setomttger: ᾿ ὉΝ ΠΝ
ἢ “ap in Charge
Ev BA JAN 10 1964
ὥρῃ eee ΘΜ Ρε...ς
ΝΥ 100-134637
(1) A coded-ciphered message, the plain text of which reads as ~ + follows:
"To Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
“Have confirmed that JESSICA of American-Soviet Consul received $15,000.00 on November Ist. "MORRIS CHILDS.” , | yu (Re NYO airtel captioned ,"SoLo, Is-c, “ dated 9/6/63, “ advising that on 9/5/63 KOLOBASHKIN gave NY 694-S* $15,000 for JESSICASSMITH' s magazine, “New World Review.")
(2) A céded message, the plain text of which reads as follows: "Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
"Te would be well if some country other than a socialist country would sponsor a proposal for Puerto Rican independence in the United Nations Assembly, The Mali representative was to have made that proposal but he is no longer in the UN, and we do not know the new representative, Therefore we request the above.
“CUS HALL National Executive Committee cPUSA”
(3) A coded message, the plain text of which reads as follows: "Please convey for me to HENRY WINSTON that I have received all
of his letters and regards. "GUS HALL”
πὰ.
NY 100..134637
(4) A coded message which reads:
"Sister HELEN next. BERKMAN next."
(This refers to the next drop and the next meeting place through which NY 694-S* may make contact with KOLOBASHKIN.)
ReNYairtel 12/3/63, captioned "SOLO, IS-C; ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY,” which enclosed a document dated 12/5/63 which NY 694~S* had received from GUS HALL for transmittal to the Soviets on 12/6/63. ‘This document concerned an evaluation of President LYNDON B, JOHNSON and expressed the intention of GUS HALL with respect to his taking issue with what he considers wrong and harmful tactics by some forces in Venezuela. HALL had requested by 12/16/63 a reply setting forth the observations of the Soviets before he made a statement criticizing these tactics.
NY 694~S* advised on 12/18/63 that in the course of his meeting with KOLOBASHKIN on 12/17/63, KOLOBASHKIN read to him a message which KOLOBASHKIN was simultaneously translating from a Russian text. The message was addressed to GUS HALL, National Committee, CPUSA, and was signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, The message, as read by KOLOBASHKIN, included the following:
The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union heartily thanks you for the analysis of President JOHNSON and for your observation concerning President JOHNSON's continuation of the policies of the JOHN F. KENNEDY administration. Undoubtedly this analysis will -be received with great interest by the world public,
Regarding the Venezuelan question, and your announced public statement of criticism, we doubt that this would be expedient at this time. It could easily be misinterpreted by the world reactionaries and those who threaten the peace of the world. It is also possible
- 3+
ΝΥ 100-134637
that such criticism could be misunderstood by the Venezuelan comrades. It could provide the Communist Party of China with an occasion for further accusations and attacks upon the CPUSA, and furnish support for further pro-Chinese activists in the USA. Such criticism can be attacked by the Venezuelan and Cuban Parties as interference in their internal party affairs. Such criticism would also lead to the deterioration
of relations between the CPUSA and the Venezuelan Communist Party, as well as between the CPUSA and other fraternal parties in Latin America.
It is necessary for the Venezuelan comrades to undertake a discussion of their tactics during their last election.
We wish to you and to the leadership of the CPUSA our fraternal and communist greetings in this noble and manful struggle.
ReNYairtel, 12/9/63, setting forth details of a conference between KOLOBASHKIN and NY 694-S* on 12/6/63, at which time they discussed the difficulty being encountered in the use of the walkie-talkie equipment. As set forth on page 2 of referenced airtel, it was agreed that the walkie-talkie operation be tested on Wednesday evening, 12/11/63, at 10:00 p.m. and again on Thursday morning, 12/12/63, at 10:00 a.m., when the Soviets would go to the informant's home neighborhood and attempt to send him a message by walkie-talkie. It was agreed that whether or not the informant received said signals, he would go to the area of the headquarters of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations at 7-00 P.M. on Thursday night, 12/12/63, and send a message indicating whether or not he had received the aforementioned signals from the Soviets.
NY 694"S* advised on 12/18/63 that on 12/17/63, KOLOBASHKIN and he again discussed the difficulty being experienced in the operation of the walkie-talkie equipment. NY 694~S* informed KOLOBASHKIN that he had not received the signals either on 12/11/63 ox 12/12/63 at the specified times. KOLOBASHKIN informed NY 694-S* that the Soviets had not received any signal from NY 694<S* on 12/12/63.
It was agreed that on the occasion of their next meet,
-ἃ -
NY 100-134637
KOLOBASHKIN would furnish NY 694-S* with a tuner suchas was pre- viously furnished NY 694<S* on 9/5/63. (See NY airtel, 9/6/63, page 10). Using the tuner, ΝῪ 694-S* would then be able to recheck-his walkie-talkie receiver. .
It was further agreed that in the event KOLOBASHKIN wishes to contact NY 694-S*, he will notify NY 694-sS* by CW radio transmission. In the event NY 694-S* wishes to contact the Soviet, he will transmit the usual signals in the vicinity of the head- quarters of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations on Tuesday or Thursday nights between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m. as before.
(See SOLO airtel, 10/4/63) On a Tuesday or a Thursday when
NY 694-S* sends such a signal between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m.,
he is to-be in the public telephone booth at the Parsons Boulevard Independent Subway Station, Jamaica, New York at 9:00 p.m.
(JA 6-9427), The Soviet will call this number at 9:00 p.m. and allow the phone to ring twice. This will acknowledge receipt of NY 694-S*'s earlier transmissions between 7:00 p.m. and 7:15 p.m. on the same date,
It was agreed that NY 694-S* and KOLOBASHKIN will meet on either January 14, 1964, or January 21, 1964, at the "Berkman" rendezvous at 6:00 p.m. If they fail to make personal contact on January 14, 1964, NY 694-S* and KOLOBASHKIN will again attempt to make personal contact on January 21, 1964,
Before parting, KOLOBASHKIN advised NY 694-S* that the people at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations were favorably impressed by President LYNDON B. JOHNSON's 12/12/63 address to the United Nations.
IN, VIEW OF THE HIGHLY SENSITIVE PoszTion or[___—'|””” EXTREME CAUTION MUST BE EXERCISED IN HANDLING THE INFORMATION SET OUT BELOW. NO ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN WHICH WOULD POSSIBLY JEOPARDIZE THE SECURITY OF THIS SOURCE OR REVEAL HIS IDENTITY.
In 7D
At 1:55 p.m. on 12/17/63, [ ery—cameomtacted the NYO by telephone and spoke to SA VIN . iLLL over the private
Line.
NY 100..134637
Informant said that he had learned on this date in KGB quarters at the Soviet Mission that ALEKSEI KOLOBASHKIN was to have a meeting with an agent at 6:00 p.m. this date, at a place unknown to the informant. Informant said he did not know the identity of the agent with whom KOLOBASHKIN would meet.
Informant stated that ‘as part of the arrangement for this meeting, VLADIMIR’ GHUCHUKIN was to be in the KGB quarters in late afternoon of 12717763, monitoring FBI radio transmissions. Informant said that in the event CHUCHUKIN heard any transmissions over the FBI radio which appeared to indicate an interest in KOLOBASHKIN, CHUCHUKIN at 5:45 p.m. would go to a public telephone and would call KOLOBASHKIN at telephone number RE 9-9713, to warn him that he was possibly under surveillance by the FBI. Informant said that in the event CHUCHUKIN detected no FBL radio transmissions relating to KOLOBASHKIN, then, of course, it would not be necessary for him to contact KOLOBASHKIN by telephone,
Informant said he had no other information to offer at this time, but said that he was anxious to pass this information along to the interviewing agents since it appeared to be an excellent opportunity to determine the identity of the agent with whom KOLOBASHKIN would meet.
As set forth above, NY 694-S* met KOLOBASHKIN at 6:00 p.m. on 12/17/63, in the vicinity of the Townhouse Restaurant, located at 138-39 Queens Blvd., Jamaica, New York. It is noted that telephone number RE 9-9713 to which reference was made a is located in a public telephone booth at the Rose Hill Barvand™ Grill, 138-19 Jamaica Ave., Jamaica, New York,
b7D
OFTIGHAL FORM NO. 10 Φ Φ ᾿ Telson
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT =
Memorandum ROUTE IN I ENVELOPE ἐξ
TO : Mr. We 6, sultivam Jy DATE: December 27, 1963 Ξ 1 ~ Mr. Belmont τονε Bef
Mr, Sullivan Tele. Room
Holmes
Mr, Baumgardner cay
FROM: . Ε΄, J. Baumgardner 5 aK VS. Me, Shaw SUBJECT, SOLO Wy RNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST recur AMR
ἐγ!
J This is to advise that CG 5824-S5*, while on his recent Solo Mission in‘the Soviet Union, was unsuccessful in his efforts to dis- cuss with Soviet officials problems relating to the Jewish question in the Soviet Union,
μι FE fet
It will be recalled that in October, 1963, Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), disturbed about reports of ~Santi-Semitism_in the Soviet_Union,. directed a communication to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) concerning the possibility of sending a CPUSA representative to the Soviet Union to discuss matters relating to the Jewish question in the Soviet Union, Prior to the departure of CG 5824-S* on his Solo Mission in November, 1963, Gus Hall instructed informant to discuss with responsible CPSU officials the Jewish question in the Soviet Union, Hall indicated that it should be. pointed out to the CPSU that the CPUSA was not looking for a fight on , | this matter but was raising it only from a tactical point of -view. f°
se eimsapern agen niaanemmmmaniial
In mid-November, 1963, CG 5824-S*, while in the Soviet Union, presented to the CPSU both written and oral requests that a meeting be arranged to discuss the Jewish question with responsible CPSU officials, However, in neither case was there any official response from the CPSU,
At every occasion where this matter was raised by informant, CPSU offi- cials sought to avoid discussion of it, In view of the reaction of the CPSU, informant did not push this matter beyond initial stages of inquiry. As a result, there was no formal, direct response, negative or positive, to his request to discuss with responsible CPSU officials the Jewish question in the Soviet Union,
& ACTION: & POO Κ8539 OA - 3535
For information, ihzpiew of the failure of the Soviets to state their position in regard “to the Jewish question, no dissemination is being made of this information,
ei 100-428091 Ὁ
| ΠΝ x" a | IN | ὅδ IAN 1 δ 7084
ey eee
oe
Casper
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE ἘΣ
a ἡ ᾿ Ὄς OPTIONAL FORM NG. 1 @ 3010-104 τ Φ MAY 1762 EDITION Ef ; “GSA GEN. REG, NO, 27 . Tolson UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT sii
Golo TO ‘+ Mr. Conrad ees DATE: December 16, 1963 = Besen γίδες Taye! —__ tiger σ Trotter ; . . Reo a, ως C. F, Downing lms ον
Gandy
SUBJECT: © το TERNAL SECURITY - C
sr Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly BE cofrtidential , informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted ¢ a, to him by radio. BL uy (Re GALPM 1500) On 12/16/63, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio . station at Midland on scheduled times and frequencies at which time two it messages were sent. ae
The plain text of the messages is set forth below. The cipher text is attached.
NR 214 GR 180
TO BIRCH (Gus Hall). UZBEK SOCIETY FOR FRIENDSHIP AND CULTURAL RELATIONS IS SENDING TO REV, GALAMISON AN INVITATION FOR SEVEN PERSONS. IT IS POINTED (out?) IN THE INVITATION THAT THE DELEGATION WILL HAVE A POSSIBILITY TO VISIT DIFFERENT PLACES IN THE USSR (NOT ONLY IN UZBEKISTAN) AND TO ACQUAINT ITSELF IN DETAIL WITH THE LIFE OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE, PLEASE TAKE’ i INTO ACCOUNT THAT UZBEK SOCIETY FOR FRIENDSHIP AND tap tf RELATIONS, WHICH IS INSTRUCTED TO RECEIVE THE DELEGATION, MAY ACCEPT ONLY SEVEN PERSONS, AS YOU WERE INFORMED BY
| US EARLIER, FAIR (Washington) CASHIER (Embassy) HAS ALL INSTRUCTIONS. IN ORDER TO AVOID ANY MISUNDERSTANDING OR
_ COMPLICATIONS WITH THE MEETING OF THE GROUP, PLEASE INFORM
ὶ ; ; US IN ADVANCE OF THE DATE OF ITS DEPARTURE AND ITS ITINERARY,
{oot sx Enclosure ΒΕ 2] Ζ go al ¥ QO yi , -- -ῷ 5: 3 ό Ὡ
1 - Mr. Belmont “Ἐππεοὶο[οόπ“πφ-π--: σσ-ν ΩΣ
2 - Mr. Sullivan (Attentioiz- ΜΙ OS. A. ΒλΖοριν "glk * G. Shaw) δ
ἰ
WP:drv . ΥΩ --: " β (CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE) ἰῷ ς
\wr Se 65 Jan 1964 ἐπ
. fod hy
Memorandum to Mr, Conrad Re: SOLO Internal Security - C
NR 126 GR 38
FOR REFEREE'S (Central Committee) OPINION IN RESPECT OF BIRCH'S (Gus Hall) LETTER FROM DECEMBER (number) FIVE PLEASE MEET US AT ARMSTRONG ON TUESDAY DECEMBER (number) SEVENTEEN AT THE USUAL TIME, ᾿
The UZBEK SOCIETY FOR FRIENDSHIP AND CULTURAL RELATIONS is an organization in the Soviet Union. REV. GALAMISON is probably identical with a clergyman. from the Bronx, New York, who is thought of very highly by the Communist Party. ARMSTRONG is a meeting location at the Town House Restaurant in Queens, New York.
For information. δ “2
ACTION:
Φ “Φ
NE 126 GR 88
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ENCLOSURE
OPTCHAL FORM NO. 10 Φ Φ “ἘῈ
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE
Sullivan 2235.
Mr, Shaw acs
(4) This is to advise of the results of a δ ρος which took place in Moscow, Russia, between CG 5824-8* and a Soviet official relative to the Solo communication apparatus and electronic devices designed to counteract listening devices,
You will recall that CG 5824-S* was abroad on a Solo Mission from 11/1/63 to 12/2/63, Prior to informant's departure, he was briefed by Gus Hall, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), Hall instructed informant to ask the Soviets if they have anything which the CPUSA could use to counteract electronic listening devices,
During the week of 11/18/63, CG 5824-S* had the occasion to meet with Pavel Lukianov of the Security Department, Intelligence Division, Central Committee, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a CG 5824~S* brought up for discussion Hall's request that the CPUSA he - supplied with information concerning recently developed electronic f equipment designed to counteract listening devices, Lukianov noted * that the Soviets had nothing that could be sent to the CPUSA, but ο΄ stated he would arrange for CG 5824-S8* to be briefed by an expert, who would demonstrate what was new and would also discuss the means
or detection of electronic devices, Informant mentioned that Gus Hall is not convinced that it is possible to pick up sound waves through glass by electronic devices, in spite of the fact that the Soviets had previously demonstrated to CG 5824-S* τ this could be done, Inform ant stated that Hall wanted the Soviets to demonstrate this technique again to informant, Lukianov noted that such a demonstration would be given informant in connection with the briefing informant would be given by an expert,
(Although arrangements were made to, have CG 5824-S* briefed {lon electronic devices, no_such priefing took place. CG 5824~5* was informed by a Soviet official that the briefing had been canceled because of the turmoil resulting from the interventte assassination of President John F, Kennedy, It was explained ‘to CG 5824-S*%,ithat for the time being the Soviets must be most cautious and discreet in any matters involving the CPUSA,) _
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TO : ΜΙ We Cc, Sullivag DATE: December 26, 1963 Gale . a
1 - Mr, Belmont mee FROM : Mr, F. J. Baumgardner @ f 1 = Mr. Conrad Tele. Room A 1 - Mr, Sullivan fm 7 sunjec SOLO i - Mr, Baumgardner foo Ϊ ΤΙ - Mr, Branigan “ΠΊΩΝ a : NAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST 1. ᾿ | -2,εδ ὅν fer,
on 1 : Φ . μ᾿ ad =
Memorandum to Mr, Sullivan RE: SOLO 100~428091
Lukianov stated that the Soviet security officials had nothing but praise for the work being performed by NY 694-S*, (NY 694~-S* handles the Solo communication apparatus between the CPUSA and the Soviets,) CG 5824-S* pointed out that if the quality of work performed by NY 694-S* on occasions was poor, it must be attributed to the technical equipment which has been made available to hin, CG 5824~S* suggested that the Soviets consider providing NY 694-5* with any available new technical equipment or provide NY 694-S* with information as to how he could secure such equipment in the United States, In this regard, Lukianov stated that apparently NY 694-S* had the latest technical equipment available and they had nothing new to supply or recommend to hin,
CG 5824—~S* raised with Lukianov 2a complaint regarding the method used to transmit to the CPUSA in September, 1963, the contents of a confidential letter from the Soviets, CG 5824-S* noted that in this particular case the contents of the Letter had been placed on tape and from one hearing of the tape at a meet set up in a public \place, NY 694-S* was expected to make sufficient notes from which he could convey the full text to the CPUSA, CG 5824-5% suggested that in the future meetings between NY 694-S* and his Soviet contact in New York City be held in a motel or hotel room rather than in parks, sub- ways and the like, This would provide an opportunity to talk matters over which cannot be done under the present setup, Lukianov agreed to raise this matter with his superiors to see if some new arrangements could be made, He also agreed that in the future messages would not be put on tape and consideration would be given to transmitting such messages during personal contacts by microfilm or otherwise,
ACTION: For information, No dissemination of this data which per-
tains to the extremely clandestine Solo apparatus is being made as it would jeopardize the security of this valuable operation, :
δ yor or ἌΣ
λ BS JAN7 1964
OPTIONAL, FORM No. 10 £01D-t00-05
MAY 1962 EDITION UNITED STATES co Msn
6
ven FBI (100-428091) DATE: 12/27/63 vial FROM AC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) SUBJECT: ᾿ SOLO.” . 8 ts ¢ ἢ ν ReBulet dated December 23, 1963, inquiring
whether Chicago had inadvertently neglected to include in the monthly Solo Funds accounting letter for the
month of November, 1963, the amount of $6,006.00 which amount. was obtained by CG 5824-S* during November, 1963.
For the information of the Bureau, although this amount of $6,006.00 was obtained by CG 5824-S* during November, 1963, this information was not available to the Chicago Office “until December, 1963, since the source had not returned to the United States. until December 2, 1963 and not until December 6, 1963, did he return to Chicago where the Solo Funds are maintained. Therefore, the $6,006.00 was not actually added to the Solo Funds until December, 1963, and will be so recorded in the December, 1963, Solo Funds accounting letter.
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(2)-Bureau (RM)
1-Chicago go JAN” ὦ Ἰθβϑᾷ ¢ QO WAB: MDW . er δ As :¢ a | 7 2 (3) Ley, op Wk?
OPTIONAL FORM HG, 16 Ὶ 3010-108 ς and he MAY 1742 EDITION GSA GEM. REG, NO, 27
Tolson
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT rermont . Casper Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE & , Evans a” TO : Mr. Conrad(/ DATE: December 30, 1963 Rosen ry
Sullivan Oe ni} Tovel μ᾿ of Trotter
. Tele. ἢ
rom : C. F. Downing Holmes
CY ᾿ ΒΡ Gandy
SUBJECT | ‘SOLO ἜΝ - Ge NTERNAL SECURITY - C '
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable is ἫΝ informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.
On 12/30/63 transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland on scheduled times and frequencies but no messages were sent.
ACTION:
For information.
2- Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. A. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
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ΠΕΟΣ /oo- FAC 81, .- 32 34
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Lerat, Vonn (100-621) January 2, 1964 Vircetor, FRI (100-76385) 1 + Mr. Schwartz
1 - Mr. Shaw
GLONGE UHLWERTUER "
SECURITY MATTER - ὦ
Information has been reccived from a delicate and reliable source that captioncd individual has an iliness for which he ncecds to live in a warner climate. ’ As a result, Ghiwerther and his wife, Uclga Weigert . bhiwerther, plan to move tu Africa.
It is desired that you rcnain alert for uny 'y additional information pertaining to subject's plan to ~ move tu Africa. Because of the extreme scnsitivencss _
ef the source, you should not advise your sources that you are in receipt of the above information.
1... Sur Francisco_(100-26672) ~
C 1» 100-428091 (Solo) - Foreign Liaison Unit (Route through for rcvicw) RUTE:
Source is CG 5824-S* who received information concerning Ohlwerther's plans to travel to Africa. 500 airtel from Chicago 12/16/63 captioned "Sulo, IS-C" enclosing letterhead mcnerandum entitled "Gcorge Lohr." Vhiwerther is not on SI, He has been out of the country since 1951, He has a long history of activities in theCrusa and was formerly Chairman of the San Diego County CP.
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ΒΟ Ὁ ΤῈ ΤΟΑ ΤΊΤΟΝ AUTHORITY DERIVE
PRI. AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GOIDE
SATE Lg-23-20il
_ Mohr
The Attorney General January 7, 1964
Director, FBI
Mr, Baumgardner Mr, Branigan
1 - Le
1 - Mr. Sullivan 1 -
1 -
1 - Mr, Shaw
( COMMUNIST PARTY, USA INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS INTERNAL SECURITY - Ὁ
We have learned fram 8 which has furnished reliable information in the past that Soviet Premier Nikita 8, Khrushchev recently prepare 1 “nassige document" addressed to "All Heads of Government" a
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2
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cold war, Khrushchev believes that by pasing tensions with the Germans, for ozample, the Soviets will be able to move troope from. the West to the East and concentrate on the Chinese,
ἘΕΞ 1: ἕ ὃ re oe ἢ + Μ0 OHI bg. HY OS ii
—_/
According to information received by our source, Cormuniet China is currently basing ite foreign policy | with respect to ite borders on its desire to re-establish its borders as they vere a hundred years ago. At that tine the Chinese territory was ἃ great deal more extensive and included areas now held by the Soviet Union.
Because of the sensitive na our source, ad οοὺ we have classified this communication " information has been furnished to the able Walter rv, ᾿
Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, and other - interested eficials οἵ the Governnent, ὦ
onda BEM: “συ ἀκ 602.:. 3540
2 i- noma Attorney General go JAN. wf
fe nr padi THO ΩΣ πε ει ἀξ 7 = Tolson eee ate) ἢ ' vue : vs Ὁ if, : - 4 Pa 1 ΕΣ ᾿ 5 Belmont Mey i) , εἰ = ἊΝ ii nal ARES As
Cospet Calleban Conrad DeLoach Evans Gale
WGS:kmj ς (0) Sulliven
Tavel a ¢ why Hol ESA a NS AIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT caf
Trotter
WH Ἄ ΡΜ
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The Attorney General
NOTE;
Classified “ee “et because unauthorized disclosure of this informafion could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage
to the Nation. Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Com- nunist Party, See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS-C,"
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ἔπιομαι FORM NO. 10 5010-106 , og MAY 1942 EDITION é GSA GEN. REG, NO. Telson
UNITED STAT ES GOVERNMENT Belmont
MemorandunROUTE IN ENVELOPE Hiss τὸοο : My. We. Cy sui Baxan DATE: 12+31-63 A
Tavel SSS " & 1-itr .Belmont Tole, Revo FROM : Mr . EF e J . Baumg anit L—hr * Sullivan Holmes
i-Mr . Baume ardner Gandy
ὃ
Cao.) 1-Mr , Row 22 SUBJECT: ἡ SOLO_¥- 1l-Mr, Shaw tom fille SRNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST fe a o
This is a memorandum setting forth information concerning [8 trip to Canada by NY 694-S* as instructed by the Soviets in a Ὁ the SOLO apparatus, /
αν Μ TNE Sse
Ὦ T2-30-63 ASAC Roney of the.New York Office telephoned to state that! NY_694=5%* had asked permission to go to Canada for a rip in connection With the SOLO apparatus, NY 694-S* pointed out that when CG 5824-8%* was in Russia during the recent SOLO Mission 14, certain problems regarding Guba were discussed and it was decided that ᾿ certain arrangements should be made with the Canadians, The purposes | of the trip were to be as follows:
(1) Arrange a system of communications between the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), and the CP of Cuba via Canada. | (2) Arrange to send funds through Canada to Beatrice 8. | “Fohnson ,, correspondent tan. '"The Worker" in ΟΡ,
/ (3) Discuss with the Canadians the "World Marxist ἰ
Review," a magazine published in Prague, Czechoslovakia, a Σ᾽
which sets forth the international communist line. The ;
Soviets pointed out that some CPs are not patronizing the
"World Marxist Review" and the Russians desire that the
CPUSA and the CP of Canada discuss the matter in an effort
to gain support among other CPs of the worid, particularly
France, for the "lorld Marxist Review."
(4) NY 694-S* is to get for us all the information he ° | can concerning activities in ba, σαν seater nenerse ON SET SATIN WSR UREN Ero?
N¥ 694-S* pointed out that he would confer with top Party leaders in Canada and would stay at the Royal York Hotel in Toronto. NY 694-8* said he planned to leave New York City at about 6 p.m., 12-30-63, via Trans Canadian Airlines and fly to. Toronto. He said it would be necessary for him to take his wife along in view of the fact that she is suffering from cancer and he cannot leave her alone.
LTG: jad LS REG 9 / 5d ~ 42.0. 09/— 35H
(6) ἫΣ | “ εν eo JAN Φ 2,984
GSJAN9 1954 | oe — 5% We &
Memorandum to Mr, Sullivan Re: SOLO
Roney desired authorization for an advance of $300 to NY 694-S* for this trip.
In view of the urgent nature of the trip to Canada by NY 694-~S* and the great potential of information he will obtain, the funds were authorized by telephone, ACTION;
Immediately upon the return of NY 694-S* to the U, 58. he will be debriefed and you will be apprised of the arrangements
made, Any information which can be disseminated as a result of this trip will be appropriately handled,
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ἣν δ. ; ᾿ 0-1 (Rey. 1-2-63) ¢ / “UNITED STAPES GOVE GY ~Memoran
TO —-: SAC, _Chicago (Your file 13-46 Sub ft) DATE: ΤΕ
FROM .: Director, FBI (Bufile and Serial 1 uf28091) ἣν Oy, tt RB δ
SUBJECT: 01 τς "ἦ [| Post in file and INTERNAL RY - = destroy 01 For §06 ase
Repy let O73 only)
Ί 1, Bufiles indicate this case is ἐμῶν. Give specific rast for delinquency, ͵
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of she LL horas F bor a, nt, * Addstiblgtal,,
εὐ Madey 6b falaracte δ CAL 2, dork naaetle
2 Dat [_Jairtel [ΓἼ letter [_| submitted
[ |report [7] letterhead memo [1 will be submitted 3, If valid reason exists for not submitting report at this time, state reason specifically ἫΝ when report | B rep
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will be submitted
|
| ΚΗ, Status of [Ἴ Appeal [] Inquity ΓῚ investigation [__] Prosecution | _(_Jaistel (_] letter
| Js. Sumit pot (letterhead memo By
(Place reply hereon and reture to Burean Note receipt and acknowledgment on top
FD-37 (Rev. 12-13-56)
Transmit the following in
Φ΄ ἡ i seat ςΦ
Date: 12/31/63
(Type in plain text or code)
AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing) |
--.-.------........ re rr er eee ee ee .. . .....-..... .. — — .-ς... ere ee
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Approved:
TO : DERECTOR, FBI (100~428091) | “
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) " far f
ἫΝ Hl
Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are three copies and for the New York Office one copy of an informant's statement captioned, "Document Concerning Doctor Wellington
hung, Former American in Czechoslovakia.”
The information appearing in the enclosed informant's
statement was furnished on 12/27/63 by CG 5824-S* to SA RICHARD τ, HANSEN.
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@3Bureau (Enc. 3) (RM) Τὴ I-New York (100~134637) (Enc. 1)(Info) (RM), gan 8.1964 [ ae 1-~Chicago JX vue
' RWE: MDW
(5)
EAS Sent ___ τ Ὰύ Μ Ρ:.-.- στ \ ΝΕ Spgqeral ᾧ in Charge -- Bo JA 1 δ οἷν
1963. B Bui te latter part of the week week ‘of Devenber is,
1 5 oxo ey, a Conminist ty, USA Frepre- sentative fr tne Bouthern Calizorata District, had in her possession a document concerning Ur. ‘Wellington. Chung setting forth certain facta and details concerning that individual.
in connection with this information, Healey requested that
the CP, USA arrange, if possible, to make inquiries concerning the mat tex get forth in the Gocument with the CP of Gzechosle- vakia in order that the true facts might ba known. The docu- ment which Porethy Healey had in her possezsion at this time wae as follews:
"Sy, Wellington Chung died en Oct 28, 1963 a suicide.
His last residence waa Ernsta Thalmanna? | Cheb Czechosiovakia he
yee ΠΝ is hospitalized with a nervous _ bic wer | anal Alice Fivun, « ind was
“Dr. Chung emigrated te Czechoslovakia in 1948 as a young etudent to study medicine and with the dadi- cated fervor of ayoung militant progressive.
"Hig mother, Alice Hyun followed him to Czechoslo- vakia hoping to enter North Korea from that country . She was permitted ta go τὸ Herth Korea in approx.
G months or so. Sater, unconfirmed reperts were received in this country that she was arrested and executed by the North Korean government for traitorous activity.
"Correspondence with Dr. Chung was kept to a minimum by his family before, during and after the Korean War on account of FBI harrassment of the family at home and then later for fear of international com- plications etc,
3642 ζω. bf a2. yoy] A! pNCLOSURE
"In approx. 1960 correspondence was received and the following conditions seemed to appear in his
letters.
"(.)
"(2}
" (3)
"(4)
(5)
He was extremely unhappy in Czecho- Slovakia and wished to return to this
country.
He was considered a suspicious person and ostracized by the North Korean Btudents Suspicion was such that he could not hope for a good medical appointment and anyone who so recon- mended him was sticking out his neck.
He attempted scientific medical studies and research with little encouragement and help from his profession. What iittile he accomplished was apparently in spite of conditions.
He was bitter at the racial prejudice he encountered.
It appears all the youthful enthusiasm and dedication became so frustrated that he said in his letter to hie uncle in
his last message~-the vorld is confusing, the family is confusing~--then something __ him to snap.
“Most of the information above is not bared clear conclusive or confirmation or outspoken grievance."
ΜΝ ἜΘΩΤΡ IN SNVELOPE
a? we wed TEC LASSTSPLTCATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROE: 1 ™ Mr, Belmont RBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION cUTDE 1 —- Mr, Sullivan MATE 12 ΕΒ 2011 1... Mr, Baumgardner 1 - Mr, Branigan 1 - Liaison 1 = Mr, Shaw fy) . : January 7, 1964 BY LIAISON a [3 = oo. Honorable Dean tusk 4 vo > = The Secretary of State \ ἔ fi Ons wm Washington, D.C. ᾿, Wo Wed , μΞ = ro mW Dear ἔχ, ΒΘ τ | 4 8 οἱ ᾿ ra
Ye have leartiéd from a-most sensitive source which has furnished reliable information in.tho past that Soviet Premier Nikita 3, Khrushchev recently prepared a — ‘massive document” addressed to “All Heads of’ Goveranment™ throughout the world asking for a termination of the cold wer. The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the Siao-Soviet border is responsible for Khrushchev's ypro- posals to capitalist countries with respect to ending the — cold war, Khrushchev belidves that by easing tensions with: the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able to move ῥα μον fren the Vest te the East and concentrate on the + nese.
Aceording to ingornation received by: our source, - Comsunist China is currently basing ite foroign policy — with respect to its borders. on its desire to ro-establish its borders sa they were a hundred years ago. At that time the Chinese territory was a great deal more extensive and . included areas now held by the Soviet Union.
Because of the sensitive nat ce,- we have clasaified this communication τς νι This information is being furnished to other eres efficiais of the Governnont.
Pie 100-428091 KBD τρτομ Sincerely | yours, πον Ὁ
Talson a : ra 4 ff Nebr τ SEE NOTE PAGE THO . oth GTO DS Casper one eas | ᾿ ee ἈΝ ὡς se ὧν Callahan . : ᾿ ‘s , ' : Conrad ᾿ }
econ —— HGS: mj 2. G0 7 5 Gale (5) ᾿ πὰς
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sali — τς a ay 8 1964 mY gt a
Holmes penta) Gandy or BOI An RE εἦχν 7094 TELETYPE UNIT L_] “
ne shee
Honorable Dean Rusk
NOTE:
Classified "Tox Nacket" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation covld result in exceptionally grave damage
to the Nation, Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Com- munist Party, See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS-C."
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Airtel 1 -~ tr, Shaw
TO: SAC, Chicago (154-46~5ub B)
aE wo From: Doug FBI (100-428091) Subjock: C SOLD
RNAL SECURITY ~ ὦ
Advise by return airtel if your office haa any additional information to submit relative to Solo Wission 14,
wee pyr IU 09-3547
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Tale. Room Holmes Gandy —+
ATE 12-29-2011 * i . | ἐ \ ΡΝ ‘ o Re y t 1 é 4 ‘ δι ἰ . wr \
! - Le 1. Liaison 1 = Ur, Bland | 1 - Mr. RW, Smith 413) 160+-428092 1 - Mr. Shaw Date: deanuany 7, 19864 Tes. Dir
rector Contral Intelligence Ascney ΝΕ
Attention: Deputy Director, Plans Oo ᾿ "ὰ ὦ Fron? John Edgar Hoover, Director ,τ' an 7. Ly ge ee 7 fete ἮΝ _ Subject: _wELUmNeror'GHuNG I πὶ
SUCURTTY MATTER = C (Δ
Reference 18 made to previous correspondence in this matter which disclosed that captioned individual _ denarted the United States for Czcchoglovakia in 1048 for the purpose of attending the University of Prague, Praguc, Gzechoolovalia,
Tae following information was supplied by ἃ souree which has furnished reliable information in the past.
NOTE: to JAN 8 {1964 Classified ngpexee" because disclosure of this
information to unauthorized ‘persons would jeopasdize the-seurce who is furnishing information on a top-level basis concerning the international communist movement, Source is 5824-5* who obtained the above information from Dorothy Healey, Chairman, Southern California District, Communist Party, USA. See CGairtel 12/31/63 captioned “Solo, I8-C," Wellington Chung and his mother, Alice Hyun, were known to be members of the Communist Party in Hawaii in 1946, Subject's father, Chun Chung, in 1948 was known to,be residing in Korea, 2
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ΕΟΙΑΒΘΙΕΙΘΆΤΤΟΝ AUTHORITY DERIVES Fan: ROT | ΕΗ ΙΝ J N \ ELOPE FEI AUTOMMAZCIDECLASSIFICATION GUIDE VATE 13-80-2011 4 δίς ui
με fend aad oct feat ad. inutte s a tA g fool με μι» :
January 7, 1964 BY LIAISON
Special Assistant to the President ..-—— Tne White House Washington, ἢ, C.
Dear Με. Jenkins: as
(!, Honorabie Waiter Ἐν, Jenkins
φ- =. s =z 2
Ξῷ ΓΕΙ 43 ΩΣ “ rm 8 rin = [= | S =z
Ye have learned from ἃ most t sensitive source which has furnished relieble information in the past that Soviot Premier Nikita 8. Kleushchev recently prepared a ‘nessive document” addresged to "Ail Heads of Government” throughout the world oering fer a termination of the cold war, The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the SinoeGovicst border ic responsible for Khrushehev's pro= posals to capitalist countries with respect toe ehding the cold war, Ehrushchev believes that by easing tensions with the Germans, for ezanglie, the Soviets will be able ‘to move.
troaps from. the West ἕο the East and concentrate on the δὰ Chinese, ὃ According to iagormation received by our source, \? Communist Chine is currently basing ite foreiga policy ct with respect to its borders on its desire to re-establish ἐξ ite korders as thoy were a hundred years ago. At that time = | ἊΝ the Chinese territory vaso great deal more cxtensive and _ included areas now held by the Soviet Union. yy Because of the sensitive uate seurees 4
we have classified this comunication | ? information is being furnished te other intefest of the Government,
; . i: ὩΣ . Γι Pe 100-428091 rats Sanephely yours,
Tolean Balmont Mohr Casper
Collchon Conrad DeLooch Evans Gale Rosen Sullivan --.......... Tavel
SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
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Honorable Walter W, Jenkins
HOTE:
Classified "Ii speet" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation, Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Conm- munist Party, See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS = C.”
‘ f pe . ΓΞ ΖΑ ar. Re - 4-17-63) Φ 2 “} ἐ ΝΕ ᾿ - - Φ “OM : <
~
: Johan μ Α siti DECODED)jCOPY τῆ mara CI AIRGRAM cI CABLEGRAM CRADIO xsTELETYPE τορι ποι τ τε τ πτπῆσὰ EGA DIRECTOR "2" yr re, SAC NEW YORK 030400 aa
CANADA, AND FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS OF INFORMATION, 085» TAINED THERE FROM THE CANADIAN £2:Coreusveuur λέν πο MN LESLIE MORRIS, SECRETARY OF THE CANADIAN CP, ADVISED ON DECEM= ps). ἢ BER 30 LAST THAT THE CANADIAN CP RELATIONS WITH THE CASTRO REGIME IN HAVANA ARE AS BAD AS, IF NOT WORSE THAN, THOSE OF THE CPUSA WITH THE CASTRO REGIME, MORRIS ATTRIBUTED THIS SITUATION TO THE FACT THAT IN THE SPRING OF 1963, WHEN THE TERRORIST GROUP KNOWN AS "FLQ"EWAS ΒΕ" SPONSIBLE FOR BOMBINGS AND DYNAMITING IN CANADA, THE CANADIAN CP ASCERTAINED THAT CASTRO WAS AIDING AND ABETTING THE TERRORESTS# ° AT THE TIME CASTRO WAS IN MOSCOW, AS ALSO WERE CANADIAN CP FUNGTIONARIE INCLUDING NELSON CLARKE, THE CANADIAN CP, THROUGH NELSON CEARKE, PROTESTED TO CASTRO IN MOSCOW, REQUESTING THAT HE CEASE AIDING AND ABETTING THE AFOREMENTIONED FLO, CASTRO'S RESPONSE WAS “MIND YOUR OWN DAMN BUSINESS." AS A RESULT, THE CANADIAN CP DID NOT RECEIVE AN INVITATION TO THE CELEBRATION IN HAVANA OF THE 5TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTION CURRENTLY BEING OBSERVED AND THE CANADIAN CP 15 QUITE DISGONGERTED ABOUT THIS SITUATION, THE CANADIAN CP HAS SCHED~ ULED Ay MEETING WITH THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO CANADA ON JANUARY 10 IN THE HOPE OF AMELIORATING THE CURRENT BAD S4ZUATION EX{SIAING BETWEEN THE CASTRO REGTME AND THE CANADIAN CP,
al NY 694-S* av SED FURTHER THAT ON JANUARY 2 INSTANT, SHORTLY
LL bE eltie filet tame Vag gy ROIs Lore tb | ea
Gos μ᾿ Sou, CA OS on didi " οί oP ἰ, νεῖ δ...) ‘ ᾿ , Vee 71 δα foes
{ ἔ i Saeey bee . Uf the intelligence co) piped in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, itis suggested that it be suitably ἘΝ paraphrtiseld in ordey protect the Bureau’s cryptographic systems. a wl af 4 . ῃ
I Ὁ wy
ca an 4.2 (igus 4-17-63) Tolson . αὐτῆς Υνο. Φ Belmont ~ Mohr
- Casper Callahan Conrad DeLoach Evans
DECODED COPY δας ΓΠΑΙΒΟΒΑΜ Γι ΟΑΒΙΕΘΒΑΜ ΓΙΒΑΡΙΟ TELETYPE τε “PAGE TWO FROM SAC NEWYORK ‘o30K00 Ι
BEFORE HE LEFT FOR NY, HE HAD ANOTHER MEETING WITH LESLIE MORRIS, WHO TOLD HIM THAT HE HAD JUST RETURNED FROM OTTAWA WHERE HE HAD CONFERRED WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CANADA, MORRIS STATED THAT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS PAST HE HAS BEEN MEETING REGULARLY WITH THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR WHO FURNISHES HIM AND THE CANADIAN CP WITH INFOR~ MATION CONCERNING MATTERS OF INTEREST TO THE CANADIAN CP, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR, HE HAD JUST RECEIVED FROM MOSCOW A #MAS~- SIVE DOCUMENT” WRITTEN BY KHRUSHCHEV, ADDRESSED TO “ALL HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS"! THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ASKING FOR A TERMINATION OF THE COLD WAR. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO TRANSLATE THE DOCUMENT FROM THE ORIGINAL RUSSIAN ΙΝ WHICH IT IS WRITTEN AND THAT AS SOON AS SUCH TRANSLATION IS MADE, THE DOCUMENT WOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE RESPECTIVE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. HE STATED FURTHER THAT HE WOULD FURNISH TO LESLIE MORRIS EITHER A COPY OR A RESUME OF THE AFOREMENTIONED DOCUMENT AS SOON AS A TRANSLATION 1S MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM, LESLIE MORRIS TOLD NY 694-S* THAT HE IN TURN WOULD MAKE WHATEVER MIGHT BE GIVEN TO MORRIS BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AVAILABLE TO THE CPUSA,
NY 694-S* STATED THAT HE WILL FURNISH FURTHER DETAILS REGARDIN HIS TRIP TO TORONTO ON JANUARY 3 NEXT.
NY 694-S* FURTHER ADVISED THAT HE HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION FOR NY 694-S* AND HIS WIFE FROM JACK COWAN, CANADIAN CP MEMBER, WHO 1S CLOSE TO THE CANADIAN CP SECRETARIAT, TO ACCOMPANY COWAN AND HIS WIFE TO NASSAU ON SUNDAY, JANUARY 5 NEXT, NY 694-S* STATED THAT HE WILL BE IN NASSAU BETWEEN JANUARY ° ΕΝ ANG feTuRN TO NY ON JANUARY 12. HE STATED HIS PRIMARY PURPQSE ΙΝ GOING. TO, NASSAU iS TO PROVIDE HIS WIFE WITH A NEEDED REST, μὴ δὴ au
AIR MAIL COPY TO CHICAGO, §' '
RECEIVED: 2:31 AM ENT
If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably ) poeraphrased in order to protect the Bureau’s cryptographic systems.
OPTIONAL FORM HO. 10 5010-106 MAY 1942 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 ᾿ Tolson
¢ ™ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT he Casper Callahan Memorandum cs ΝΕ Ὡς — AB TO : Mr. Conratiw” DATE: January 6, 1964 Sullivan Ai y ᾿ a 0 τον (2) “" Trotter Lop at ᾿ Tele. Room FROM υἷ M Li C.F. Downing Holmes SUBJECT: ΟΝ Wut) _ “INTERNAL SECURITY - C Oy, ( Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidenti j
informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by radio.
On 1/6/64 transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station al Midland on scheduled times and frequencies at which time a message was sent.
The plain text of the message is set forth below. The cipher text is attached.
NR 627 GR 144
TO BIRCH (Gus Hall) FROM LAST (Henry Winston). BEST WISHES AND HAPPY NEW YEAR, (Number) i. IN PRAGUE (repeat) PRAGUE I HAD A TALK WITH RODRIGUEZ... HE PROMISED TO RENDER ANY ASSISTANCE TO BEATRICE (repeat) BEATRICE JOHNSON (repeat) JOHNSON, IN REPLY TO MY PROPOSAL TO ADDRESS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE SUGGESTING NORMALIZATION RELATIONS BETWEEN CUBA (repeat) CUBA AND UsA (repeat) USA RODRIGUEZ PROMISED TO CONVEY IT TO FIDEL CASTRO | AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CASTRO MAY INCLUDE THIS PROPOSAL INV His SPEECH ON JANUARY (number) 2. PLEASE PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO THIS, (Number) 2. ROBSON WAS GOING TO MAKE A NEW YEAR STATEMENT DEVOTED TO THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE. ἝΝ
' Cae ae RODRIGUEZ is probably Ἵ eat with cern, « a functionary ἰ ΘΕ the Cuban Government. BEATRICEAJ OHNSON is robably identical with the | gk Havana correspondent of the communist east coast newspaper, "The Worker,"
ge of that name. ROBSON is probably identical with Paul Robeson, Ὕ singer \ and Soviet apologist, “ie has spent considerable time in the see
ACTION: “4 | σὺ et OLY
ν For information. we eo di 10 re) eo Enclosure
Belmont — Sally oo? (Attention: Mr. J. A.Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw) ΓΕ idl
ENCLOSURB/ yp, - LQG 9 9) - 27}
S119 (1-10-61)
tate ee
m4
Domestic Intelligence Division
INFORMATIVE NOTE
1/3/64
Attached contains hiehlichts of conference by NY 694-S* with Leslie Morris, Secretary of Canadian Commimist Party.
Dete
Upon receipt of complete details from informant dis- semination will be made to Depariment, State, CIA, and military agencies.
BCR
is
SECLASSIF our ΠΡ AUTHORITY DERIVED FROH: 1 ~= Mr, Belmont FEI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION ΡΕΤΕ * parE 12-20-2011 1 - Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr, Baumgardner 1... Mr, Branigan 1 ~ Liaison danuney 7, 1094 u DY BEATS ATS 0 Cs 3 Ξ yo™ | ma Yonorablce Jaan i, MeCone 5 το Director yagi ys z ὃ Contral intolligcones Agcuey go ' . Fo = Yoohineton, τὶ, ὃν 5. “Ξ a cre τ᾿ * = i= Doar ty, Lelono: ; το havo loarned frou ἃ Gest ΟΣ
Ὁ courec which hao furnished rolin ΠῈΣ Ἐπὶ infozzation in she past thet
Loviet τος δ ob, Chvushkehcy zorently becpared zt προσ ΟΕ ἀθᾶρος ‘ocd to MALY Teoas of σου throucnent the τοῖα ashins for a bevedation os tho cold var, “Sao heavy cencentr ration of | thincse tyoons on the wince λῶν bardex la vcopsnoible vox “Cheashehoy's OL PSIeLs te conkin Lick counteics with reaneat to cadint: the mold vey, Uovuchehov bolievcs thac by ona senuiens ith the Germans, sor πολ, tho Coviets will bo able to move tPoIps eyon the Vics’ toa the East ond concoentyrnte on the Chinese,
i ecorading to invornation rcealved by our courceo, ( | Cornice China is eur seentiy ον lts govoleon noliey “ wath weapoot to Ltn borders on dia dcaive to ΞΟ σα γι
igo borders a9 thoy woo a huadycd youre eco, At that tice the Chincsa ters ΡΟ waa & GrCrk & ucad nord cxtorsiye oid Sneludcd areas wow hold by tho Coviot Unios,
Decause of the concltive nat oe δρλσοοι o hava elacsisied thio comiumication | “tipi Coe ee" Shits ine roxnetion £5 boing furniched to othor “inter ostod orfioeLaia ν΄ of ¢ho ἀονονεπςὺς
ες | RecA Jory ~ 5: (G73 9479.
Tolson 100-428091 analog Ὅτ,
I ἢ» Η A i Q et — i Δ, τ an a 7}! Calle ——————— | "ge AN 1016 49
Callahan Conrad DeLoach Evans
+ Α
hy
4 τ a
cate WGS: kmj i . m Bo oN Rosen (8) i oy TMV GO δὲν tte | Γ i Ϊ Tavel σα Ι ἘΝ ‘ ct
Tole, Room ge Mest nskleceezn [’
Holnfge PT Ἵ1 Ἰοδᾷ Gongyte ἔττὴς tae ROME] τεμετυρε ὑμῖν Lo
16» sdacer
Honorable John A, MecCone
NOTE?
Classified Days δοκέοι" because unauthorized disclosure of this informatiom could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage to the Nation, Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Com~- munist Party. See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, IS-C."
+ Ske
ἮΝ » ΒΟΌΤΕ IN ENVELOPE
LASSTFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED F Rom: ,
AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION CUIDE lL = Mr, Belmont ATE 1-30-2011 1 - Mr, Sullivan 1 = Mr, Baumgardner 1» Mr, Branigan 1 - Liaison 1 = Mr, Shaw " January 7, 1964 (0) . 8 F _‘p BY LIAISON =o =. a ni ~ Lieutenant General Jasegh F. Carroll ων > = Director ( me = Defense Intelligence Ageacy mes 9 The Pentagon = = Washington, ἢ, Ὁ. 3 sa | zrE= Dear General:
We have learned fron a most sensitive source which has furnished reliable information in the past that Soviet Premier Nikita S, Ehrushchey recently prepared a “nasdive decument” addressed to "All Heads of Government" throughout the world asking for ἃ termination of the cold war. The heavy concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Soviet border ig respansible for Ehrushchey's pro- posals to capitalist countries with respect to ending the ¢old war, Ehrushchey believes that by ensing tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able to move troops from the West to the East and concentrato'on the
Chinese, According to information received by our our source, Communist Ching is currently baging ite foreign policy with roapect to ite borders on its desire to re-establish
its borders as they were a hundred years ago. At that tine
the Chinese territory was a great deal were extensive ond
included areas. now held by the Soviet Union.
Because of the sensitive natur
information is pe ane furnished to ether intefested officials
100~428091 fi ‘gincerats’ yours, Talsoo
Belmont —__ Wh, A i wl thy ἱ
STi SRE NOTE PAGE TWO By zie he te τὰν
Casper Caliahan
Gandy TELETYPE uNiT [1
nS J ant Laie
--- .-. - -- -α mn --ὦὃὦ'ὁΝἝν.---. .. ....... --.- ee
é é def sn
Lieutenant General Joseph F, Carroli
NOTE:
Classified age ace" because unauthorized disclosure of this information could reveal the identity of the source, who is of continuing value, and such revelation could result in exceptionally grave damage
to the Nation, Source is NY 694-S*, who obtained this information during his recent mission to Canada where he conferred with the top leadership of the Canadian Con- munist Party. See New York teletype and airtel, both dated 1/3/64 and captioned "Solo, I5-C,"
-~ 2-—
OPTIONAL FORM HO, 10
4010-104
UNITED STATES & [ENT ‘5
M em 0 V bev [ἡ word ὶ
TO
ya
ME
suapeen, O SOLO ) S= Ὡ
DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091 )
SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637A)
ReNYlet 12/4/63.
pate: 1/3/64
The records of the NYO reflect the following transactions regarding SOLO funds, as reported by NY 695-85 during the month of December, 1963:
Credits
on hand 12/1/63
Debits
12/11/63 to GUS HALL for:
12/17/63
AWS
~ Bureau
Democratic Party Work $3,000.00 National Executive Comn-
ittee Meeting expenses Pe 2ooroe Peoples World 2,500.00 BETTY GANNETT for
"political Affairs" $2, 000.00 $12,000.00
to LENA DAVIS SCHERER FOR:
Prompt Press $4,000.00
CP National office
expenses $14,000.00 $18, 000,00
Total Debits:
Balance:
RM L - Chicago 134 46-2) (sou0)(r0
1 - New York (134-91 Bey #41 1 ~ New York (100-128861 1 - New York (#41)
WGC:men ,», ὁ ὦ
4
xy
?
10 JAN Nae
5) (#4 mops Ae)
Nz
CPUSA-FUNDSSKESERVE F
$258,595.00
ξ
4 12,000,00
$ 18,000.00
4 30,000.00 $228,595.00
wR joo- 4357, 355]
\
re
οἰ 68 TAN 147964 ye ye
Ἢ
Yr Me 1
i woop ς |
re ᾿
SAC, Chicaro (134-46 Sub B} 110-64
Director, EBL (100~428091) L - Ir, Shaw
Gh | CUSOLO NYERVAL SECURITY . ¢
Reurairtel 12.27.68 enclesing one copy oF the pook, "Dag Procrarm der KPdSU und der Westen” (Tho Propran of the CPSU and the West) written by Tinur Timofeov.
Being returned herewith is the copy of the kook furnished as an enclosure to reairtel. For γοῦν infornation, the Bureau has made photostats of this beok,
Enclosure 4 C q 7,7} mor Sa pO. ag [66- 2547, ἴω go θ᾽ JAN 10 1964
eee ᾿ [τ απο,
“ ᾿ ye fr 4
= ™ yi
: ες ΤΙ
“ 11". MAIL BOOM TELETYPE unit L_]
ὧδ . : , ᾿ _@ Φ β 9 © TRANSLATION FROM GERMAN The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the West From the Soviet Viewpoint (European Perspectives) Europa Publishing House, Wien, Koeln, Stuttgart, Zuerich. By Timur Timofejew (or Timofeev) Printed in Austria by Gutenberg, Wiener Neustadt.
The book was written with the cooperation of Wladimir Turadshjew (or Vladimir Turadshev),
Translated from the Russian by Lili Keith, Erich Einhorn, Heddy Hofmaier and Spartak Borissow (er Borisov).
Contents Page Preface 7 The Manifesto of the New World 9 ‘The Higher Phase 18 What Communism is 19 The Production Apparatus of Communism 21 Utopia or Realism ? 42 Competition of the Giants 45 Production and Man 52 To Each According to His Needs 62 Genuine and Seeming Surplus 70 Economy and Politics 73 A New Society - A New Race of Men 179 Communism Means Peace 93 Where the Danger of War Arises 94 bé The New Ratio of Power 96 bic Powerful Influence 107 The Strength of the Model 109 Guatemala Will Not Be Repeats 111
[a ἢ tao: hee pase
Necessary Concessions
The Collapse of Colonialism
The Class Struggle Under Peace Conditions
Two Worlds - Two Tendencies
Capitalism in the Vise of the Contradictions
The New Given Conditions and Marxism The "Neocapitalistic” Front and the Reality The Omnipotence of the Monopolies The Capitalism "Without Crises" The Exploitation Increases Integration’ of Europe or Fight of the Trusts ? Not "Social Concord," but Fight Against the Monopolies Communism ~ the Future of wand ὉΠ ἢ
bad Ν & ott. Ν ὑϊ. Ἂ
FD-96 (Rev. 12-13-56)
Date: 1/6/64
(Type in plain text or code)
AIRTEL REGISTERED (Priority or Method of Mailing)
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM: NEW YORK €100-134637) ) A ( SUBJECT: ἫΝ ; “}
ἶ A coded=ciphered radio| message was sent to NY 694-s* on 1/6/64 by the Soviets, the plain text of which is as follows: : μΜ "To GUS HALL from HENRY anston est wishes and/ _ Happy New Year. wa lipase
| "1, In Prague I had a talk with RODRI UR? He hf promised to render any assistance ro, BBATRIGE SO κέν
In reply to my proposal to address the American People C! ἰ.:. suggesting normalization relations between Cuba and USA RODRIGUEZ promised to convey it to Fidel Castro and it
is possible that Castro may include this proposal in his
speech on January 2. Please pay special attention to this.
{5-C
"2, ROBESON was going to make a New Year statement devoted to the struggle for peace,” ᾿
Ἔν Τὰ would appear that RODRIGUEZ pasethis refers to Ὁ CARLOS BAFAEN\RODRIGUEZ, Director of "Hoy," the Cuban CP news paper, in that\BEATRICE JOHNSON, to whom reference is made in the message, is "The Worker" correspondent in Havana, Cuba.
In the absence of NY 694-S*, who is currently in Nassau, Bahamas, and scheduled τῷ retum to New York on 1/12/64, νὰ 3 ΣΎΝ 428091) (ΒΜ) «ἀϑ' St 3 ἘΠῚ i 69) -3 1 - CHICAGO- (134-46-Sub-B) (RUN AM) / oo “ 43 ot £ ἡ ἫΝ
1 - NY 134-91 (INV)(41) -- 1 = NY 100-134637 (41) g JAN Z 1964 Ne ἢ Tins D , π΄ SS wl a ph aa Approved: A | Sent 4M SOCO~Perr ΟΝ ne ΣΝ in Charge A δ
ἰΞι νι:
' Special} Ob JAN 18 eli
NY 100-134637
the above message was telephonically furnished to the Chicago Office 1/6/64 for referral to CG 5824-S*, with understanding it will not be furnished to GUS HALL.
The message will be furnished to NY 694-S* upon his return to New York, who will furnish it to GUS HALL.
PTIGHAL FORM NO, 10 SO OE-Oa MAY 1662 EDITION GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27
UNITED STATES COVERNMENT Memorandum
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) DATE: January 6, τοοῖ
ΝΙΝ : SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub F)
SUBJECT: ἫΝ
c
(4 Re Bureau letter dated 5/4/60 und Chicago letter dated 12/17/63,
| Referenced Bureau letter dated May 4, 1960, instructed Chicago to set forth details of receipts and disbursements of funds in possession of CG 5824-S* and report such information to the Bureau by the fifth of the month following the month being reported.
Balance of funds in possession of CG 5824-S* as of November 30, 1963
Solo Funds
Yaintained in cash in safe deposit box, Michigan Avenue National Bank, | Chicago, T1TAnOiS, so ceccaccacveceeaceaeand 23 , 830.58
Maintained in cash in safe deposit
pox, Chicago Office, FBI, to be 7} returned to CG 5824-8* for redeposit “ἡ in sage deposit box, Mid America
National Bank, Chicago, T1Linois,..csses 62,000/60
CP, USA Reserve Funds
Maintained in cash in safe deposit box, Michigan Avenue National Bank,
Chicago, ΟΣ PEE ae a 22,8 oY age a) : Rites £07, Ak, ae 90
top ------- π΄ ™ ἐκ ise es oe, “
᾿ rhe i” ane 2 - Bureau (RM) died Pio Wes 2 ~- New York (2H) ees (1 - 100-134637) (SOLO)! © τ κει fie τ΄ (1 -- 100-128861) (CP, USA - Reserve funds) ar, 1 - Chicaso " ἐγ Ri: DLL ἢ ih ye [ἡ Cee Lf
Bo Jaya? cat
ue
CG 184-46
Soup ἢ
AMOLELORS
Foto Fords
feewivead Frou represcntutive of
the Internawtionst ρος
σον Committee, Cr, Soviet
Union, durin: course of Vth solo Mission, Hoveuber, 1955, and added
to Solo funda December, 12°03 (lor
details see Chicuro airtel captioned "SOLO, IS = €," Thscorbor 9, LOB. ese ld
πὰ σὸς ὁ wr omwaces CP, UGA toserve Funds
Solo funds hone, WONG.
Totil funds in yvossension of CG U024-5% as ox παστοῦ 21, 1253
Solo funds
fhuintiined in cach in sare deposit
box, Michizan Avenue National Baak, Chicurro, ΕἸ βολιθ, κα να seman naensenne
τὰ ἀγερλχι ἀπ cash in suite aeposle Ἔν.
box, Mid ἀρωχίοιυ National Pant, Cniesapo, ΤΊΊ ΛΟ ἘΠῚ κι wwe eet eee eae
faintained in cash in cate deposit
box of Chicaro Office, FBI, to ho returned to CG 5524-8% for redenosit
im gave devosit pos, Mid America National Pank, Chicaszo, Illinois,
during veek οὐ δου ὦ, LEGA. κι κὰκ κὰν
6,005..0Ὁ
6,003, 00
62,000.00
CG 134-46 Spb ὦ
cP, US. Hesorve Muads
Maintained in cash in save deposit box, Michiran avenue Nacional Bunt, Chicacs, TLLiNOL cava vert aevanruvataceeeaay 22,005 Ὁ ἃ
Potal 3114,689,90
v
----- ---΄ς--..----..---- - τ -ν----- - ---τ-- - Ἐ-ἶ-ς-ς----ς---Ἴ--ς--------- -π--τ------ ---------------------.---....--------- - ---.ὄ--»....
FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)
Transmit the following in
FBI
Date: 1/10/64
(Type in plain text or cade)
͵ AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL ΝΕ
(Priority or Method of Mailing) |
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100~-428091)
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) ( ;
ReBuairtel dated 1/8/64, For the Bureau's information, debriefing has been completed and all information received from CG 824-53: relative
to the 14th Solo Mission has been submitted to the Bureau by Letterhead memoranda or informant statements.
£
Lot he ,
;
REG 58)
/ 00. 42 ὁ 197} - -22.5:
αὐ} 15 1954
el
ea’ @eureay a ζ NE\
WH: DW (4)
devin ral i 22 yl
Approved: DG] Sent ὦ Μ Per WW
1 ὦ 6 5 JAM AY 1 " ΕΙ α Κ gent fin LV
rN
FD-36 {Hev. 12-13-59} : .
| | Ι | FBI i Date: 1/10/64 |
|
|
Transmit the following in
(Type in plain text or code)
νι. APRTED ὃ ὃἝὃ REGISTERED MAIL (Priority or Method of Mailing)
mmc i i me ee ee re ie ee ee
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) (4 FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) OLO = C
ReBuairtel dated 12/26/63.
The matter referred toin reairtel has not to date been handled by Chicago because of lack of opportunity for extended personal contact at which discussicn on this matter could be held. Every effort, however, will be made by Chicago, to handle this matter as expeditiously as possible.
ᾧῷ Ὁ μου τ χοη BOP
ae dA Lo 4862 ᾿ Ἡ ἐν Ἶω Bureau (RM) ΟΝ Oar: York (100-134637) (Info) (RM) [ὴ ia 1-Chicago
RVH: LDW (5)
mel att Approved: Sent. —eesesSSMsséP
Go. 4 AM 1 /Seagiol ΓΝ Charge
ιϑοίίμαν. 12-13-56)
" le * _ t , | ,
ΕΒῚ
Date: 12/27/63
Transmit the following in
(Type in plain text or code)
γα. AIRTEL _—=s«<§—Ss REGISTERED MAIL (Priority or Method of Mailing) |
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091)
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (134-46 Sub B) Lo oa. / | “47 SOLO, { I $-- C
"σον
ReBuairtel dated 12/23/63.
Epes Pros herewith for the Bureau is one copy of Pate "Das Programm der KPdSU und der Westen," ("The |
rogram of the CPSU and the West"), written by TIMUR TIMOFEEV, which the Bureau expressed an interest in reviewing by reairtel.
'
CG 5824-S* has indicated that he intends to present this book to PEGGY DENNIS, mother of TIMUR TIMOFEEV, in approximately 45 to 60 days. Therefore, the Bureau may retain
this book for thatperiod at the end of which time Chiéago will return the book to CG 5824-5S*, Oe POR LA SHO ee NED IN LAB. 3 PPB Ue ἙΒΡΟΗΣ νὐτ (Bureau (Enc. i-Chicago WAB: MDW (4) | ᾿ Y ΓΙ Rho : | : _ ......,, Μ ΡΣ
Δ ᾿ 7 She aba al Agent in Chirge
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 15 - Tolson ~ “UNITED STATES GOVE ENT Belmont γ 10.
r Casper “ Memorandum anne Conrad ᾿ βϑΠοσοῖ, το : My, Ἐν ὦ, paungardner eC DATE: 1-14-64 Rosen Sullivan tes 1. - Mr. Baumgardner Trotter
FROM Mr, We Ge Shaw : 1 - My. Shaw rare. Room
Gandy
NAL SECURITY - C
This memorandum outlines the material developed during Solo Mission 14, and will assist in locating pertinent data within the 5010 file,
DESCRIPTION OF INFORMATION: AIRTEL SERIAL ALGERIA (CP OP) wcccccncseccccccscsvensnsesvcceserns 12/7/63 3404
ALTMAN, MISCHA CPUSA member residing in Vienna, Austria....... 12/16/63 3527 Wrote document orf int. inst. of PEACE το νου 12/9/63 3505 AMERICANS IN USSR (Writing book). ..ccccccccesesecese 12/16/63 3475 APOLOGISTS OF NEO-COLONIALISM (pamphlet by Chinese). 12/19/63 3511 ARISHMENDI, RODNEY (CP of Uruguay).cccccccnvsascesss 12/17/63 3482
ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. .ccccnccccvcseses 12/5/63 3448 BARKOVSEY, VLADINTR (CPSU OFFicial) wecccccsccsseseser 12/19/63 3513 BELLA, AHMED BEN (Leader of Algeria) wessesecsvesesves 12/7/63 3404
BORODIN, MICHAEL (Husband of Anna L, Strong).....e.+ 12/12/63 3506 BUDISH, JACOB (Royalty from "World Marxist Review"). 12/16/63 3476 CARLISLE, HARRY cocccccncreceseessvcesnsecesecenesess 12/9/63 3409 }ς 1 Lei CO ee ἡ ὺ ee | 12/10/63 3417 ἘΠῚ Roberto Comacho)...eeee. 12/16/63 3469 CHERNIK, ENU CP Of Czechoslovakia) -csssccecececes 12/17/63 3508 CHILE (CP ΟἿ) veccncerivvccccsesesesensevesvesssesecs 12/19/63 3512
CHINA (CP of) Aid from Soviet UNTON. wecccecancessssevanvesese 12/6/63 3372 . Cancels Loan to Ghand.rsccesccccecescsssesesese 12/16/63 3468 LL Discussion with CP of New Zealand... .c.cscesesee 12/7/63 3382 . SHipS armS tO Iraq.escecccsensccsessssaceseseee 12/7/63 3384
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
Travel expenses to Soviet Union... .ssccececsccese 12/18/63 3493 Desires printing equipment from East Germany... 12/13/63 3467 Political and funds ΠΟΘΙ, ccsceccesesereveses 12/12/63 3465 Relations with Cuba. cecccnceenreessenesseeteres 12/12/63 3462
To pass on future visitors to USSR...ccesecesee 12/11/63 3461 5;
viets of BG, O06, .cecesscnsecaceses 12/9/63 3405 Bic
(studying in USSR) ...ccsesecesness 12/16/63 3471
MUTUAL, RCONOMIC ASSioranee 7 7777 17177τηη᾽5 12/11/63 3440
100-2596) au ἣν» ΤΑΝ ‘REG 40 / 00 a (, f ObL a7) rf
WGS: pq: (ὃ go JAN LG.i964
nth
Ἷ ᾿ Β Ws γακρίς τριμοι σπσν
“αἱ i μ Ἂ we tt } ἡ é
Memorandum to Mr. Ἐς, J. Baumgardner RE: SOLO 100-428091
CUBA Relations with SOVIETS. ccoessvenevevsessesseersers Shipment of arms to Venezuela. .cassesecessesecs CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Domestic Situation) ...scrcescvcnenene DENNIS, PEGGY (To yeceive $2,000) wcecsncccevescccss ESCALANTE, ANIBAL (living in exile in USSR)..cccscee ESCALANTEL, CESAR (Visits USSR). .ccccvcessccccccceee Discusses Cuban relations with CPUSA...ccccoees FOSTER, ESTHER (Soviets furnish funds for). ..ecceeens FOSTER, WILLIAM Z, (film on life). .cccccccccescscceds Film on life brought tO CPUSAccvrevesnevvcccvess FRANCE (CP ΟΕ), veveccccccveccacecusneseaccesesececes Difficulty with "World Marxist Review". scsesces FREED, NORMAN (Canadian CP representative) Paid $95 for aiding CPUBA ceo ncvsaceseceseeenens Requests CPUSA publications. .ccscrccescccaccons Oan cancelled by CP of China)...cecccevccence GREEN, GIL (letter to Henry WinSton)...ccccscecesece HALL, GUS (CPUSA General Secretary) Soviets criticize for using term "Left". ..ceseoe i " ist Review".
ee eee ᾧ καὶ 8 ἃ ἃ καὶ ἃ Καὶ α ἡὶ ὦ Ψὶ ὁ ὁ ὁ αὶ eer
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE ,.ccccoscccceseces INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHERS... cece ccvecccccccneenseses IRAQ (Shipment of arms by Chinese). ...ccsccccevccesens JANDIK, CFNU)} (Czech OFLIciAL) cccccccceccnvevesscces JEWISH QUESTION (Soviets decline comment) ..ccccssess JOHNSON, BEATRICE ("The Worker" Correspondent in Cuba eeF OPER PPP CCH υ ὶ ὃ ὁ ἃ ὁ ἃ Βὶ ἃ ἃ ὦ ᾧ Paid through CP of Canada Instructions re activity in Cuba. .ccccccscseces Discussion with Cuban officials concerning..... Letter to Henry WAINStON. cesncosseceseseseseseees KENNEDY, PRESIDENT (Assassination Of ).sesccsceecvees KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA (Speech 10/14/62) .cccaccsencceese KLING, JACK (Contact with Polish Consulate, Chicago) KORTANOYV, VITALY (CPSU OFLACLAL) cccccccenveesesseses Current SEATUS . coccracecasnesevseresesaeessveses KOTZMAN , LADISLAV (Czech OLTLCLAL) wescacacesccsussss
=~ Dn
AIRTEL
12/11/63 12/11/63 12/17/63 12/9/63 12/7/63 12/9/63 12/12/63 12/9/63 12/17/63 12/23/63 12/6/63 12/9/63
12/18/63 12/17/63 12/7/63
12/16/63 12/16/63 12/10/63
12/17/63 12/16/63 12/16/63 12/4/63 12/9/63 12/9/63 12/7/63 12/6/63 12/17/63
12/15/63 12/17/63 12/12/63 12/10/63 12/5/63 12/7/63 12/16/63 12/7/63 12/7/63 12/6/63
SERTAL
3438 3437 3508 3405 3381 3412 3462 3405 3489 3530 3389 3411
3493 3481 3380 3473 3468 °° 3407 © '”
348 5% 3476 3470 3371 3505 3509 3384 3373 3488
3493 3490 3462 3418 3448 33883 3507 3404 3388 3374
- ¢@ é
Memorandum to Mr. F. J. Baumgardner RE: SOLO 100-428091
KOZLOV , F, R, (Soviet OFFICIAL) cacccccsccesccccses LABOR RESEARCH (Soviets want publications of)..... LAWSON, JOHN HOWARD (To contact re Clif Odets).... LITERATURE PROBLEMS (Taken up with Soviets)......+. LOHR, GEORGE (Wants to move to Africa) .csvovsesecs
LUKTANOV, PAVEL (Soviet intelligence official).....
MATTHEWS, JOE (CP of South Africa). ...ccccrssecsecs MOSTOVETS, NIKOLAL (Soviet official) eeepeue eee δ δ PHF MIKHAILOV, IGOR (Soviet official) .cccsccescsnesecs NEW ABRALAND (CP OL) ccccccccasencseneseesesenessese "NOVA MYSL" (Organ of CP of Czechoslovakia) .....+. NOWAK, STANLEY (Poles do not regard as CP member). ODETS, CLIFFORD (Soviets to publish his works).... OSWALD, LEE HARVEY Soviets desire to know if member FPCC..coccace Soviet's file regarding. .ccccsecceesseevssees Soviets reaction LTegarding.ccccccccsevcserseses PANUSHKIN, A. (Former Soviet Ambassador to USA)... PARTY LIFE (Organ of CPUSA) cececcvccvccssceccececes PENKOVSEKY, OLEG (Soviets reaction to). ccssccceasee POLISH EMBASSY (contact with in Chicago) .scessessee POLISH UNITED WORKERS PARTY (contact with). .secees PONOMAREV, BORIS N. (Soviet official) wccccccanvoes PROGRAM OF CPSU AND WEST (by Timur Timofeev)...... RADIO MOSCOW ccc ce teers ecccereeereeereeneneoneece "RUDE PRAVO" (Organ of CP of Czechoslovakia) ..eees RUMYANTSEV, A. (Editor of "World Marxist Review"). ROBESON, PAUL (Winston to visit in E. Germany).... SHARKEY, L. L. (Official of CP of New Zealand).... SILVERMASTER, NATHAN G, (Re visit in Moscow). ...4. SINO- SOVIET DISPUTE. sce cer cere svesasecreeseseresers Ramifications of ἘΞ} SIRINOV, PROFESSOR I. (Mail drop in USSR)...cseees SOBOLEV, A. (Editor, "World Marxist Review")...... SOCTALIST UNETY PARTY OF E. GERMANY. ....ccaessases SOLO APPAVATUS . scessccncaesereseeseeeeseseeseesecs Informant no longer needs Czech viSa..sccsaas Activities of informant in MOSCOW. ..escoseees Activities of informant in Prague..ccccsscece Activities of Informant in London...ccccscsss Highlights of Solo La ccanecceccaccccaneasceces 5ΟΌΤΗ AFRICA (cP OL) ccccccccecncscasscuuseesenesas
~ 3 ou
AIRTEL
12/17/63 12/17/63 12/12/63 12/18/63 12/16/63 12/19/63 12/12/63 12/11/63 12/9/63
12/7/63
12/17/63 12/16/63 12/12/63
12/17/63 12/9/63 12/5/63 12/17/63
12/17/63
12/16/63 12/16/63 12/16/63 12/7/63 12/16/63 12/16/63 12/17/63 12/16/63 12/13/63 12/7/63 12/10/63 12/7/63 12/7/63 12/17/63 12/16/63 12/7/63
12/19/63 12/17/63 12/11/63 12/11/63 12/10/63 12/4/63
12/12/63
SERTAL
3473 3485%* 3464 3509 3478 3513 3463 3442 3406 3382 3508 3507 3464
3485* 3425 3448 3486 3491 3474 3507 3507 3386 ἡ 3479 3480 3508 3476 3466 3382 3408 3404 3386 3485 3476 3377
3513 3508 3442 3419 3441 3371 3463
ΣΝ 4Φ Φ
Memorandum to Mr. F, J. Baumgardner RE: SOLO 100-428091
SOVIET UNION Reaction to assassination of Pres, Kennedy...ee-s Relations with Cuba. .rcsccvccsrccerasscsccacsevaes Delegation to visit Ceylon and India.s..ccccccces Debriefs experts who worked in China. .sssesaaees SPANISH LANGUAGE MARKIST MATERIAL. ..cccacccccecaceses STERN, MARTHA DODD (AfrTed) .ccccccrecvevesecvceceveces STRONG, ANNA LOUISE. wa cce cece cane erseeeeseaeenseseeens SUSLOV, M. A. (Soviet of ficial) wcrscccsccceccccveeses TERESHK IN, Vv. P, (Soviet OFLiciAal) .ecccccccvcvcsceces TIMOFEEV , TIMUR: (wrote DOOK) ceccecevesecaveceseneeses Concerned because of mother, Peggy Dennis),...... URUGUAY (cP ro ΜΉ ΨΥ VENEZUELA (Arms shipped from Cuba) ..cccoscscvvccsvoce WAGNER, ZENIK (Czech official) ..cscvccceccovncccecess info re Cuban arms to Venezuecla..ccees (Correspondent for Afro-Am, in Moscow). : (BELLE) Paid $250 for trip to USSR. .ccscccccceesecsseoce Arrival in MOSCOW scccen en certsorserececesenesneens Paid $1006 by BOVLEES seer cecceverncecessancesesse WINSTON, HENRY Travel to Czechoslovakia. scocesecceseesevesseeve Letter tO Gus Hallisavcscvcrsaneesesnssesscaasas To travel tO EB. Germany.cccccccccesceesevseceseee Re return to the ἘΆΝ Not to visit in Cubs acccoserevesnseveceanesspace WORLD MARXIST REVIEW To send 2000 copies to World BooksS....cccacssvece Dissension WITHIN. seccecer secrete enseceereetnsane Disagreement with France. rccccccccccatenscasvecs WORLD BOOKS (To receive copies of World Marxist
ROVLGW) cccccsesaccesccacessceceseesccccn
ACTION:
None. File for record purposes.
AIRTEL
12/5/63 12/11/63 12/7/63 12/7/63 12/17/63 12/7/63 12/12/63 . 12/17/63 12/7/63 12/16/63 12/11/63 12/17/63 12/11/63 . L2/17/63 12/11/63 12/18/63
12/18/63 12/18/63 12/9/63
12/10/63 132/10763 12/13/63 12/16/63 12/19/63
12/16/63 12/9/63 12/6/63
12/16/63
3448 3438 3378 3376 3484 3387 3506 3473 3379 3442 3442 3482 3437 3385 3437 3492
3493 3494 3405
3443 3418 3466 3472 3510
3476 3410 3389
3476
SERTAL
be
1, Te ne bic
OPTIONAL FORM HO, 10 " 5010-106 ; MAY 1767 EDITION GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27 Tolson
' UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Belmont
Mohr
Memorandum ROUTE IN ENVELOPE ss
DeLoach
ναι... σι 4 SY Gale if . Conrad pare: January 14, 1964 em gt Sullivan
μὰ
Tavel
Trotter Tele. Room
LG et . . FROM, Lit 90. F. Downing vt Holmes
ve 6 Gandy x ͵ (ως SECURITY -ὦ ἜΚ .0{ῃὌ.0(.Ξ ῷ SPE
-%
Captioned case involves the Bureau's highly valuable confidential informant NY 694-S* who has been receiving communications transmitted to him by. radio.
On 1/13/64, transmissions were heard by the Bureau's radio station at Midland at scheduled times and frequencies, but no messages were transmitted,
ACTION:
For information.
2~- Mr. Sullivan (Attention: Mr. J. Δ. Sizoo, Mr. W. G. Shaw)
oF Jov- 42 509/355
20 JAN AB)964
D-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)
ων ἰ { } [π olson... ΝΣ ἫΝ μ᾿ } Uf t iy. Belmont. ECL CRTION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: mee Ee Mobr_____
FEL AUTOMATIC’ DECLASS IFICATION sSUIT Wh a mee. fe.
τὶ roma oe ROUTE IN ENVELOPE: ΣΝ
rE;
ransmit the following i Alea Fe Cs ae ae (Type in plain text or code) iS! TSA med HE BE Bort Ak
! ayn ΟΝ
iq ATRTBT REGISTERED MAIL i Te cer
i de, Room_ He 3 Ustneg |, ind Gand
TO: DIRECTOR, Bt (100-2809) |)? yan
"
te re ee ee eee ee i i ee i
FROM: SAC, NE YORK [(100-234637 ) iia ff
MTS BY (oS ci) ΒΘΒΚΝ =
ἣ SUBJECT: fSOLg.. x) Af pee ὌΝ : ἐν ae aM =" [Ὁ ye ἀ i : - et τὸ " , C
we
ReNYtel, 1/2/64, cone oe 694 G* t trip ὧρ 9 y
ὁ Toronto, Canada, 12 ἐς Ἢ ο 1/2/6 - =a
e085 SAS ALEXANDER ¢ C. yo 1/3/64, as as forlows (if Hes
ἢ According to ‘orgekenens, ORRIS, General Secretary, CP of Canada, the Soviet Ambassa dor to Canada informed MORRIS that ~the massive decument" as : for termination of the,cold War, was prepared by KHRUSHCHEV because of the following {fy oe ALS
t_ \y
The concentration of Chinese troops on the Sino-Seviet border is "overwhelming." The Soviets are making the proposals [ |
Eoin peergts ed moa oe
to the capitalist countries with respect to ending the cold war because of this concentration of Chinese troops. By easing
Pt
A tensions with the Germans, for example, the Soviets will be able |.. a\S, to concentrate on the Chinese. If necessary, the Soviets will >I Merk be able to move troops from the west to the east and the Chinese ~ AS will recognize that the Soviets will be able to do this by reaso meee of the fact that tensions have been eased with thé. eapitalist 1 PAN countries ey A BAN PTX nave so many troops, 3 yoga ft " 1 5} ]* Ἶ ~\ SiN AER. 4,2 Sores? 00428031 iL + wens 1 Lad iL « ΜΕ με λοῦτῷ (7) ac Sine aia
τῇ Ν “ἢ
_Approvedy.., eg
ey) ae Ν ΩΣ in Charge “ie
“ut ay! ; é
oe 313, ΤᾺ
th ny § 00-234637) ἢ)
The Soviet Ambassador told LESLIE Moaars that the Chinese are basing their foreign policy, with respect to thely borders, on the borders which China hod 100 vyyenurs ago. At that tame the Chinese territory 2 Was a great deal more extensive and ineluded areas now heid | by the Sovict Union. The Chinese wish fo re-establish their borders as they wore 100 yoars ποία,
NY 6904-S* advised that he met with ΠΤ] ΒΟ, Chairaan of the CP of Canada and the latter's wife at Bucs " residence on 1/1/64,-~ On the authority of the Canadian ΟΡ,
BUCK and NELSON CLARKE, a GP of Canada functionary, who were in Moscow ia May, 1963, sent through the Central Comittee of the CP of the soviet Union to FIDEL CaSTRO who was adso then in Moscow, a letter protesting Cuban support of “FLu" terrorist activities in Canada. Subsequently both BUCK and CLARKE met FPIDEL CaS$ZRO at a reception in Moscow and conferred briefly with him. CLARKE and BUCK raisncd tre question of support of "PLO" activities and Casto told tho to “mind their own damn business." According to TIM Buen, the CP of Cuba docs not enjoy the complete confidence of PIDEL GASTRO in that CASINO relics primarily upon young administrative people who were with him in the mountains prior to his suecessful overthrow of the Batista Recine, Although old time members of the CP of Cuba are respected
by CASTRO, he leans in the direction of the youns adainistrators wuo know nothings of the years of work of the Cuban cP,
The Cuban CP would like to tell PIDEL CASTRO that the ravolution in Gubaw did not bemin when CASTRO came out of the mountains, vather there had been a class strugele existing for years before CASTRO's appearance on the scene and that the cuban CP was extremely helpful in briuging \
about the successful revolution, The Cuban CP considers i¢ politic, however, not to do so.
TTT BUCK utated that CASTRO leans upon the soviet Union in every respect bul at the same tine many of the people surrounding him lean toward the chinese. (K) (Ὁ
I fh 3
MY (100-13463
TIM BUCK informed NY 694.8% that he nad received | letters from "Comrade Jackson" of ὕπο νου Zealand cP whieh reflected that JucKSON is now leaning toward the Soviets rather than the Chinese. sAccordins to JACKSON, others in the leadership of the New Zealand Party are berinainn to lean towards the Soviets. However, the Mew gealand Party ! in total consists of only 500 members
In a subsequent meeting with NY 6904-g*, IESLIZ MORRIS informed NY 694-s* of the followins :
The Sovlet Ambassador to Canada is pleased by
the fact that the Canadian Party will continue 1ts ;
polemics in support of the Sovicts with respect to thelr dispute with the Chinese CP. The Soviet Ambassador further advised MORRIS that the 6 Canadian students who had been sent to Moscow CP training school, have completed their course, The Soviet Ambassador requested that 6 more poudents rrom Cunada be sent to Moscow in the near future to attend this particular CP training school. MORRIS expressed the opinion to ἮΝ 6904-s* that 10 is not wise to send students from Conada to Moscow. He would prefer
that the cP of Canada should provide a training school
for its own students. MORRIS observed that 87 canadian
CP members traveled to the Sovict Union during 1653. MORRIS expressed the opinion that this d¥stracts from the independent character of the Canadian CP, ee ins the influence of the Soviets upon the Canadian oP |
With respect to an inquiry by NY 694~9* concerning printing equipment for the GPUSA to be obtained in Hact σοχσαν, HORRIS informed ἘΝ GO4-s* that he is aware that NORMAN FREED is looking into this-matter for the CPUSA.
Re did not know of the results of FREED's efforts. ‘
MORRIS further informed NV 694-s* that he has no information from NORMAN PRECD concerning the seminar that was scheduled to take place in the German Democratic Republic for 12/€%9/63, coneerning the conditions in the
mast Gertian mer TA
7 ὁ "“"
rad 100-138637/ QS
Γι MORRIS did note, however, that FREED, who is the Canadian CP representative δ the tiorld Marxist Review in Prague , Czechoslovakia, is scheduled to return to Canada re in Feb., 1964.4, MORRIS is not covtain FREGD will return ᾿ Dah οὗ OACanada fuombis assignment on the ‘orld Marxist Review ἐβ because of a discussion presently going Eon between the cP ἰ of Canada and the World Marxist Review. The Canadian cP contends that the- orld Marxist heview 1s "too Russian" and concerns ifdelf to an excessive extent with issues concerning tif Rugslan CP, The Canadian cP contends that bo the tlorld Marxist Review chould adopt a policy of becomins ἘΠ ΚΑ a more international.in character. Ὁ ι
RIS expressed the opinion that the recent artaele y ELIZABL’ a GQURLEY. FLYNN wppearing in the Nov., 1963 is 5 of "Political Affairs" was “indiseraet in that she displayed /. | excessive partiranship for the Sovict position with respect to the China-Soviet dispute: MORRIS requested that his opinion te brought to the attention of GUS HALL, General Seerctary of the cP
MORRIS advised that the Convention of the cP of Canada wlll be held on or about Easter, 1904, and that the CPUSA is ἀγροῦ to send 3 delerates. 9
ΝΞ . Roby IN ENVELOPE
Date: 1/6/64
Transmit the following in
(Type in plain text or code)
Via AIRTEL REGISTERED - | re (Priority or Method of Mailing) ᾿
-.- - - -.............-................-..-.-...-.....-..-.-.... ι...-..-....-. 7 TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-428091) ae ᾿ Ψ FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-134637) ~ AS
SUBJECT: -C
ReNYairtel 1/3/64, concerning NY 694-85} trip to Toronto, Canada, 12/30/63 to 1/2/64. he 5
=S% advised SAS ALEXANDER C. BURLINSON nd. ἊΣ re 1/3/64 that he conferred with GUS HALL, ne ecretary, CPUSA, on that date, advising HALL of the results of his Canadian trip. aie -3/
Page 4, par. 2 of referenced airtel notes that oo | LESLIE MORRIS expressed the opinion that an article by [vet ELIZABETH. CURLEYAFLYAN appearing in the November, 1963, issue of “Political irs" was "indiscreet," in that she displayed excessive partisanship for the Soviet “position with respect to the Ghina~Soviet dispute. MORRIS requested that his opinion ° be brought to the attention of HALL,
)
HALL advised. NY. 694-~S* that he, himself, as well as /
others in the leadership of the CPUSA, agreed with MORRIS! ile opinion of the FLYNN article. HALL stated that the article
reflected an undesirable intimacy between the CPUSA and the Soviets.
Referenced airtel on page 3, par. 4, also notes that Canadian students were attending a CP training school in Moscow. HALL advised NY 694-S* on 1/3/64 that he was uopposed 4)
ἧς 5 we AAA i (100-428091) 1) ἅδ᾽ [Ub σὺ ἐς ὅς ἅ.0 7 4 3 56 1 « GHICAGO- (134-46-Sub -B) (AM-~RM) yet Ν᾿ 1 + ΝΥ 134-91 (INV) (41) -- JAN“? 1964 ζω» ™ ~ NY 100-134637 (41 | ζι Ω WGC :msb Le ee omen a x a i
Approt gdp Sent___ Μ Ρβε Me ὁ wWNSbecial Age ]
NY 100-134637
to the procedure whereby students from this country go to Russia to study, in that it reflects Soviet influence on the CPUSA. HALL said that with respect to the Canadians, he
would suggest that the Canadian CP organize a national training school in Canada which could be used for the training of both Canadian and American students for CP leadership. HALL also suggested that such a school could be staffed with instructors not only from Canada and the United States, but also from -England and possibly even with one from the Soviet Union.
Bureau attention is invited to page 4, par. 1 of referenced NY airtel, lines 3 through 6, which state: "MORRIS is not certain FREED will return to Canada from his assignment on the World Marxist Review because of a discussion presently going on between the CP of Canada and the World Marxist Review." The Bureau and Chicago are requested to change this particular sentence to read as follows: "MORRIS is not certain FREED will return to Prague from Canada to his assignment on the World Marxist Review...."!
KA
: ®
4.™ “UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-63) DATE: any 6 1964 FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-74560) SUBJECT: CPUSA FUNDS " | 15-Ὁ ἊΝ ἣν " : δ The following are the positive results in the tracing of SOLO money used by the CPUSA and related organizations. XN
J Committee for a Free Press
The Committee for a Free Press is the name of the ἢ bank account at First National City Bank, 250 5th Ave., NYC, maintained for receipt and disbursements of monies used in ™ the operation of Publishers New Press, Inc.
Amounts Identical bate of Deposit Denomination with SOLO Funds ΝΜ 6/17/63 7 $10 bills ἃ 93 $20 bills ~ 105 $20 bills ~ 6/25/63 103 $20 bills 77 $20 bills z 69 $10 bills 2 $10 bills a 1 $50 bill ig μι 8/5/63 50 $50 bills 47 $50 bills μ᾿ 8/7/63 1 $10 bill 228 $20 bills 8 253 $20 bills 48 $50 bills 50 $50 bills | 3 Ἐπὶ 9/17/63 220 $20 bills 206 $20 bills g 3 $100 bills Ξ σιν. (> Bureau . ( Ὶ (3 - 100-428091) (SOLO=TRACING OF SOLO MONEY) 2 « Detroit (100-30975) (ASSOCIATION FOR ECONOMIC STUDIES) (1 - 100-13460) (CP BUNDS) 6 - New York a 1 - 97-169) (PUBLISHERS NEW PRESS) (414) 22 ΄. 7; ley Yi ; 1. = 100-14 189) (FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC. YY Pf SA 1 + 100-134637) (SOLO) (41) ΝΟΥ RECORDED 1 - 65-17695) (TRACING OF AMERICAN MONEY 162 JAN 10 1964 USED IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE ΟΡ ΠΑ ΤΟΝ ΘῚ ra . (1 - 100-141893) (YOUTH PUBLICATIONS) (414) st ij SS RLP:jec «Ὁ
(11)
we C4 53 JAN 23 1864
NY 100~74560
9/23/63 150 $20 bills 145 $20 bills
10/11/63 2 $100 bills 60 $20 bills 62 $20 bills
10/23/63 140 $20 bilis 126 $20 bills
10/28/63 298 $20 bills 278 $20 bills
11/6/63 150 $20 bills 142 $20 bills
Freedomways Associates, Inc,
The account for this organization is maintained at the Amalgamated Bank of New York, 11-15 Union Square, NYC,
7/19/63 200 $20 bills 194. $20 bills 1 $5 bill 5 $1 bill
Association: ‘for -Economic Studies
The account for this organization is maintained at the Bank of the Commonwealth, Wyoming-Grand River Branch, Detroit, Michigan.
7/11/63 50 $20 bills 45 $90 bills
wouth Publications, Inc.
The account for this organization is maintained in the Amalgamated Bank of New York, mentioned above, 7/18/63 ko $20 bills 35 $20 bills 2 $10 bills
The identity of the foregoing money was established by checking serial numbers against the index maintained in connection with NY case 65-17696, "DHE TRACING OF AMERICAN MONEY USED IN SOVIET ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS,"
ZHE FOREGOING INFORMATION SHOULD NOP BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE BUREAU.
° > 73 ώ
| O a
; OLO RNAL SECURITY -~ C NY 694-S* has following itinerary for trip to Nassau, Bermuda, and return? Laie ngage me Rh eerecuasiernienrerersirn errata,
Leave J, F, Kennedy Airport, New York City, Sunday, ’ -i-5-64, Pan, American,.Akinwayseliieht 205, 11700 a.m. , ‘arriving Nassau, Bermuda, 1:30 p.m. same date,
When returning will leave Nassau 1+12-64, 3:00 p.m., | via Pan American Flight 206, arriving J. F. Kennedy Airport 6:00 p.m. same date,
While in Nassau, informant will stay at Glenéagles House, He will travel and will be registered in this hotel under his true name and will be accompanied by his wife, Roslyn, Arrangements have been made, utilizing adequate security measures, to contact informant and for him to contact us in
event of emergency,
es ; 3 5 ; Joy - 7: (οὐ) - | NOT RECORDED ἢ 22 JAN Rad 1964 Wye | GE JAN23 1964 - me |
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NECLESSTFIUATIUN AUTHORITY DERIVED ΕΡσπτ. - = FEI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
WATE Ζιφ - 5011
|
"Ἢ 18 (1s) ic0-42e001 ~ 356 1 BY LIAISON
Date: January 14, 1064
Tos Director 1 - Liaison Central Intelligence Agency es Attention: Deputy Director, Plans \ " ͵
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From: John Edgar Hoover, Director “fo ι J
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Subject: REPORTING ON THE IMPACT Of THE SINO-SOVIET “2 =
SPLIT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT “ΤΊ i = m
2 ΟἹ
Reference is made to your memorandum dated by = καὶ
Decenber 30, 1963, captioned as above (your file CSCI-~ SF aay
2/779 276), ὁ concerning the collection of data on the Sine-S ed
Soviet split and requesting that this Bureau make availabl¢ =
any comprehersive study made on the impact of the Sinc- Soviet split on the Communist Party, USA {(CPUSA),
Your study of the impact of the Sino-Soviet split on the international communist movenent is of considerablic interest to us, We are certainly detirous of cacperating to the fullest extent and will continuo to disseninate to you ail date received dealing with the various aepects of the Sino-Soviet dispute and its repercursions,
a We are forwarding to your agency under separate = cover 2x copy of a 1Sl-page study we have prepared entitled - <, "History and Development of the Sino-Soviet Rift,” Gur ° study covers Sino-Soviet relations during the neriod 19568 " 3 to Becember, 1953, which is the period during which most of ' the major developments in this rift occurred. The study - . also contains a section pertaining to the impact of the ; 7 Sino-Soviet dispute on the CPUSA,
“NOTE: Classified "Soest
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, international communist movement, Source is CG 5824-S*, See » ‘Chicago airtel 12/16/63 " enclosing letter-
head memorandum entitled Subiect is included ᾿ nd
ion B of Reserve index, [on _ [communist Party, USA, members from New York City, State, partment of Justice have previously been furnished reports pertaining to subject, D6
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, [ } ΤῸ * DIRMCTON, FBI (100.-426091) DATE: 12/31/63 -- . i a FROM : SACL: ECAGO (154-46 Sub B) ATTN: ASSISTANT DIUECTOH
< ἰ WILLIAM C. SULLEYVAN Ὁ απο 22) op spon EN
There are enclosed by separate package seven copies for the Bureau of a. paper prepared by the Chicago Office of materials furnished by CG 5824~S* and to a lesser extent by NY 694-S* on the AHistory and Development of the Sino-Soviet nift" and on Sinod-Soviet relations generally during the period ΠΟΥ 1958 to December, 1963. This paper is the joint effort of
CG 5824-8: and Supervisor CARL N, PseYMAN. One copy is enclosed herein for New York. Granta
In the interest of setting a background for these developments and since to a large degree they are the focal point and core of these disagreements, considerable attention was also given to the proceedings of the 2Qth Congress, > Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1956 and the Moscow Conference and Declaration of 1957.
"gq facilitate the reading of this voluminous docunient,
a foreword, table of contents and an index of names were also Ζ 7 prepared. The summary and conclusions beginning at page 171 ἢ are based on the information appearing in the document itseitr and the observations of CG 5824-S* who has read the entire 4, document and approved of same for accuracy oi content.
As will be noted, the document is detailed and pointed in content insofar as contacts with individuals, ρ travel and attendance at conferences, congresses and celebra- Te
. " mad dit ΕΖ " tions are concerned. It was felt necessary to be specific fi pie in order to give the paper authenticity and’ value as well as “
to indicate the true reliability of this source, for this
reason a classification of ™ t" must be recommenced. One copy of this paper is designated to New yor OY Y
yiew of the participation of NY 694-- in the Solo operation
and the utilization of certain documents furnished by this source and received through ,the Solo apparatus. ot)
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FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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SUBJECT:
DATE:
ENCLOSURE
f25. 247-250 3
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT
December 31, 1963
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
I, HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CEC ΠᾺΡ KELATION TO SINO-S50VIET RIFT - RECTIFICATION PROGRARB . eee erate cece nem meee ee eee rere eantaee 1
II, CONFERENCES AND DOCUMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RIPT,..+ccseeereves 4 A. 20th Congress, CPSU, Fepruary, LOSS eee ΜΝ 4
1. Significance of the 20th Congress, CPSvU in the Sino-soviet Rifts ccceccetesceusenenenvecpespespsnwepessesda
B. Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto, November, 1957 15
Cc. Issues Developing Out of 20th Congress and Moscow DECLAVALTONs cece cece ccce ees ee secon eee sree reese renee eee reese sau
D. B. N. PONOMAREY, Secretary of the Central Committee, in Charge of the International Department, CPSU, Interprets KHRUSHCHEY's Position at 20% CONSVEDGS ν νιν ἐν το εκ εν εξ εν σον. 30
E. ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN, Chairman, CP, USA, Speaks of 20th CONETCSS s cece cece cece eee tennant aera ree eerae eee κε renesne
TIX. CPC LEADERSHIP SPEAKS -- 1958.,...ccgccuceeseececeeceeensegenaee e232 A. Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC. .cccccccnacoereevgeneda B. MAO TS@-tung.sccyecccccccccsqcrevecccqeeeessunaeecssgeseeetegan C. Liu NEnG~yiwccccc ere ce cape esecersas gree eeeeseeca ssa s sees gee rad D. impressions Received from CPC Leaderghip ~ 1958....e¢eesee ee BE ΒΕ. USSR Speaks of Economic Aid ἕο CHLMA. ce νιν κεν κε ce κε κα κόρος νον 90
IV, EVENTS OF 1959 REFLECTING DEVELOPMZNT OF RIFT AND STRUGGLE FOR ALLIGNMENT oF FORCES cep ccc cceccccenceseespeesescescteesseneens eg ee
A. 21st Congress, CPSU, Jamuary, 195θ,γ ν νιν κεν κι κεν κα κε κεν κενόν. th 1, Attitude of CPC Delegates to Praternal Delegates,..,+0+++-46
2. CPSU Efforts te Influence Letin American DelegateS..e.y»e-47?
9 Φ
Page
B. CPC Tenth Anniversary Celebration, Peking, China, September 28-30, LGED ccccceosvnnccvecsecsesnnsssenseesk’d
1, Efforts to Curry Favor of Latin American Parties CONTLNUC. ccccescccessesnessscccccecvececss edd
VV. RIF DEEPENS, RUSSIANS INFORM FRATERNAL PARTIES - BUCHAREST, JUNE, LOGO. cr cadicccccccvessesacstscccsscesesesreeedl
A, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn Reports on Rumanian Meeting.....51 B. CPSU Reaction to Rumanian Meeting .scccccccccecceccccee ed? VI. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST - LATIN AMERICA AND CUBA....seeae0060259 A, Latin AMCTACAs veccececcccccccacuccccccccnevece<aunsnensd9
ΓΝ ΚΝ
VII. ἘΡΙΤΌΚΒΙΑΙ, .COMMISSION MEETING PREPARATORY TO 81 PARTY CONGRESS , OCTOBER, T9GO, cecccasccscccccnvasssecccnsesassess ell
VIII. 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 10 - DECEMBER 1, WG0.ccccccnnnccccvevvsseveccesescvetdh
A. Report of Mikhail Susioy, Member of Presidium, CCCPSU...72 " B. Report of Nikita Ss. KhruShchevyecscccescenvescescessssestt
σ, Circulation of Mao Tse-tung's Speech Made at Meeting. Discussing Draft of Moscow Declaration of 1957... .........05
D. Enver Hosha, Albania, Speech of November 16, 1960...2..246 E. Khrushchev REPLicS ce vvccccvcesecesessccsccnccsesesenvestl
F, Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC, Replies, November 24, WDGO. a cvvcccccspescesssenerseasennsseseserld
G. SUMMATYccsacccccevccereseescessvesaencccsevesevvesveseseld IX, 22nd PARTY CONGRESS, CPSU, OCTOBER 17 -- 31, 196lisscseeeee sr 84 A. Briefing-of Fraternal DE leGateS wecsccesecessnesescesess sd
B. Proceedings of 22nd Congress, CPSU sce cecccccccccccces$ 136
= Ὁ =
Cc, GEscuseion Between L, L. Sharkey , General Beeretary.
ἃς» REPERCUSSIONS MAKE THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE IN THE “WORLD MARXIST ΝΣ
XI. HVENTS OF 1962 CONTRIBUTE TOWARD DEEPENING RIFT weeccsencvesesta A. Letter of CCCPSU to CPC , February 22, L9G wa ssaveceesseseda B. Chinese Yiewed by Soviets as Promoting "East is East" Doctrine and Separating "National Liberation Movement
from SOCTALISCM’, sceaaroseersceaceseveseseresersssesenseeeda
C. Speech of Ν, 8. Khrushchey, October 14, 1962, on the ᾿ Departure of Liu Hsiao, Ambassador of PRC to USSR.......99
D. Highth Congress of CP of Bulgaria, Sofia, November, 1962; Eighth Congress of Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Budapest, November 20-24, 1962; and .F2th Congress, CP of Czechoslovakia, Prague, December 4-8,
1962. se vevecececscrecscuccscnereenenessineesswen seen s ohOZ
E. CPC Severs Connections with "World Yarxist Review," Also Known as "Problems of Peace and Socialism"........103
F. Status of the Split, December, 1962... c.cccesveesesesee LOS XII, ECHOES OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT IN THE CPUSA (1962)....κ......107 A.. January, 1963, National Leadership Meeting...ccvcceeseel08
B. Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman, CPUSA ~ Inner Party Document, September, 1963. .ccccereceseesecell2
- Gilbert Green Views Regarding Sino-Soviet RiLtececeoseed2l XIII. ECHOES OF SINO-SOVIET RIFT IN CANADIAN CP, APRIL, 1963......128 XIV. CPSU VIEWS AIMS OF CPC AS DIRECTED TOWARD BUILDING UNITED WORLD ANTI=-IMPERIALIST FRONT BASED ON NATIONALISM AND RACISM = SHIFT ‘OF "CENTER" FROM MOSCOW TO PEKING» « «9 ..1....».152
A. Castro and the Sino-Soviet RLifteccasccccsnstesvesesseseiau
o iL =
e e
Page XV. CPC-CPSU CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, USSR, JULY 5 + 20, 1963......13%
A, CPSU Reaction to Failure of July 5 - 20, 1963, Meeting with GPC seco canecvccecccvonseveresenessssorneLag
XVI, BORDER INCIDENTS BETWEEN USSR AND CHINA.....csesscceeceeeeslDl ὸ 7 XVII, - ALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT , SEPTEMBER, LOGS cco ceecnrvnnsweccccesenssserceeeeeLad XVIII. SOVIET GOVERNMENT ATTACKS PRC, SEPTEMBER, 1963.......0++++153
A. Soviets Explore Possibility of an Opposition to Present CPC Leadership in PRC = Late 1963. .sseeceeees 158
B. Status of Sino-Soviet Relations Mid-November, 1963....159 C. One More Effort by CPSU to Effect Conciliation........163 XX. FURTHER DEFECTIONS FROM CPSU VIEWS NOTED IN ASIA. νυ μενον ον e170 XXI, SUMMARY AND ΟΟΝΟΙΜΙΒΙΟΝΒο ὁ cecocsccccvccvcecccvescssevenceceelZl
- νὰ =
Φ 8
XY. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CPC HAS RELATION TO SINO-SOVIET
RIFT -RECTIFICATION PROGRAM
Communist Parties of the world at one time or another go through periods of preserving the "purity" of the Party. Stalin had his purges in the 30's anc at other times, Khrushchey, after the Stalin exposures, cleansed the leadership of the remaining pro-Stalin elements by disposing of Malenkov, Kaganoyich, Molotey and others from positions of leadership in the CPSU.
The CPC, on the other hand, has had a continuous orogram of cleansing its Party of unrelicbles which is known in that Party as the 'Hectification Program.” Kang Sheng, eltes- nate member of the Political Bureau and a member of the Becvetrrict, Central Committee CP of China (CCCPC), in charge of ideological york for the CPC, in 1958 descvibed the rectification campaign within the CPC as a struggle between proletarian ideology and non=<proletarian ideology. Outside the CPC, accorcing to Kang, it is'a struggie between revolution end counter-reyolution. it is δὶ nation-wide campaign of socialist education to raise the level of Morzism-Leninism. It is a campsign to use methods
of criticism and self-criticism. It is = campaign against the
τὰν L Cael
class enemy = it is a struggle of revolutionaries against counter-revolutionaries.
The Rectification Program began as an internal program in China in 1942, seven years before the taking of state power by the CPC, It was important, according to Kang, because it laid down the ideological basis for victory of the reyolution | in 1949 as it solved the problem of who conquers whom on the ideological front + capitalism or socialism.
While the Rectification Program carries on a struggle against counter-revolutionaries, it goes much further. Kang quoted Mao Tse=-tung as stating that it is the socialist revolution on the "political and ideological fronts ."
Kang explained the Rectification Program historically, noting that the capture of power by the CPC was only the beginning of the revolution; that getting state power was only the beginning, | and that thereafter the task of the working class was to continue socialist transformation by continuing the economic revolution to change the ownership of the means of production. If the CPC had not continued to carry out an ideological revolution on the political and ideological fronts, the socinlist revolution, even though accomplished on the economic front, could not have been consolidated and enemies
on the inside and outside would have attempted counter“revolution, A
ΠΡ
ΦὍὌὋ ᾽
prolonged period of struggle must follow the capture of power. Therefore, this formulation is included in the common laws governing transition, and the CPC views this universal truth as very important,
| Kang, in summarizing, quoted Mao as stating that rectification has for its purpose the getting of a correct political orientation for everybody. Mao listed the aims to include, "A campaign to correct shortcomings and weaknesses of the Party work -- to rid the Party of bureaucracism, sectarianism, and subjectivity and to raise the political and ideological levels of ail the people? Revisionism, according to Kang, has one characteristic the world over - revisionists never understand how to defend the purity of Marxism-Leninism. The history of the CPC is that victories were inconceivable without unity obtained through the Rectification Program.
The remarks of Kang Sheng are not unrelated to
and cannot be disregarded in any analysis of the present rift in the international communist movement. They represent the ideological basis of the CPC for the need of the preservation of Marxism-Leninism in the international comnunist movement
at this time. The Chinese think dogmatically on Marxism-Leninism
and have extended their thesis of the need to preserve the
purity of Marxism-Leninism from the area of purity as an
Φ 4
internal matter into the arena of the international communist movement. The international communist movement under the leadership of the CPSU in the eyes of the Chinese is pursuing a revisionist line in the matter of foreign policy through its "peaceful «wepexistence" line, in its program relative to the undérdeveloped countries, in its evaluation of the effect of nuclear weapons in the hands of imperialism, and in other similar areas, Consequently, in the view of the Chinese, a program among Communist Parties is necessary to correct deviations from Marxism-Leninism and to preserve the purity
of the ideology on an international level,
II, CONFERENCES AND DOCUMENTS CONTRIBUTING TO THE RIFT
A. 20th Congress, CPSU, February, 1956 Nikita Khrushchev, in his report on the international situation given at the 20th Congress, CPSU, in February, 1956, emphasized that the most important task confronting the world at the present time is the preventing of a new war, He called for cooperation within socialist circles, including cooperation with the Social Democrats, whose views on forms of transition
may be different than that of the Communist Party,where they
were willing to engage in an active struggle against war,
-Φ 4
, “ Ὧν i ,
The CCCPSU endorsed working with “hig popular forges" in the fight for the preservation of neace,
Khrushchev called for the winning of political freedom of former colonies and semi-colonies through the achievement of economic independence and proferred economic help from the socialist countries. He differentiated this type of "aid" from the imperialist countries from the so-called aid proferred by socialist countries by pointing out that when imperialism gives "aid" it is granted on definite political terms,
Khrushchev stated that the peace initiative of the Soviet Union has became one of the most important factors, exerting a tremendous influence on international events, He listed important steps in which the Soviet Union initiative for peace had developed. They included the following:
1,. Improving relations with the great powers.
. 2, Elimination of the breeding grounds for war
an -West Europe and Asia. |
3, Adjusting tensions with a number of countries in East Europe to ease tension in Europe, including the normalization of state relations with Yugoslavia.
4. Exploration of new ways to settle questions such as the establishment of a collectiye security program in Europe, disarmament, prohibition of atomic weapons, the
German problem, etc.
5. Rapprochement with all countries desiring to serve
peace.
6. ' Expanding international contacts through trade unions, social, cultural and economic means.
Khrushchey noted success in the Soviet program to ease tensions and pledged to strive to establish greater and closer cooperation with the great powers = France, the United States and Great Britain.
He listed three cardinal problems whose solutions can lay the foundations for lasting and durable peace; they were: collective security in Europe, assuring collective security in Asia and disarmament.
He enumerated the ending of the arms race as being one of mankind’s vital tasks and pledged the CPSU to spare no effort to solve this problem. Khrushchev pledged the Soviet Union to do everything necessary to safeguard international peace and security.
He then proposed five principles of "peaceful coexist- ence" as a basis for peace if the United States would agree to them. These included mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference with others' domestic affairs, equality and mutual advantage, peaceful
coexistence and economic cooperation.
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Φ ᾿ς 4
He expressed a desire of the Soviet Union for
‘ : :
friendship with the United States and cooperation with it for peace and international security. He also called for cooperation in the economic and cultural spheres and stated that the Soviet Union had proposed such a treaty with the United States.
On the question of the present day international development, Khrushchev listed peaceful -eoexistence of the two systems, and the "possibility" of preventing wars in the present era, and forms. of transition to socialism as being the key questions of the day. |
On the question of "peaceful coexistence" of the two systems, Khrushchev said that it rests on Leninist principles and remains the general line of Soviet pélicy.
He denied that the peaceful ‘coexistence policy has been reached out of considerations of expediency or as a tactical move. He stated the program was possible because thetSoviet | Union does not want war.
He denied that the Soviet Union was out to "export revolution" to overthrow capitalism. He said the Soviet Union has no plans to interfere with the internal affairs of countries of capitalism. :
He said that communists say, "Socialism will win in competition between the two systems, This by no means
signifies that its victory can be achieved through armed
4 | 4
interference by socialist countries in the internal affairs of capitalist countries. Our certainty of victory of communism is based upon the fact that the socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production," .
He stated that the CPSU has always held and continues to hold that the establishment of a new social system in one or another country is an internal affair of the peoples of the countries concerned,
Continuing on the question of the "possibility" of preventing war in the present era, Khrushchev said that Marxists must answer this question by taking into consideration the epoch-making changes of the last decade. He recognized the Marxist principle that "Wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists."' He stated that this precept evolved at a time when imperialism embraced the entire world system and social and political forces which did not want war were weak and unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war.
He stated that in the early period of socialist state development this precept was absolutely correct, but at the present time this situation has changed radically. Now there is a world camp of socialism and the peace forces have support
and material means to prevent aggression. The movement of
9 ὃ
peace supporters has sprung up and developed into a powerful factor,
In these circumstances, according to Khrushchev, the Leninist precept that so long as imperialism exists the economic basis giving rise to war will also be preserved remains in force - that is why the Soviet Union must display the greatest vigilance, But he noted, war is not "fatally inevitable," - "The more actively the peoples defend peace, the greater the guarantees that there will be no new war,"
Explaining the formulation of forms of transition to socialism in different countries, he noted that radical changes in the world have opened up new prospects in respect to the transitions of countries and nations to socialism, He recalled that as far back as the October revolution Lenin wrote, "ALI nations will arrive at socialism ~ this is inevitable, but not all will do so in exactly the same way, each will contribute something of its own in one or another form of democracy, one or another variety of dictatorship of the proletariat# one or another rate of which socialist transformations will be effected in the various aspects of social life." “Works, Volume 23, Page 58.
Continuing, he reported that" it is probable that more forms of transition to socialism will appear. Moreover, the
implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil
war, under all circumstances...True, we recognize the need for the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society into a socialist society. It is this that distinguishes revolutionary Marxists from reformists and the opportunists. There is no doubt that in a number of capitalist countries the violent overthrow of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the sharp aggravation of the class struggle connected with this are inevitable. But the forms of social revolution vary. It is not true that we regard viglence and civil war as the only way to remake society." (Emphasis added.)
Khrushchey continued by stating that Lenin thought the ruling class will net surrender voluntarily and that the use or non-use of yiolence in transition depends on the resistance of the exploiters, on whether the exploiters will resort to violence rather than the proletariat.
The question arises whether it is possible to go over to socialism by parliamentary means since the historical situation has had radical changes which make possible a new approach to the question, Socialism today, according to Khrushchev, has the great power of attraction for workers and peasants and intellectuads of all countries,
Khrushchev noted that at the same time the present situation offers the working class in a number of capitalist countries a need and real opportunity to unite the overwhelming
majority of the people under its Leadership and to secure the
~ 10 «
basic means of production in the hands of the people. The winning of a parliamentary majority backed by a revolutionary movement of the proletariat and all of the working class could create for the working class of a number of capitalist and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes.
Continuing, he said, "In countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will inevitably offer. strong resistance. There the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class revolutionary struggle." (Emphasis added.)
Khrushchev, in his report, then listed the tasks con~ fronting the Party in the sphere of foreign policy as follows:
1. To pursue the Leninist policy of peaceful coexist= ‘ence between different states irrespective of social systems.
2, To strengthen in every way the fraternal relations of the Soviet Union with the other countries within the socialist camp. To strengthen friendship and cooperate with the fraternal | peoples of Yugoslavia.
3, To consolidate the bond of friendship with India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Afghanistan and other countries which stand for peace.
4, To pursue a vigorous policy of improving relations
with the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan,
- 11 -
Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and other countries with a view to strengthening mutual confidence.
5. To follow vigilantly the intrigues of circles who do not want a relaxation of international tensions, to ensure the security of our socialist state. |
Continuing, Khrushchey reported on the question of improving the state apparatus. He stated that whenever the Party
.made mistakes the CCCPSU took the necessary steps to correct them. The CCCPSU considered it of paramount importance to re- establish and strengthen in every way the Leninist principle of collective leadership. The CCCPSU was concerned with developing the creative activity of Party members and to this end it took steps to explein the Marxist conception of the role of the individual in history. "It vigorously condemned the cult of the individual as being alien to the spirit of Marxism~Leninisn,a cult which ters tomeke a.partiarlar leader a hero and miracle worker and at the same time belittles the role of the Party and the masses, and tends to reduce creative efforte=-=," Continuing, he said, "at the same time we firmly stand for peaceful coexistence, for economic competition between socialism and capitalism; we follow a consistent policy of peace and friendship among nations."
2. Significance of the 20th Congress in the Sino-Soviet Rift
At an important conference involving the CPSU and CPC
leaders held from July 5 = 20, 1963, Teng Hsiao=-ping, General
- 12.
ὃ 8
Secretary, CPC, delivered two significant speeches in which he outlined the history and development of the. Sino-Soviet rift.
He stated that many of the differences between the Parties stem from the 20th Congress , CPSU, in 1956, which: pre= sented propositions which ran counter to Marxism-Leninism on the question of war and peace and peaceful transition to socialisn. Also, the 20th Congress was the scene of an indiscriminate attack on Stalin on the "pretext of the personality cult." This paved the way. for a revision of Marxism=-Leninisn.
After the 20th Congress, according to Teng, with the mistakes laid as a basis, revisionism as an ideological trend became widespread. 7 |
Revisionist and anti-Party factional groups became widespread, They began operating in Canada, the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, France and in other Parties. The Soviet Union began to take an opportunistic and revisionist path. Teng reminded the CPSU that as early as 1956 the CPSU was told that the CPC disagreed with the peaceful transition to socialism and on the question of Stalin. Teng said that Mag Tse=-tung, Chairman of the CPC, himself, said that it was better to view Stalin as 70 percent good and 30 percent bad as against Khrushchey's statements that Stalin was 50 percent good and 50
percent bad.
.- 13 «-
"κα Ἵ Φ
Continuing, he stated that in 1956 Chou En-lai, Premier of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), spoke to Bordsé-N. Ponomarey, a Secretary of the CCCPSY in charge of international affairs, criticizing the mistakes of the CPSU and for failure to consult the other Parties on the question of Stalin. Teng continued, reminding the interested Parties that on November 30, 1956, Mao spoke to Comrade Yudin, then USSR Ambassador to the PRC, stating that the basic policy or line “during Stalin's leadership was correct, dnd one should not treat one's comrades as an enemy.”
Teng said the CPSU's claim that the CPC agreed with the criticism of Stalin was not in accord with the facts. What the CPC said in the past was that it agreed on the Stalin criticism to uphold the prestige of the CPSU in the world communist movement.
M. A. Susiov, a member of the Presidium and a Secretary
of the CCCPSU, representing the CPSU at the same meeting, in his.
reply to Teng, brought further light on the history and development of this rift.
He charged that the CPC had linked its campaign against the CPSU with the lessening of international tensions, which began jn 1954, He charged that the CPC's claim that the serious diffi- culties between the Parties arose out of the 20th Congress was
untenable, as will be demonstrated.
- 14 =
B. Moscow Declaratian and Peace Manifesto, November, 1957
A basic document in any understanding of the current Sino-Soviet rift today is the "Declaration of Communist and Workers Parties" signed by representatives of 12 Communist and Workers Parties following the 40th anniversary celebration of the CPSU in Moscow. This meeting occurred from Noyember 34 “ 16, 1957, It was signed by representatives of the USSR, China, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Vietnam, East Germany, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia, Representatives of Yugoslavia, while present, did not sign this document. Representatives of fraternal parties of the capitalist countries and later most: parties in one form or another endorsed this document.
Section J] of this Declaration noted that the main content of the ‘present epoch is the transition from capitalism to socialism; that the growth of the forces of socialism had stimulated the rapid expansion of the anti-imperialist national liberation movement during the post=«war period. It notes that the people of the colonial and dependent countries still languishing in slavery are intensifying the struggle for national liberation, and the progress of the national liberation movement had greatly accelerated the disintegration of imperialisn. |
It states that in the present epoch, world development is determined by the course and result of the competition between
two diametrically epposed social systems and the rapid economic
- 15.
nF Φ é
advancement of the socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, is demonstrative of the vitality of socialism.
It states that while socialism is on the upgrade, imperialism is heading toward a decline. Imperialism is weakened as ἃ result of the disintegration of the colonial system.
Because of the conditions of the working people in capitalist countries, as well as contradictions between classes in these countries, increasingly favorable conditions are being created for bringing them into an active struggle for socialism,
The Declaration attacks the United States as a center of world reaction and as the sworn enemy of the people. It states, "So long as imperialism exists, there will always be soil for aggressive wars." At the same time it charges that the aggressive imperialist forces flatly refuse to cut armaments, to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, and are continuing the "cold war," the arms drive, building military bases, and conducting an aggressive policy of undermining peace and creating a new war. It notes that should a world war break out before a prohibition of nuclear weapons is reached, "it would inevitably become a nuclear war unprecedented in destructive force." The document condemns the "imperialists" for trying to impose on the freedom—loving people of the Middle East "the Eisenhower=-Dulles Doctrine," thereby creating the danger of war in this area.
It states, "the question of war or peaceful coexistence
is now the crucial question of world policy...At present the forces
Φ od .. of peace have so grown that there is a real possibility of averting wars, as was demonstrated by the collapse of imperialist designs in Egypt." It maintains that, "The cause of peace is upheld by the powerful forces of cur era: the invincible camp of socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union; the peace~loving countries of Asia and Africa taking an anti~imperialist stand and forming, together with other socialist countries, a broad peace zone; the international working class and above all its vanguard, the Communist parties; the liberation movement af the peoples of the colonies and semi-colonies; the mass peace movement of the peoples; the peoples of the European countries who haye proclaimed neutrality, the peoples of Latin America and the masses in the imperialist countries are putting up increasing resistance to the plans of a new war." It adds, "An alliance of these mighty forces covld prevent war." ᾿
Continuing it states, "The Communist and Workers parties taking part in the meeting declare that the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence of the two systems, which has been further developed and brought up to date in the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, is the s@und basis of the foreign policy of Socialist countries and the dependable pillar of peace and friend- ship among peoples. The idea of peaceful coexistence coincides with the five principles advanced jointly by the Chinese Peoples Republic and the Republic of India and with the program adopted
at the Bandung Conference of African-Asian countries. Peace and
- 17 =
peaceful coexistence have now become the demands of the broad masses in all countries. The Communist Parties regard the struggle for peace as their foremost task. They will do all in their power to prevent war,"
Section [I of this document declares that the bedrock of relations of the parties lies in the principles of Marxism- Leninism and proletarian internationalism; that the working class throughout the world is interested in preserving from eneny encroachment the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic and "in seeing these gains extended and consolidated." The docus ment recognizes that the socialist countries base their relations on principles of complete equality and noneinterference in gene another's affairs, Further, that fraternal mutual aid is part and parcel of these relations. |
It pledges the socialist states to haye economic and cultural cooperation and to expand this cooperation,
| It asserts the socialist world as being against the
division of the world into military blocs, but reqognizes the need for the Warsaw Pact Organization as a defensive necessity because the Western powers refuse proposals for the abolition of military blocs, It pledges solidarity and unity of secialist countries and agrees on a MarxisteLeninist policy for education
of all working people in the spirit of combining internationalism
= 18 =
with patriotism and it calls for a determined effort to overcome all survivals of bourgeois nationalism and chauvinism, It pledges that all issues of disagreement pertaining to relations of socialist countries will be settled through comradely discussion "with strict observance of the pyinciples of socialist internationalism. ' Section III states that the meeting confirmed the identity of views of the Communist and Workers Parties on the "cardinal problems of the Secialist Revolution and Socialist construction," It. reaffirms “the correctness of the Marxist+Leninist proposition that the processes of Socialist revolution and the building of Secialism are governed by a number of basic laws applicable in al], countries embarking on a Socialist course," but notes that historic national peculiarities and. traditions must be taken into account. The Declaration specifies these laws to include: 1. "Guidance of the working masses by the working class, the core of which is the Marxist-Leninist Party in effecting a
proletarian revolution in one form or another and establighing one
form or another of the dictatorship of the proletariat,
2. "The alliance of the working class and the bulk of the peasantry and other sections of the working people.
3. "The abolition of capitalist ownership and the establishment of public ownership of the basic means of production,
4. "Gradual Socialist reconstruction of agriculture,
aed 19 =
5. "Planned development of the national ECONOMY « » «
6, "Defense of the achievements of sacialigm against attacks by external and internal enemies,
7. "Solidarity of the working class of the country in- question with the working class of other countries, that is,
proletarian internationalism,"
for a creative application of the general prineiples of socialist revolution and construction depends on concrete conditions of each country and "rejects mechanical imitation of the policies and tactics of Communist parties of other countries." The document recognizes the need for correctly applying these basic principles by each nation, but states that disregard of national peculiarities by the proletarian party inevitably leads to its divorce from reality, from the masses, and is bound to prejudice the cause of socialism. Conversely, exaggeration of the role of these peculiar ities or departure, under the pretext of national peculiarities, from the universal Marxist-Leninist truth on the socialist revolution and socialist construction is just as harmful to the socialist cause and both tendencies should he combatted simultaneously,
The document recognizes that dialectical materialism is the basis of the theory of Marxism-Leninism. Dialectical materialism is countered by metaphysics and idealism. A failure to base decisions
on dialectical materialism will result in one~+sidedness and
» 20 «-
ῃ | 8 ϑ
Subjectiyism. It recognizes opportunism in the working ¢lass movement and notes that the meeting resolutely recognized the need to overcome revisionism and dogmatism in the ranks of the Party. Dogmatism, it States, leads to isolation of the Party and causes contact to be lost with the magses. The Party condemns dogmatism but believes that the main danger is reyisionismrra manifestation of bourgeois ideology which paralyzes the revolutions | ary energy of the working class and demands preservation or restoration of capitalism. This document points out that the conquest of power is only the beginning and not the conclusion ot the revolution. After the gonquest of power, the working class . is confronted with the serigus tasks of effecting the socialist reconstruction of the national economy and laying the economic and technical foundation of sécialism, At the Same time the overthrown bourgegisie always attenpts to make a comeback and the influence of the bourgeoisie is very great. Therefore, a "fairly long time is needed tg resolve the issue of who will win, capitalism or socialism." The existence of the bourgeois influence is the internal source of revisionism, while surrender to imperjalist pressure is its external source.
According to this document, revisionists"deny the historical necessity for a proletarian revolution and the dictator ship of the proletariat during the period of transition from
capitalism to socialism, deny the leading role of the Marxiste
Leninist party, reject the principles of proletarian internation- alfsm, and call for the rejection of the Leninist principles of party organization and, above all, of democratic centralism, for transforming the CP from a militant revolutionary organization into some kind of debating society.”
Section Iv of this Declaration enumerates the tasks of the Communist and Workers Parties with which they are faced in the present epoch. Carrying out these tasks necessitates closer unity, ποῦ only of the Parties, but also of "the entire working class...and peasantry, rallying the working people and progressive mankind, the freedom and peace-loving forces of the world."
Phe defense of peace is the most important world-wide task..." The Declaration calls for Communists and Workers Parties in 8411 countries to join in action “on the broadest possible scale . with all forces fayoring peace and opposed to war." Participants in this meeting declared that they will support the efforts of all states, parties, organizations, movements and individuals who champion peace and oppose war, who want peaceful coexistence, collective security in Europe and Asia, reduction of armaments and prohibition of the use and tests of nuclear weapons." On the question of the historic tasks of the struggle of national inde- pendence against colonial aggression, “what is needed is a united
anti-imperialist, anti-feudal front of the workers, peasants,
= 22 =
urban petty bourgeoisie, national bourgeoisie, and other patriotic
democratic forces,"
Since monopoly capitalism is chiefly responsible for the arms φῦσα, the present strugele of the working class must be spearheaded against it. Objective conditions exist in countries suffering from the United States policy of economic and military expansion which are a basis fer unity under the leadership of the working class ond ite revoluti.nuvy party. The tasks include a program to fight for peace, to defend national independence, to raise the standard of living, to carry through radical land reforms, and ta overthrow the rele of the nmononolies who betray the national interests. This section of the Declaration states that forms of transition to socialism mey ver: for different countries and that the working class and its vanguard “seek to achieve the socialist revolution by peaceful means." It notes that today in a number of capitalist countries, the working class can defeat the reactionary forces and secure a firm majority in parliament, launch a non= parliamentary struggle, smash the resistance of the reactionary forces, and create the necessary conditions for peaceful realization OZ the socialist revolution.
It states that all of this is possible only by "broad and ceaseless deysliopment of the «lass struggle of the workers, peasant masses, and the urban middie strata against monopoly capital, agaias* reaction, for »srofsund sotial reforms, for peace
and socialism,”
However, the document notes that in the event the ruling class resorts to violence, the "possibility of non-peaceful
transition to socialism” should be borne in mind.
This section of the Declaration also sets forth 4 recognition of the need for cooperation between communists and socialists on many issues and states that ideological differences should not keep them from establishing unity of action on many pressing issues confronting the working class movement.
it states that, in the socialist countries, the task is to establish close relations with the broad masses of people to consolidate the socialist systen.
It also states, as a task of the Party, the promotion of unity of Communist and Workers Parties for further solidarity between Parties of all countries. “This solidarity is the core of still greatér solidarity, it is the main guarantee of the victory of the cause of the working class." It adds that Communist and Workers Parties have the responsibility with regard to the destinies of world socialism and the international ; communist movement to promote this unity.
The Declaration, which was signed by 811 the 12 socialist states including the Chinese, recognized the historic decisions of the 20th Congress of the CBSU (1956) as not only, important to the CPSU and to the building of communism in the USSR, but as opening a new stage in the world communist movement and as pushing
further ahead the development of Marxism-Leninism.
C. Issues Developing out of 20th Congress CPSU and Moscow Declaration
The Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957 are cornerstones around which the Chinese-Soviet ideological rift has developed. A close study of these issues therefore becomes of utmost importance.
‘At a CP Conference held in Bucharest, Rumania, in June, 1960, a secret letter of the CPSU dated June 21, 1960, consisting of some 80 pages, was distributed. It was addressed to all Communist Parties and indicated that as of June, 1960, many of the major issues between the CPC and the CPSU developed out of the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957. | The June, 1960, CPSU letter discusses a number of these points of conflict stemming from these so-called basic agreements. According to the CPSU document, these included:
1. There is disagreement on the character of the present epoch of world development. The CPSU contended that the 1957 Declaration that imperialism remains aggressive is still in force. The point at issue, according to the CPSU, is "Can imperialism carry out its aggressive plan as it might have done fifty years ago?" The CPSU says "no," that the relation of forces between socialism and imperialism has changed radically, therefore imperialism cannot do things as it could before. Due to these
changes it is necessary to have a noa-dogmatic analysis.
o 25 =
The CPC, according to this document, sees the present
. epoch of world development as being one of imperialism, wars and reyolution. All other descriptions of the epoch are a departure from Marxism-Leninism and Lenin's characterization of imperialism.
2. On the question of war and peace, the CPSU at the 20th Congress spoke of the possibility of preventing war in the present epoch, The CPSU charges that the CPC in recent statements departed from this thesis of the 20th Congress by speaking of “illusions'" regarding the possibility of preventing wars.
The CPSU contends that the CPC overestimated the forces of imperialism and underestimated the forces of socialism and the World Socialist System which it, the CPSU, considers as the chief factor of peace.
The CPSU contends that the CPC departed from this thesis and spoke of imperialism as a “paper tiger" an the one hand and on the other hand says "imperialism is all powerful."
The CPSU contends that "peaceful coexistence” was pro~ claimed by Lenin in the early days of the revolution and was later agreed to by all Parties at the 20th Congress. Now the CPSU — contends that the CPC position is that until capitalism and imperialism are completely abolished, disarmament is an “illusion! and the alternation of war and peace is a constant inevitable |
phenomenon. . The CPSU contends that “peaceful ceexistence" is
identified by the CPC as "class peace” and as flirting with the
national bourgeoisie. This is regarded as wrong in theory.
=~ 26 =
Tne CPSU comtends that Marxism-Leninism never extended
coexistence to relations between colonies and mother countries, between dependent and independent countries, between proletarian masses and exploiting classes. The CPSU contends that peaceful coexistence means peaceful coexistence with states having different social systems. Further, that peaceful coexistence facilitates revolutionary struggle in all countries under capitalism because the working class would be less influenced by patriotic slogans of defense, national aims, etc. The CPSU stated in the document that it supports the national liberation movement by using alliances with the national bourgeoisie. The CPSU contended that peaceful coexistence dees net weaken the might of the socialist eamp te repel aggression. The CPSU guarantees the safety of socialisn. | The document contends that the CPC contention that dis- armament is an illusion is not correct or farsighted. Lenin, as early as 1922, supported disarmament. Today, it is not nerely a "diplomatic move" but a serious “political aid" in the interest
of world socialism. The CPC charges that disarmament slogans
. ὩΣ
weaken the masses and the will of the colenial people to fight for lberation andaainst imperialism. The CPSU contends that these charges axe false and that the demand to disarm the great powers will hasten the colonial struggle te an earlier victory.
8, The 20th Congress Declaration as to the "possibility" of the proletariat winning power by “peaceful" means is challenged
- BT =
᾽ Φ 8
by the CPC, The CPC also charges the CPSU with advocating "neaceful means as the only way of transition.” The CPSU in answer refers to the 20th Congress documents which speak of the peaceful way as only one of the ways provided, in addition to armed struggle and the overthrow of the state apparatus, to attain the victories of the revolution.
The CPSU contended in this document that its thesis is supported by Lenin who taught the working class to master all forms of class struggle, peaceful as well as non-peaceful.
4. The CPSU charges the CPC has departed from the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957, The CPC, on the other hand, claims that it adheres to the Moscow Declaration of 1957.
' The CPSU answered in the Jume, 1960, document that the 1957 Declaration said "the main content of our epoch is the trans- ition from capitalism to socialism - ~ in our epoch, world development is determined by the course and results of the competition between two diametricaily opposed systems," The CPSU contends that the CPC has reversed this Declaration by describing the epoch as “an epoch of the last stage of the development of capitalism, an epoch of wars and revolutions.” The CPSU quoted the Declaration as saying "at present the forces of peace have so grown, that there is a possibility of averting war," The CPSU _contends that the Peace Hani festo in effect says "wars are not inevitable, war can be prevented, peace cam be preserved and made
secure ,' . 92 .
8 Β ;
The June, 1960, document contended that the Moscow Declaration and Peace Manifesto of 1957 was based on the saqund . Leninist principles of "penceful coexistence" and is a sound basis for forsign policy of socialist countries. The OPC says that this is an illusion, that a world without wars and arms oan only be achieved when socialism is victorious Ali over the world,
The document states that the CRO deglares the thesis of the 1957 Declaration that ‘weace is the foremost task" is "erroneous and antieLeninist" = that Lt spreads delusions that there can be peace with capitalism,
The CPSU contends that the CPG has rejected the thesis of the 1957 Declarntion that there oun be different forms of transition, The CPSU contends that the thesis opens a new stage in the world Marnist-Leninist movement end facilitetes the further development of new lines, ἔμ CPC questions this thesis, secording to the CPSU.
The June, i960, cocwumens contends that the 20th Congress _ wejeeted the cuit of (ιν, ὦ, Stalin anc scaiied fay the restoration. of Leninist principles or norme of activity of the Party in relation with fraternal perties οὐ other countries, with soecijajist states,and Soviet forsign policy ss a whole. The CPSU charges that the CPC continues to question this matter despite the fact that in the 1956 documents statements were made to the effect that
the cult of the personality revealed to the Chinese what negative
consequences the ceification of the individuel can have. The ΟΕ contends that events haye proved the CPSU wae right and charged that the CPC hinéers the precess of compliating the job in other
Parties.
The CPSU noteda that the declaration of 1957 stresses international solidarity as the bedrock of the principles of MayxismeLeninism and that this resupposes froternal relations
hy
of Parties, They charged that the CBC has violated these principles.
The dune, 1960, document chayged that the CPC has attacked the CPSU for revisionism, partiqularly in regard te Yugoslayvie. The CPSU contended that it has siways upheld the purity of Marxism-Leninism and pursued a constant policy of
proletarian internation: lisn.
Ria)
The OPHU claimed that the WUPl hus violated the pripn¢gipia of proletarian internationslism through congtant attacks through | the Trade Union Movement (World Federation of Trade Unions) and through other world macs orgnnizetions,
D. B. N, Ponomarev, Sear comms tee in ρον ΕΘ
B. N. Fonomarey, in Discussing the Khrushchey speech made at the 20th Congress, CPSU, in 1955, stated in 1908 that while the CPSU regards United States imperialism as the chief
enemy of mankind, it did not feel United States imperialism was
m OQ ὦ
as strong as claimed, Ponomarev stated that when Khrushchev made his speech at this Congress on the question of different paths to socialism, he had in mind giving legal protection to the various parties in capitalist countries because he felt a number of these parties were in trouble for advocating force and violence, He was trying to ease the situation of these parties from a tactical point of view. Ponomareyv was quick to point out that Khrushchev also said that in the same capitalist countries where there is a strong regime with military and police power at its disposal, the working class may have to resort to force and violence and this applied specifically and coneretely to the United States. Ponomarev said that Communist Parties cam talk about different roads to socialism, but programmatically there can be no illusion that the dictatorship of the proletariat will not require force
and violence to suppress the bourgeoisic who will resist. The
r amoumt of force required will depend on the extent of resistance
by the bourgeoisie or rulimg class,
E, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Chairman, CPUSA, Speaks om 20th Congress
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn attended the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties at Bucharest, Rumania, in June, 1960, Im reporting to some leading CPUSA officials on the conference, Flynn revealed that Khrushchev had stated at Bucharest that the CPC even though it had signed the Moscow Declaration of 1957, was mot in complete agreement with the Declaration and signed it with reservations,
-~ 32 -
Khrushchev said that while the CPC supported the CPSU in its condemnation ef Stalin at the 20th Congress, the CPC was, at the same time, attempting to undermine the leadership of the CPSU. He used a saying to illustrate the CPC position on Stalin as: “Here are two swords, one is Lenin's and one is Stalin's = if it is rusty Let us clean it." Flynn quoted Khrushchev in defending the position of the CPSU at the 20th Congress in replyhg to the Chinese at Bucharest by saying "Lenin's sword was directed at our enemies, but Stalin's sword had our people's blood on it."
III, CPC LEADERSHIP SPEAKS τ 1958
A, Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC
Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, together with other members of the Politbure of the CPC, while talking with some foreign comrades in. July, 1958, in evaluating the world
political situation from the point of view of the CP of China,
stated that the fight against United States imperialism is the main struggle in the international, communist movement. The important thing for the communist world is that they hold high the banner of Marzism-Leninism in order that all parties can move forward when revisionism is cleaned up. He quoted Yao Tse-tung as saying, "Ihe golden age of impeyialism is over = the East wind
prevails over the West wind."
=» 82 =
Teng summarized the world international sityation by gtating that the communist world after the Masgow Conference of 1957 was in ggod shape and was united now for the pane purpape, In world relations it is now either peace or wav, The Moscoy Declaration, according to Jeng, said that all Communist Parties want peace. China wants peace hegause it wi} give China the opportunity to finish off capitaliam peacefully, BUT, ACCORDING TO TENG, CHINA τῇ NOT AFRAID OF WAR,AND IF WAR COMES MANY QF THE COUNTRIES WILL HAVE THEIR REVOLUTIONS FASTER, IF THERE 18 A WAR; THE CAPITALISTS WILL BE THE LOSERS, THEY WILL BE THB LOSERS IN 7 PEACH OR WAR. THE USSR IS ΟῚ APHAID OF WAR « THEY HAVE MIGSILES AND SPUTNIKS. | :
B. Mao Tse~tung "
Mag Wsertuag, also in discussing the world international . Situation, stated in talks with leaders of other Communist Parties ; in the middie of 1958, that the main enemy of communism asp the | United States; that the United States fears big wars and singe the Sputnik, Mao doubts the United States ean even successfully carry out little wars, ligo cautioned that reyisionism nyst be fought to the end and further that the CPUSA must stigk to the fundamental ‘principles of Marzisme-Leninism, He said that imperialism has many contradictions, ‘our enemy looks tough on
the surface but it is not that powerful."
ἢ BS =
° Φ ®
C. Liu Ning-yi Liu Ning-yi, Chairman of all trade unions in China and, member of the CCCPC, was introduced to a prominent CP leader as
the most capable authority in the CPC on the question of the CPC's
taking power in 1949. In the summer of 1958, Liu stated that the
CPC struggle to take over state power was effected through the
unity of workers, businessmen, intellectuals and patriots. It
was carried out through underground activity, infiltration of mass organizations, and eyen infiltration of the military. The Party estimated the enemy carefully and did not engage in adventurism.
It accumulated strength and adopted careful and cautious tactics.
It cautiously built its membership, being careful to ferret out a disruptors. It separated its legal from illegal organizations | with the illegal organization being absolutely secret. Prior to taking power in 1949, the CPC developed the art of infiltration
to the highest degree. The CPC experiences of infiltration were
a master plan for use by the international communist movement.
Liu even claimed that the CPC had practically controlled the entire Kuomintang Government, organizations under the control of the Kuomintang, the trade unions and the military. Before the "liberation," Liu claimed that practically every Nationalist General had a communist as his executive officer. One, could only
' gonclude as a result of the interview, which covered a detailed
outline on the methods of infiltration, that China must be
‘= 34 3
φ
considered as 4 most dangereus enemy in connection with ite activities in the international anene,
D. Impressions Regelyed from CPC Leadership = 1958
αι
As of the summer of 1958, based upon conversations with every leading OPC official, including Mag Tsertung, Chadrman of the CPC and then Premier of Chinn; Kang Sheng, Alternate Member of the Political Bureau and Member of the Segretariat, CCCRQ;.
Liu Shao-chi, Chairman of the People's Republic of Ghina (PRG);
Li Hisien-nien, Member of the Political Byureay and Finance Minister
of China, and others of similar official status in the PRC Gevern-
ment, gone could only reach the conclusion that Chine was then a very serious enemy. I+ had twelve million Panty members and twice as many members of the Young Communist League. China wag then receiving 816 of every type, inciyding not only capital geqce hut aisg whole factories, Russian technical personnel, etc., reayested from the USSR. : |
- The Chinese were taking the Jead in all ideglogigal — battles, Mao, for example, wag giyen the honor of actually intros ducing the Moscow Declaration of 1987. The Chinese were put forward to give leadership in the struggle against revisionisn. The importance, strength and infftyuence of the OPC upon the Chinese people cannot be minimized.
© 9
As early as the summer of 1958, however, in talking with - the leadership of the CPC, one received the impression that the Chinese wanted to work things out on their own instead of being dependent on the Russians. While the Chinese endorsed the policy of coordination or meshing of the economies of the various socialist countries, the leadership put China in a category of a developing, big industrial power. One had the feeling that so long as the Chinese could gain something from it, they would "take it on the chin" eyen from the Russians, while they were buiiding and learning. As of that time, however, the CPC leadership gave every impression that it considered the CPSU the leader of the international communist movement.
| The Chinese, however, continued to look upon Asia as “within their sphere of influence and as a sort of "sacred preserve." They noted that they could reach the Asiatic people easier than Russia, and they were doing it. The Russians are white and are_ looked upon with suspicion in some of the far eastern countries. fhe Chinese were playing a very important role in these countries, For example, the Chinese were assisting the Burmese and giving them economic and technical aid. They were well aware of conditions in Indonesia and had promised President Sukarno economic aid when he was in China at that time, Leaders of the CPC stated that the Indonesian CP had two million members and that the Chinese were in + contact with the Indonesian CP, It appeared that the Chinese had
closer contact with the Indonesian CP than did the CPSU as of 1958.
φ 9
An important part of the CPC program was to set up schools for children of overseas Chinese in Peking. The Chinese were interested in youth and knew that the ancestral ties were strong. They were obtaining thousands of .overseas youth to attend these schools from all parts of the world and were building up tremendous good will as a result.
During a meeting in July, 1958, in the International Liaison Compound of the CCCPC, in Peking, certain statements were made by CPC leaders which led to the conclusion that personnel in the compound were made up of overseas Chinese who were CP members and who might in the future work as espionage agents in areas where many Chinese live. A number of Latin Americans were also housed in another guest house in the International Liaison Depart~ ment Compound,
The. CPC in discussions with the leaderships of other Communist Parties even at that time gave the impression of competing with the CPSU to see which of the two Parties would receive the allegiance of the interested CP of another country. However, as of 1958 it appeared that for every practical reason the Chinese would be. boyal to the CPSU and the Russians would not permit a break with the Chinese to occur in the international communist novement. |
. These reasons were largely economic and as of that time there did not appear to be ideological differences, as both were
Ww
. 37 =
in agreement on the dangers. of revisionism and Titoism. As of the summer of 1958, however, there wére many nationalistic differences and some antagonisms apparent at that time.
E, USSR Speaks of Economic Aid to China
The CPSU during November, 1963, made available certain secret compilations of economic aid rendered by the Soviet Union to China during the period of 1950 through 1961, The essence of this document follows:
The Soviet Union gave to China a truly all-embracing amount of aid in compliance with the requests of the Chinese leadership. This resulted in a mighty industry based on modern technology set up in China, In 1959 the Chinese leadership stated, ‘The fraternal friendship and all-around aid and cooperation between the peoples of China and the Soviet Union serve the fundamental interests of the peoples of both countries" and, “The victory of the Chinese revolution and the successes in the building of socialism are part and parcel of the fraternal support and aid on the part ‘of the great.. peoples of the Soviet Union. The Chinese people are deeply grateful to the Soviet Union for its support and aid." ΝΕ | | The CPSU noted that in establishing and strengthening the Chinese socialist state by setting up its national industry and 8 modern defense industryin China, it had done this by denying to the Soviet people many prime necessities and causing them to
experience serious sacrifices.
~ 38 -
eo φΦ
The CPSU noted that the volume of the economic ties . between the USSR and the PRC almost doubled during the period 1953-1959 while the volume of Soviet deliveries for Chinese industrial projects grew eight-fold. All in all, the Soviet Union lent technical assistance and helped to build 198 modern industrial enterprises in China.
These enterprises included modern steel works, tractor “plants, bearing and mining equipment plants, electrical engineer- ing, turbine and boiler plants, 2 synthetic rubber factory, an oil . "refinery, nitrate fertilizer plants, shale producing factories and ἃ number of high capacity power stations, aircraft factories and other specialized plants.
| By the’ beginning of 1961 the production capacities of enterprises built with the help of the USSR involved millions of tons in the various industries as well as millions of kilowatts | in the electrical industries, The aggregate capacity of turbines -put into operation at power stations equalled 3,250,000 kilowatts.
In 1960 the share of enterprises built up with the technical assistance’ of the Soviet Union “in total volume of industrial output in China accounted for 30% in pig iron, 39% in steel, 51% in rolled metal, 80% in lorries , 91% in tractors, 30%
in synthetic | ammonium, 25% in electrical power, 55% in steam and
: hydraulic turbines , 19% in generators , 25% in aluminum, 11% in
᾿ς heavy engineering, ete. of the aggregate production of the PRC. -
~ OD =
Continuing, the CPSU reported that in.the period of 1950-1960, 8,500 qualified Soviet specialists were sent to the PRC to render technical aid. ΤῸ the same period, 1,500 specialists were sent to China to give ahelping hand in science, higher education, public health and other fields, About 10,000 Chinese engineers, technicians, skilled specialists and researchers received practical craining in Soviet factories, construction sites, design offices and research institutes.
In the course of some ten odd years the Soviet Union handed over to China, gratis, some 21,000 sets of scientific and technical decumentation, which were the result of tremendous pro- gress in the USSR accumulated for many years. Among the documenta-~ tions handed over to China were the specifications and drawings for some 1,400 large scale enterprises.
Whole branches of industry, including aircraft, automobile and tractor, aluminum, power and heavy engineering, instrument making, radio and various chemical industries, were set up in the PRC with the help of the Soviet Union. The USSR helped China lay the foundations of an atomic industry. Soviet technical and scientific assistance was given in nuclear physics research and the erection in 1958 with Soviet aid of China's first experimental atomic reactor and cyclotron. ~The Soviet Union was supplying China
the very first models of unique equipment which even some Soviet
enterprises had not as yet received.
The Sovict Union granted the PRC loans adding up to 1,744,000,000 rubles (in new currency) on favorable terms. It deferred debt and interest payments for five years because af economic difficulties in China. It provided China with free lorns of hundreds of thousands of tons of raw suger to be returned in kind in subsequent years. If shipped grain in the amount of 200,000 tons in the spring of 1962 at the request of the PRC, (There are available other factual figures indicating the scope end extent of this economic aid rendered to the PRC by the USSR,)
IV. EVENTS OF 1959 REFLECTING DEyELOPMENT OF RIFT AND STRUGGLE FOR ALIGNMENT OF FORCES
ὡς 2ist Congress CPSU, January, 1959
The 21st Congress, CPSU, was held on January 27, 1959, and was called 2 Congress of Buiiders of Communism with emphasis on production, productivity end the standard of living οὐ the people of iussia.
The Russians at this Congress reiterated the idea of the thesis which was first Gayeloped at the AQth Congress, CPSU. This thesis was the "non-inevitability of wax." They claimed that if this thesis was valid up to the present time when the socialist countries were weaker, then it was more yalic new when the industrial production of Russia and China had been multiplied and many countries had set up their own socialist movements. In addition, the capabilitics of the socialist states to retaliate against aggressors made this thesis valid and served as a preyentr
ative against war.
ft
TO convines their own people that they had allies in other socialist countries, the Russians made a Strenuous effort to bring to the 21st Congress fraternal delegates from every country possible. Emphasis was placed on the Chinese participan tion,and the Russians boasted that not even in the days of the Communist International had such a mobilization of parties been on display. This, according to the Russians, was proof ef the international solidarity of Communist Parties.
Delegates from the nonesocjalist countries were given the red carpet treatment to impress them with the merits of socialism. There was, however, another possibile effect on the people which the Russians were attempting to accomplish. Some of the communists felt that they were not abligated to the Russians for these favors. Where the delegates were from backward countries or where they were colored and came from a country where there was vacial distinction, the Russians were attempting not only ἐρ cane vince their Party representatives that they had ebligations to. the Russians, but also that if they overthrew their present social System they could live in the manner in Which they lived in Moscow at that time. By so doing, the Russians would secure the allegiance of these various Communist Parties. |
Despite the new thesis of equality of Communist Parties, the CPSU was still dooked upon, as of the 21st Congress, as the experienced, leading CP and most Communist Parties, with the
exception of a few strong Parties in the socialist camp, nanely
China and Czechoslovakia, conferred and met with the leadership of the CPSU to air problems and obtain advice concerning policy, personalities, etc.
At the Congress it was obvious that there had been a
lot of friction between the Chinese and the Russians. While Mao. Tse-tung was still a leader of the CPC, he did not attend the 21st Congress, nor did he send Liu Shao-chi. It was noted that the Chinese delegation appeared to be very cool and aloof during most of the Congress, During Khrushchey's speech, Chou En-lai's applause was very limited and he appeared to be without enthusiasm.
Further, the delegates had been told that the Congress would close with a huge banquet. Instead of the banquet being held on the last day of the sessions of the Congress, it was held two or three days after the conclusion of the sessions. During that period an announcement was made that the Soviet Union and. China had signed a trade agreement. Thus, it is believed that this banquet was postponed until some agreement could be reached between the Russians and Chinese.
This agreement indicated that the Russians had made sone serious concessions in regard to giving scientific, industrial and economic assistance to China, including training their Chinese personnel for nuclear installations and rocketry. It is believed that the Chinese had been applying pressure against the Soviets for
a long time with the Chinese demanding a more vigorous stand against
=a 43 =
‘ ἢ
imperialism, It was not easy for Russia to escape this pressure Since the Chinese were competing with the fussians for allegiance from the various Comminist Parties, including the CPUSA.
The production of a letter from William Z. Foster, Chairman Emeritus of the CPUSA, to Mao Tse-tung, in the middle of the 2lst Congress of the CPSU was interpreted agzpartyof this vying for allegiance. All of the delegates to the Zlst Congress were invited to visit the CPC delegation and most of the delegates accepted. When the delegation from the CPUSA visited the CPC delegation, they were not accompanied by any leading representatives of the CPSU. .
Further, it is noted that while the Hast German communist regime had recently concluded a trade agreement with China, this could not have been done without the approval of the Russians, and . this at the same time indicated that concessions were being squeezed out of the Russians by the Chinese,
Summarizing, it is believed that the following were sone oi the factors currently at work in influencing the Party of the Soviet Union at the time of the 2ist Congress in January, 1959:
1. Russia was not anxious to engage in armed conflicts right then since that would destroy the current Russian plans for a higher economy as set forth in the seven year plan of the Congress,
| 2, Russia was fearful of the growth of German imperialism
and the growth of German military power and rearmament, and it was
- 44 a
. Congress was providing mobilization to engage in some form of
whe tried to discourage an easing of tensions between the USSR
‘and the Western powers. The Chinese used the tensions between |
necessary to convince the fraternal parties that Germany was 2 real threat and had to be eliminated, | | 3. The Russians were playing on the fears of the European people, particularly those who were previously victims of German aggression, to remind them of the destructiveness of nuclear war. 4. The Russians were mobilizing the internationa] -
communist movement in every part of the globe and the 9160
activity tg hamper in any method or form imperialist aggression. The Russians did this by playing on the nationalistic sentiment | of the Parties, particularly in Latin Ameriga and Africa.
ὥς The Russians were under pressure from the Chinese
Russia and the Western powers in order to wring concessions from
the Russians. In the past the Chinese had not supported 2 ‘summdt meeting when it appeared that they would not be involved.
6, The top Soyiet leadership was very sensitive to United States opinion and attitude.
In this regard, the CPSU, even in their relations with the CPUSA, tried to be circumspect and to discourage bold and 7 challenging speeches by the American communis ts when they were on Soviet soil because such speeches might cause discord between’ the
Russians and the United States.
-~ 45 =
1. Attitude of CPC Delegates to Fraternal Delegates
During the 2ist Congress the delegates of the CPC were not oyeriy friendly with other delegations. Yet there appeared to be conpetition between the Chinese and the Russians in order to win the allegiance of the international Communist Parties, It was further believed that the new thesis on the relationship of the Communist Parties, that is, that all Parties are equal, signifies that the CPSU did not want to assume responsibility for . all of the activities of Chine.
the vying between the Chinese and Russians for the allegiance of other Parties can be illustrated by the fact that Mag Selected a date during the middle of the 2lst Congress to put @ letter by William 2Z, Foster, Chairman Emeritus of the CPUBSA, in en official Chinese publication, 10 was necessary fou ρα" to reprint parts of the letter quoting the Opinese source. The Chinese were also known to have extended forme) invitations including invitations to the American delegates to visit the Chinese Embassy in Moscow and to visit China itsels,
Further, immediately following the lst Congress af the CPSU in February, 1959, Anna Louise Strong, an American who bad lived and worked in China for many years, directed a letter in her name from China addressed to American delegates tq the 21st Congress. In this letter she stated among other things, "J think
it is very important that someone come here soon who goes hack to
the USA to organize 'contacts.'"' The interpretation placed on
this message was that Strong would dike fo seg a parson simidar
to herself come to Chine wie would then return to the United States to organize and propagandize for the CPC,
ὡς CPSY Efforts to Influence Latin Amevigan Delegates
During the 2ist Congress of the CPSU, delegates of 18 Latin émerican Commynist Parties met in sessions for approximately five days. These sessions were separate and apexrt from the
Congress praper and were deyoted +9 Gisevssions of problems
relating to Jatin America as a whole ag well as to problems involving the individual Parties, It was obvious that the Chines¢ . and Russians were vying for the aljegiance of these Parties. The RUSSLAns , βου example, attempted to prevent Latin American delegates from meeting as a group. The gathering heard yeports from delegates of Cuba, yenezuela, Costa Rica, Panama and others regerding their programs and plans for the future.
B, CPC Tenth Anniversary Celebrriion, . Peking, China, September 28730, ἐθ 859
Qn September 28, 1959, there wes a reception for leading members of CP delegations 4a the celebration of the tenth annivyere | sary of the founding of the PC. None of the delegates from the Soviet Union were obseryed at this reception,
The two-day meeting of Communist Parties prasent in |
China in connection with the anniversary celebration hegan alter
» Δ im
¥ 1
the akoye reception on September 28, 1969. at this meeting the
Chinese tried to imitate the proceedings of the Gist Congress οί
_the CPSU by electing a presiding committeg, The chaiymanghip wag rotated betyveen Liu Sha@rchi, Chou Enedai, Tung Piewn and Chu Teh, iMikhajil Susloy of the Roviek Ynien spoke, but eply a few minutes . os
On September $0, 1989, A prnavet was held fer all of the dejegations. Chqu Ennlai was. chairman and the main attraction wag Premier Khrushchev. He réceiyed very gepd greetings from delegates other than the Chinese, The Chinese applauded politely.
Under appropriate protaco}, Mao should haye introdueed Khrushchey, but did not go 59 although Mag and Khrushchev earried | the same leadership title in their respective Parties and as heads ef government. 7 | |
_Khrushehey spoke emphasizing peace and peaceful eoextetence. " Hie had just returned fren meating with President Wisenhower at Camp Dayid. The little applause, in the main, came trom ofher than . Chinese, gelegates , The Chinese sat gn theiy hands. In the middle
οἵ his speech he quit speaking, turned his document ever to his —— translator, told him to read it, and sat down in disgust. |
On September 380, 1959, a missive parade was held commen | ovrating the tenth, anniversary celebration, The first tie of the reviewing stand was restricted toa Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shaorohi, Khrushchev and Sugloy,
A large poster with photographs of Chinese leaders,
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin faced the reviewing stand. Nog
m 43 καὶ
᾿ ἢ Φ ᾿ ϑ moa i. ῦ 4 υ " ᾿ 4 , 4 '
photographs of Khrushehey were ebserved anywhere. Most of the slogans emphasized 80. ag the Jenden. It appeared at that time that another quilt of the personality was being built in China. |
in 89 prominanthy. displaying photographs of Stalin, the, idea was clear among hg dslegates: that the CPC was telling the rest of the communtet ‘movenient that it was following Marxism LeninismrStalinism, - When asked why eyeh prominence tq §Stalin, the Chinese said because. RO ather leader lived through most of the communist revolutions ang pacanse Ae, Stalin, laid the foundation for ϑροῤαιάθῃς, In ‘is eussing matters with CPC leaders ship, it was obvious that the. CPG placed considerable emphasis on . ideology, that is, Mapxisiynbeninism, Tt emphasized proletarian | internationalism te a mich specter extent than did the ΡΟ, Outside the socialist ‘camp, “the OPC. views the rest of the world as being on the defensive: and: in a ‘ptate of crisis. Jt felt that | the imperialist countries were: -contrented with revolt, partiewlen dy in colonial or σφ ρολϑ ἢ βοηπῦνβο8,
The ΟΡ helieved thet the imperialist or capitalist countyies , especially. the Less power syd ones, were faced with an _ economic CrLSIS . On the other hand, it fel} that there wes an opposite camp - the βφρίβλλδῦ amp T whieh was growing every Gay in every sphere, ecqnomicalhy, politically, and with emphasis militarily. Therefore, when the hourgeoisie or the imperialists want fo negotiate or wake 2 ΓΤ ΤῸΝ this in the Chinese. view
is not due to a position αἱ strength but instead is due to weakness. on
This applied to the United States: as the leading imperialist, country
‘revolution,
Because of this reasoning, the CPC favored an inter-
national policy which could be characterized as “uncompromising”
or a policy which pushed aggressively for maximum concessions. It felt that through this policy, imperialism would be kept off balance and communism would win out. This theory was expressed in many speeches, meetings and private discussions with the CPC during the tenth anniversary celebration in 1959.
1. Bfforts to Curry Favor of Latin American Parties Continue
Many Communist Parties of Latin America were represented at the tenth anniversary celebration of the founding of the PRC. Among the. more prominent CP leaders were Anibal Escalante, Secretary of the CP of Cuba, and Victorio Codevilla of the CP of Argentina.
Based upon observations and discussions with these and other Latin American delegates at this conference, it appeared that the CPC was very much involved in the situation in Latin: America, particularly in Cuba. The CPSU was also deeply involved in currying the support of the delegates of these countries, and there appeared a possibility in 1959 of a conflict between the Russians and the Chinese which might develop with regard to policy which should be pursued by the international communist movement in these countries. The Chinese themselves were interested in training Latin Americans for immediate guerilla warfare. The Russians on the other hand adopted a long-range program for communist development in Latin America, feeling that the Latin
American countries at that time were not ready for violent
= 30 =
Υ. RIFT DEEPENS,, RUSSIANS INFORM ΤΗΝ FRATERNAL PARTIES, BUCHAREST, JUNE, 1960
A, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn Reports on Rumanian Meeting
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Chairman of the CPUSA, in confi-. dential discussions with CPUSA leaders in 1960, revealed that prior to the conference of the Rumanian Workers Party in June, 1960, the CPSU circulated an inner Party letter dated June 21, 1960, to all Communist Parties consisting of some 80 pages which outlined the CPSU views of the basis of the Sino-Soviet rift. This document dealt with specifics concerning these differences from the CPSU point of view. |
Flynn reported that in discussions on June 25, 1960, all speakers present in Bucharest said that they were in agreement with the Moscow. Declaration of 1957, that is, the Twelye~Party Declara~ tion, and the 64-Party Peace Manifesto executed at the same time. Except for the Chinese, according to Flynn, all speakers reaffirmed their allegiance to the "peace policy" of the Soviet Union.
Flynn reported that the CPC was represented at Bucharest by Peng Chen, Mewber of the Politburo and Secretariat of the CPC. He reportedly stated that the CPC favors "peaceful coexistence" but the CPC was critical of the 80-page letter being circulated by the CPSU at Bucharest. Flynn reported that some of the CPC charges
were "slanderous" in character when Peng proceeded to reply to
= 51 =
Φ 9
‘all charges made by the CPSU. The 8Q+page document submitted by the CPSU maintained that the CPC was not following the spirit of the Moscow Declaration. She reported that on the proposed Bucharest Communique, Peng claimed the CPC delegation was without power and without a mandate from the CCCPC to sign this document. hie Suggested a Moscow meeting at a later date. He claimed that the Bucharest Communique went further than the Moscow Declaration and that the Chinese delegation needed time to study it because οἵ its length. Flynn stated that Peng refused to consider cisoussion until the CCCPC was consulted.
¥lynn reported that on June 46, 1960, at the second session of the Conference, the CPC delegation announced receipt of permission from the CCCPC to sign the Bucharest agreement if CPC amendments "which were never offered" were made to it,but eyen if the amendments were not accepted Peng announced that the ORC would sign the communique. |
Flynn reported that Khrushchev took the Zloor at this Session expressing regret that the Chinese were signing the communique with reservations because they really did not agree with it. Khrushchey reportedly then went into a tong speech outlining differences between China and the Soviet Union while at the same time stating everything must be done to preserve the unity of the Parties. He, however, stated that unity must be on a principled
basis and not unity for the sake of unity.
Φ 9
Khrushchey reportedly noted that differences between the Soviet Union and China had existed for more than one and one- half years, He indicated the CPC in 1957 was not in complete agreement with the Declaration of 1957 and that since then China had expressed disagreement with the resolutions of 1957 at a World Federation of Trade Unions meeting in Peking and that one of the main differences is on "coexistence, war and peace.” Khrushchev charged that the Chinese are against coexistence but coexistence means peace ~ "only madmen want war." He stated that the USSR believes the international situation has changed since fenin formu~ lated his thesis on imperialism. Today, according to Kbrustichev, imperialism cannot alone decide to make war. If war is unledshed, Ἢ do not want to risk the lives of my people and of the world."
Khrushchev reportedly charged the CPC with attempting to force its views on Russia. He noted the aggravations between them on the India border incident and charged China with "nationalism" on the India issue. He defended "coexistence" as sound Leninism. . He charged China with failing to agree on military matters relating to the air defense of both nations two years previously.
Continuing, Khrushchev spoke on the cult of Stalin, noting ~ that at the 20th Congress he had said the CPSU had to expose Stalin. He charged the CPC with trying to undermine the leadership of the CPSU and in conclusion asked for agreement at Bucharest, but
suggested that a committee be set up to draft a new declaration at
= 53 «
a conference to be scheduled fox Moscow in November, 1960,
Flynn reported that Peng Chen replied to Khruchchev.
Ye claimed that the issue between the Parties was on the inter- national sit~uation. That is, how to conduct a battle against "our enemies" or how to defend perce. Peng charged that the CPC did ποῖ receive ecual treatment at the Ducharest meeting and Khrushchev had slandered Mao in speaking against the communes, against the "Great Leap Forward" and against the India afifsizr, He acgused Khrushchey of speaking at the Rumanian Workers Party reception With epi esentar tives of the press present.
He charged that the Rumanian meeting was specifically organized by Khrushchev to attack the CPC. Khrushchev reportedly rebutted Peng's charges and charged the Chinese with breaking agvege nents at the Warsaw Wilitary meeting, of not publishing specifies, and he threatened not to participate in the future conferences with the CPC if agreements are not kept.
Peng said that Khrushchey rejects the general line of the opc and is carvying on work with other Paryies to undexmine the CPC.
The gonmuniqnue, according to Fiynn, was signed by the | Parties and was first published on dune 27, 1960, It was aiso approved subseouentiy by other fraternal parties.
Elizabeth Gurley Flynn in September, 1983, prepared an inner Party document for the CPUSA, noting that she had attended the Bucharest Conference of 1960 and subsequently had visited
various other countries.
Flynn noted that by the Spring of 1980 the Sino-~Soviet conuftlict had degenerated alarmingly. 886 stated that following the Bucharest meeting, she had visited various countries and it became evident in speaking with leaders that the situation had worsened to the point where attempts were being made to contain the controversy ang to report it carefully and at top levels, “at first," with the hope of resolving the conflict at the 81-Party meeting scheduled fox November, 1960.
Fiynn reported that the Bucharest meeting lasted only two days and vesulted in only a brief formal "reaffirmation of international policy."
She reported that the Russians and other Parties set forth a series of complaints against the Chinese, primariiy an their procedures and tactics at various recent “mass organization" econterences of such organizations as the World Federation of Trade . Unions, the International Peace Council and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, where USSR foreign policy was criticized and at which non+conmunisis were present. She reported that the Chinese were sharply criticized for publishing certain works on international policy without consultations or knowledge of brother Parties, Charges were also leveled at this conference that the Chinese were using their Embassies in socialist countries as centers for the distribution of propaganda literature against the USSR. She reported that the Chinese had expressed sharp differences with the
commonly accepted thesis that "war is not fatally inevitable" and
Φ 6
disagreed with the possibility of achieving general disarmament
and peaceful coexistence of different social systems. Flynn claimed that the CPC engaged in personal attacks on Nikita ὃ, Khrushchev, contended that Khrushchev and his supporters exaggerated the dangers of nuclear warfare, and the Chinese claimed the United States was only a "naper tiger." Flynn further contended that the Chinese claimed the world peace movement,as presently constituted, is based on fear and is disarming the people. The Chinese argued the peace movement must be anti-imperialist and must be willing
to fight for freedom for colonial peoples and for socialisn.
Flynn contended that the various fraternal parties charged the CPC with having views at complete variance with the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and with the decisions of the 20th (1956) and 21st (1959) Congresses of the CPSU to which the Chinese had agreed.
According to Flynn, on the second day of the Rumanian Congress, the Chinese delegation announced the CCCPC had a mandate for the delegates to sign but with reservations that they, the Chinese, would later divulge through the Central Committee.
Flynn stated that the document signed at the Rumanian Workers Party meeting was the origin and basis for the 81-Party meeting in Moscow in November, 1960,
Concluding, Flynn indicated that attempts were being made at that time to contain the controversy and report it care= fully with the hope of resolving the conflict at the &l-Rarty
meeting. She said the Chinese did not reply to the discussion at the
= 56 -.
Rumanian meeting so it was agreed to adjourn the meeting arter two days and to reconvene in Moscow later that year. B. CPSU Reaction to Rumanian Meeting | | ἘΝ
B. N, Ponomarev, in discussing the Bucharest meeting in the Summer of 1960, stated that the CPSU was sa concerned about this conference that it had called for preliminary meetings with the CPC representatives in Moscow prior to the Bucharest meeting. He said two conferences were held with the CPC,and the Russians Spent hours with the CPC trying to convince them they did not understand the CPSU position. The Russians quoted Mikhail Suslov's speeches at the 20th Cangress and other speeches ani, Fonomarev said, as a result, the CPSU was now in the process of informing its Party membership regarding developments at this meeting.
Continuing, Ponamarey expressed bewilderment as to how the CPSU could handle the rift between these Parties, He said ; Khrushchev at the Bucharest meeting repeated the position of the CPSU on the matter of imperialism, that war is not inevitable, and that peaceful coexistence and disarmament are possible in the world where different social systems exist, but the Chinese do not believe Khrushchey.
He stated that efforts of other.Parties to induce the CPC to accept criticism in the manner of friends have been. for
naught.
a Θ΄ =
Ponomarey said the Soviet press had not to that date criticized the CPC by name. It has been speaking in generalities, stressing the importance of coexistence, disarmament, etc, With regard to the future, Ponomareyv stated that it depends on the Chinese comrades. The CPSU received additional reports of CPC abuses of nationals of fraternal countries who were sent to China. These reports were to the effect that the Chinese were talking behind the backs of leaders of various Parties.
Ponomarev said that the CPSU would not turn its cadre into being anti-Chinese. Khrushchev at Bucharest said he will continue to work for improved relations but will not give in on principles,
Ponomarey said that although the Chinese signed the Bucharest Declaration, they had not changed their views. The Russians used the signature of the Chinese on the Bucharest docu-~ ment to present a unanimous position to the worid in the hope that it would move the Chinese. He mentioned that affairs of state between China and the USSR are also involved, including the question of arms, modern weapons, etc. Ponomarey quoted Khrushchev as stating at Bucharest that the dispute between the CPC and the CPSU was more than ideclogical, it tpvolved problems of state. Khrushchey referred to the fact that Ching bad not given per- mission to the USSR to build radar and xidio stations on Chinese territory to maintain contact with its Russian Pacific submarine fleet. Also, he indicated the Chinese did not permit the USSR
to land military planesin China.
= 88 <
Φ Φ
Nikolai Mostovets, Head of the North and South Anerican Section, International Department, CPSU in speaking on the same subject matter in late June, 1960, went further. He reported the . Chinese had asked the USSR for modern military weapons, including nuclear warheads, missiles and A=bombs, but the USSR refused to
comply. It is noted, however, that Khrushchev, on the other hand,
at the Bucharest Conference said "We have never refused you (the Chinese) any request." Vi. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST-
LATIN AMERICA AND CUBA
A, Latin America
In July, 1960, Boris N. Ponomarey, in charge of the
International Department, CPSU, in discussing CPC successes in Latin America, stated that the Chinese had trained 50 Latin comrades in China and filled them with anti~CPSU propaganda by surreptitious propaganda insinuations. The Chinese suggested to these Latin Americans that they should be armed and that there be armed struggle and guerilla warfare in Panama even though there are only a few communists in this country. The Chinese used the same line on the Brazilian comrades and some of these comrades, although not the main leadership, agreed with them on
the question of the need to resort to violence.
B. Cuba At the Eighth National Assembly of the Partido Socialista
Popular (PSP) of Cuba, held on August 16-20, 1960,at Havana, Cuba,’
= 59 -
the CPC was represented by General Wu Hsiu-chuan who used as his theme the "United States is the chief enemy of the pegple's world." He spoke οὐ United States maneuvers under the mask of peace and called for united action to destroy imperialisn. He said imperial- ism is using revisionism to stop the march of the peopie,
A telegram was read from the CPC asking Cuba to act as a stimulant for all Latin America against Yankee imperialisn. Delegates from other Parties present (the USSR was not represented) were of the opinion that the CPC had not changed its line since Bucharest in Jyne, 1960.
It was evident that the CPC then had some influence in Cuba even though the Cuban communists were definitely committea to the line of the CPSU. The Chinese delegatiagn promised the Cubans unreserved and unconditional support by the Chinese Government and were attempting to get the Latin Americans into an action program. The pro-Seviet communist countries expressed a desire not to get involved in "little wars" and spoke along the line of current CPSU policy. Thus the Chinese were pushing the Latin Americans while the Russians were holding back a littie,
| Prior to the Eighth Assembly of the PSP of Cuba, Castro
raised the slogan at a youth rally "Turn the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of all America ." This slogan called for armed rebellion in Latin America, At the Highth Assembly this slogan disappeared.
The PSP did not thick it was tactically advisable and the CPSU
- 60 =
persuaded Cuba to slow down. This marked a definite turn on the part of the PSP to commit itself to the line of the CPSU, Economic aig by China to Cuba as af 1960 wae small compared to the eid being rendered by the USSR.
VII. EDITORIAL COMMISSION MEETING
PREPARATONY TO SlePARTY CONGHESS , OCTOBER, 1960
As a preparatory step to the $1-Party Congress scheduled for Moscow in November, 1960, it was agreed that in October, 1960, representatives of some 26 Parties would gather as an "Editorial Commission" to attempt to formulate an agreed statement on the CPC~CPSU rift to the Sl-Party Congress. Both the CRC and the CPSU were represented on the Commission.
Khrushchey was then in the United States and did not participate in the Commission meetings.
in September, 1960, Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary of the CPC, and Kang Sheng, Alternate Member of the Politburo, CPC, arrived early before the scheduled Editorial Comumissiqn neeting.
Pyotr N. Pospelov, Member of the Presidium and a Secretary | of the CCCPSU, briefed other Editorial Commission arrivals on the | status of the cpc-cpsu yift prior to the Editorial Commission, meeting.
He advised that the CPC delegates brought with them 2 165 page letter of September 10, 1960, which was full of slanderous charges. Further, that the Chinese had instigated additional
4
- 61 κα
. ἢ = - - » ᾿
berder incidents necessitating the driving back of Chinese citizens by the Soviets into Chinese territory.
Pospeloy said the Chinese representatives were ohdurate to the point where civil discussion could not he carried on with them. Discussions lasted for five days.
The OPC letter of September 10, 1960, reportedly charged that the CPSU by letter dated June 10,1960, had begun an organized -gampeign against the CPC. The CPs letter was limited to theore= tical principles, according to Pospelovy. The CPC letter charged the CPSU with selling out to jiimperialism and called Khrushchev an apologist for imperialism as well as charging him with "great power chauvinism." The CPC Letter stated that the CPC would bring these charges before the Editorial Commission meeting,
Pospelov said that unity efforts wauld continue but that the September 10, 1960, CPC letter created a cifficult situation which the Editorial Commission would be confronteé with in begins ning its debates.
In preparation for the meeting of the Editorial Comission at which representatives of 26 Communist Parties were present, the CPSY had prepared an 8lepage draft document as a basis for dig+ cussions at the Editorial Commission meeting.
The CPSY was represented by Mikhail Busioy, member of the Presidium and Secretary, CCCPSU. Frol Kozlov, also a member
of the Presidium and a Secretary of the CCCPSU, also played a
leading role. Premier Khrushchev at that time was in the United States at the United Nations and did not participate in any of
the sessions of the Commission, but he did appear at the Commission banquet held thereafter.
Teng Hsiac=-ping, General Secretary, CPC, led the CPC delegation. Peng Chen, also a member of the CPC Politburo and Mayor of Peking, was among the leading CPC representatives.
The Commission continued in session until October 22, 1960, and the deliberations resulted in a revision of the draft declaration presented by the CPSU on September 20, 1960. Repre~ sentatives of the CPC and CPSU engaged in sharp clashes throughout this meeting. It was cbvious that the CPSU desired to aveid clashes with the CPC at the Commission meetings so as not to upset the scheduled November meeting of the 81 Parties singe-such_ clashes night become known throughout the worid.
Teng Hsiao-ping, at the October 5, 1960, meeting of the Editorial Commission, expressed the views of the CPC after reading the Sl=page draft document which the Coumission was considering.
His speech dealt with the question of allegiance to the Moscow Declaration of 1957, the need to reaffirm the Declaration, as. well as the Peace Manifesto of 1907.
The CPSU in this draft, according to Teng, put forth
good theses on the character of the epoch, on imperialism and on
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the anticimperialist movement, but on the national liberation «movement the question needed further development in the document. Parties must not confuse the national liberation struggle by fail- ing to understand the role of the national bourgeoisie. (Current Marxist-Leninist theories recognize the two-sided nature of the national bourgeoisie; however, in the present world struggle, communists in the Soviet Union and other countries feel they must make alliances with the national bourgeoisie such as Nasser, Sukarno and Nehru. On the other hand, the CPC wants to de~emphasize the role of the national bourgeoisie to minimize the importance of neutrality and peace.) | Teng expressed sharp differences on the thesis that war can be prevented and on the thesis that the fight for peace is not in contradiction to the class struggle. He denied the CPC was against peaceful coexistence and for use of nuclear weapons. He charged that the draft document underestimates imperialism and underestimates the war danger generated by isperialisn. | On the question of peaceful transition, Teng charged that the draft overemphasizes peaceful transition and said that the parliamentary way is impossible. Teng said that Marxism-Leninism is not the praperty belonging to one party ~ that the experiences of the Chinese must
be considered. He charged that the draft ignores these experiences.
On the question of unity, feng stated if must haye a common ideological foundation, Teng claimed that the draft | charged 9 shift in the international communist line and that this line was aimed at the CPC. This draft alsa charges fectionalisn, 7 anc he stated these are extremely dangerous charges. He said that ‘these questions were not raised for purposes of unity. On the | contrary, they were raised for an exact’ apposite purpose.
Teng said that the Seviet Union was guilty of "big power chauvinism". in pulling,its experts og of China. He deseribed this as a father ang son velationship and as being against the Moscow Declaration of 1957 which présupposes theequality of all Parties.
| He added that the dratt can be a basis for discussion | but that the weak points not in keeping with MarsistrLeninist theory must be gorrected, |
Mikhail Susiov on Octaber 10, 1960, replied te the speech of Teng. He expressed pleasure aq agreement by the Parties that ; the draft was δι Marxist-Leninist document. His remarks were extremely conciliatory as a whele, He explained that the draft was an analysis of the experiences of the past three years in ἃ Marxistn Leninist way. ts objective was to consolidate the socialist canp and the world communist moyement, He then attempted to give Teng soue answers.
Suslovy stated that in the draft the oPSU did everything possible to effect agreement on a principled basis. However, he charged that the second point of Teng's speech did nat contribute
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to unity and that the CPSU must rebuff some of the recent charges of Teng's speech.
He said the CPSU disagrees with the CPC on the "paper tiger" idea. The CPSU believes the fight to prevent war means using every possibility to accomplish just that. The CPSU dis~ agrees with the CPC's lack of faith in peaceful coexistence in that if accepts this with all sorts of reservations, He said that: peaceful coexistence, i,e., economic, political and social, will | weaken imperialism. |
The CPSU regards disarmament as a major question. I+ is out to achieve disarnament and wants to narrow the possibilities | of the imperialists unleashing war,
On the ayestion of transition to socialism, the CPST believes in using al] forms - peaceful and non-peacefyl, This concept is contained in the 1957 Declaration to which the CPC agreed. The character of the present epoch creates the possibility for peaceful transition. The CPC ignores the attractive power of socialism on this question.
The CPSU has not ignored the collective experiences of the CPC,and when the OPSU speaks of collective experiences, it includes the experiences of China,
The CPC opposes the thesis of the struggle against nationalism,but a very important thesis of the Moscow Declaration
calis for combining national patriotism with proletarian
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internationalism, The international gommunist movement requires unity to advance socialism, The CPSU rejects Teng's charges of "ereat power chauvinism.” | | Susloy called for an end tg factionnlism among Marxist Leninist Parties anc askes Teng to support bis words with deeds.
Sugloy said that the CPSU holds there mugt be a fight on two fronts, that is, against revisionism which in the Soviet Union has been defeated, and against dogmatism which attempts to skip stages, ΝΣ ΝΞ
Suslov charged that ‘Teng! S$ speegh ‘goentedned many errgnequs propositions, many unfair intex preta tions and absyrd assertions regarding the Soviet Union which the Pay hag po right to pass over. He ¢gncluced his remarks by warning that the imperialists are trying to split the international communist movement and that “Marxisnsheninisn must be the guiding star with Commynist Parties united, solid and wonolithic.
In sessions of Octgher 17 and 18, 1960, sharp exchanges continued between representatives Qf the (PRY and CPC, Sushav charged the CPC letter of September 10, 1960, sharpened and piled on differences, It garried incorrect statements and there was 8 ladk of Mexxigt-Leniniet appreach and further the interests of other Parties were not given consideration in the fetter. Sugdev
said that the (PC rejected the thesis of the cyit af the individual
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as not being based on fact but on imagination. He said the September 16, 1960, letter contained slanders against the CPSU in
that it charged opportunism and abandonment of Marxisn-Leninisn.
Further, that the document attempted to separate Premier Khrushchey from the CPSU and to divide the CPSU from other Parties, He con= cluded by stating that the CPC letter of September 10, 1960, shows that it is unwilling to meet the CPSU half way and noted that the document does not contain one constructive suggestion.’ His con= cluding remarks were to the effect that everyone knows that the CPC, despite its assertions at this meeting,is not for peaceful coexistence. Teng replied to Suslov'’s charges stating that the
Bucharest Conference contained erroneous theses and admitted that the CPC signed the communique for unity purposes. Teng then ὁ enumerated a series of new charges including attacks on the CPC by the Soviet press which the CPC claimed were made after Bucharest and after the CPC had ceased attacking the CPSU. |
He: charged the CPSU and Suslov with garrying the differ- ences of the Parties into differences invoiving affairs of state. Frol Kozlov continued the debate. He stated that the September 10, 1960, letter does not help to overcome the differe- ences, and the Chinese have transferred arguments from the sphere
of ideology. to the sphere of state relations.
Ry so doing, the CPC has attacked the international communist movement without consulting any other Party, | Kozlov next proposed a procedure for the Editorial Board covering the following issues: | 1, Character of the epoch, a, Wax and Peace, 3, Peaceful coexistence, ἄς Forms of transition, 5.. Other miscellaneous problems, at this point, Teng siaomping ang Peng Chen then raised a new issue, that being the ad lune of the CPaY to permit the πον lishing af the Chinese side of the disagreement in articles whieh | had been prepared for the "World Marxist Review,” the theoretical organ Qf the international communis t movement. | Susloy next discussed the-ohjective of the draft docunent, stating that i4 must result in the rallying of the socialist camp and the entire socialist movement based on the theories Qf MarxismeLeninism and the Mosgow Declaration ef 1967. He stated it must give prominence to the development of the world secialist system and wust be considered a preliminary document for the 8l-Party Conference which would follow. A motion was made by a British delegate ta the effect that 4 second dacunent be prepared by the commission toe be cailed
a “Peace Manifesto." This motion was passed,
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" The work of the Editorial Commission officially ended on October 22, 1960. The draft declaration, which resulted from lengthy discussions, was, in fact,a. revision of the draft proposed by the CPSU on September 30,1960, |
Various delegates expressed the hope that the banquet which would follow the Commission meeting would serve to dull the sharp edges resulting from the frequent clashes at the Editorial Commission meeting. Khrushchey did not appear at the Editorial Commission meeting sessions because of his visit to the United Nations. He was a speaker at the banquet.
Khrushchey entered the banquet hall by obvious arrange- ment at the same time the CPC delegates entered. He embraced Teng Hsiao~ping, General Secretary of the PPC, in an obvious effort. to "break the ice" and disarm and calm the CPC representatives. The CPSU obviously wanted to avoid sharp clashes at the November. meeting.
Less than 150 persons attended the banquet, including members of the Presidium of the CPSU and delegates of the 26 Parties present at the Editorial Commission meeting.
Khrushchey, however, used the occasion to debate the representatives of the CPC. He emphasized that the CPSU did not want to be the "head Party," except insofar as it earns it. He emphasized that the working class of the capitalist countries could not be won for communism werely by slogan, that in compatition
with capitalism there must be some incentive, an attraction for the
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working people. They mus + believe they are working for a higher standard of living. Khrushchev then cited the exeiaple of the United States, where he had learned on his recent visits chat in that country an unemployed man or woman receives more in unemployment compensation than does a man or woman in the Soviet Union who is fully employed. Thus, the unemployed in the United States have a higher standard of living than the employed in the Soviet Union. He turned to the Chinese and said, "If you want to attract people to communism, you must raise their standard of living. Ideology by itself as an incentive will not build communism."
He said that for the building of communism peace was necessary and that war was not the solution to our problems. He stated that Marx, Lenin, Bebel and Liebknecht had fought for peace.
Khrushchev stated, "The building of a socialist society out of the rubble of a nuclear war is an unhuman concept. If I believed in the theory of socialism through war, and this was the theory, I would not be a member of the Communist Party. We can win by peaceful coexistence." The remarks of Khrushchev caused considerable flurry at the banquet.
VIII. 81 COMMUNIST AND WORKERS PARTIES CONFERENCE MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 10 - DECEMBER 1, 1960
Representatives from 81 Communist and Workers Parties convened in Moscow on November 10, 1960. The Editorial Commission had met from September 30 to October 21, 1960, and had edited and
modified a draft of a declaration originally presented to the
wo 71 ὦ
Commission by the CCCPSU. The draft declaration was the main point
and purpose fpr the meeting of representatives of these Parties. Nikita 8. Khrushchey delivered the opening remarks which
in effect consisted of little more than greetings to the delegates.
A, Report of Mikhail Susloy, Member _of the Presidium, CCCPSU
Susloy reported for the Editorial Commission stating that the main purpose of this Commissidn was to bring in a document which would unite all Parties. He stated that. the document contained an analysis of the present epoch, the contemporary world situation, and an outline of common strategy and tactics of Marxist Parties. He stated that the CPSU was guided by Marxism-Leninism and based itself on the Moscow Decisration of 1957. ᾿
Sus lov stated that the meeting was called because it was felt there was a need to amalyze and give answers to new problems posed by life and work out strategy and tactics for the world . communist novement in the present period, . Susloy next went through each section of the draft statement listing eight points which dealt with the pace of the development of world events in the present epoch. They included the following:
1, That capitalism is growing more decrepit and feeble.
2. Many countries im the socialist camp are building socialism at a fast pace. Some are still raising the foundation of socialism.
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S. The draft analyzes the laws of construction of
socialism, the proplem of proportional development, the interna-
' tional division of labor, specialization in construction, mutual assistance, removing of citierences in the rate of development, and lays the basis for simultaneously building socialism and reaching communism.
&, The craft sets forth a system of relations between socialist countries and explains how to strengthen their unity and loyalty to Marxism=Leninism.
ὃς, The draft shows the need for solidarity of the socialist camp.
δ. The draft also dealt with the problems of combining patriotism and socialism and how to fight nationalism and chauvinism,
7. The draft deals with the dangers oF war and peace.
It shows that there is a danger of world war and points to Unitea States imperialism es the main enemy.
S. The drat further explains that the nature of imperialism has not changed.
Suslov explained that the thesis of the draft shows that the Communist and Workers Parties are against the export of revolu- tion and are for the accomplishment of the revolution by peaceful means because this would meet the interests of the people and the
nation ὃ involved in revolution, but this path, peaceful or non-
peaceful, would depend on the given situation and class relations
in each country.
He pointed out areas of agreement and disagreement encountered by the drafting committee. Disagreement was noted in parts of. Section 5 relative to the rooting out of groups and factions. The CPC opposed the section relating to unity of Parties and felt that the question of factionalien and groupings was aimed at the CPG.and should not be raised, The.sections dealing with the CPSU and the'importance of the 20th and 21st Congresses were inserted, according to Suslov, to enphasize these Congresses as examples of international solidarity. The CPC and Indonesia opposed this. |
.On the question of the cult of the individual, all delegates except China favored this in the draft. India and Albania joined China in opposing the formulation of "a world without war and without arms” and the elimination of war in our time. . . ;
. Suslov concluded by expressing the hope that the confer- ence could achieve unity even om the items of differences mentioned and that the conference would adopt the draft unanimously. Suslov's report was presented on motion and accepted without opposition.
Be. Report of Nikita io Khrushchev _
Khrushchev in his opening address. reiterated the Soviet position concerning war and PEACE» disarmament , the character of the epoch and ways and means for transition to Socialism,
‘He specifically reiterated the thesis of the 20th Congress that transition can be peaceful and non-peaceful but emphasized -— --
peaceful transition is in the interest of the masses. His entire = 14 >
speech was conciliatory in nature calling for unity as a prerequisite for the building of socialism and communism, C, Circulation of Mao Tse-tung'’s
Speech Made at Meeting Discussing meait of Moscow Declaration of 1957
During the November 14, 1960., session of this Conference the CPC circulated ἃ speech of Mao Tse-tung which he delivered at a meeting at which representatives of communist bloc™countries only attended. This was algo the meeting at which the draft of the Moscow Declaration of 1957 was framed. |
The purpose of this circulation by the CPC was an attempt to. show that the position of: Mao on peace and peaceful coexistence was contrary to the position attributed to him by the CCOPSUinca letter of November 5, 1960, |
This document touched om Mao's views on peace and the possibilities of nuclear War. His theme was that the CPC hoped for peace, but that if the imperialists insist on war, including nuclear war, the only thing to do was to make a drastic decision to fight first and then reconstruct society.
᾿ This letter διδῶ covered Mao's views on the cult of the personality , stating that Stalin had done great work leading the Soviet Party, but over a period he developed metaphysics and damaged dialectics. Mao supported Khrushchev for ousting Molotov and others from the CPSU leadership, commenting that Khrushchev
was "comparatively correct."
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“- rede - - : - . - κεν . πεῖν
In this document Mao compares the population living within the imperialist and socialist systems and the productivity at the disposal of the two systems. He concluded that in a nuclear war ",..if half of humanity were destroyed, the other half would still remain, but that imperialism would be entirely destroyed and there would be only socialism in all the. world..." When this was | quoted at the conference, a British delegate shouted, "Who will remain? You mean millioms of Chinese will remain ~ but I haye my doubts that a Single person will remain on the British Isle if a few nuclear bombs are dropped,"
D, Enver Hoxha, Albania, Speech of November 16, 1960
Enver Hoxha, First Secretary of the Albanian Party.of Labor, delivered a violent attack on Khrushchev and the draft document itself at the November 16, 1960,session of the Conference, He charged that it was impermissible to flirt with or embellish United States imperialism. Khrushchey, he sald, was confused on the question of transition to socialism and like the revisionists, some comrades believe in peaceful coexistence, but the concept of peaceful coexistence is surrendering to imperialism. Hoxha strongly defended the CPC against the charges of the CPSU leveled at Bucharest. He charged the CPSU with dishonesty and that the CPSU violated Marxist-Lenimist norms of Party relationships. He’ charged the Soviet Union with "big power chauvinism" and with the
use of coercion, flattery and propaganda to divide the Albanian.
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leadership and separate it from the CPC. He stated that the Soviet Union even interfered:i with Albanian foreign affairs and also attempted to reach some of the Albanian military men including some generais. Hoxha defended Stalin as the greatest leader Since Lenin and charged the CPSU had no right to raise the cult of the personality at the 20th Congress and called for the deletion from the 81-Party statement of the section dealing with the cult of the personality.
Hoxha left Moscow two days after his speech because he reportedly feared kidnapping and bodily harm. He departed via Finland and traveled through West Exropean countries using airplanes other than those of the socialist nations.
E,.Khrushchev Replies, November 23, 1960
Khrushchev made his second speech before the Congress on November 23, 1960, in answer to the speech of Hoxha of Albania and Teng Hsiao-ping of the CPC. | In essence the speech was conciliatory, yet it was sharp in many respects. He defended the draft do@ument as correct in characterizing the nature of the present epoch and said it was. Supported as a Marxist-Leninist document for the world communist movement. He said this statement: and the Moscow Declaration of 1957 can be a guide for all Parties.
Khrushchev examined the draft statement as corrected and approved the part dealing with the balance. of forces and the definition of the epoch and the thesis dealing with the transition
from capitalism to socialisn.
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He said the main task was to prevent nuclear war and that peace was the cornerstone of all Soviet policies.
He denied the charges of the CPC relative to forms of transition to socialism to the effect that the CPSU recognizes only peaceful transition and denies the need to prepare for non~ peaceful transition. He reiterated that the CPSU at the 20th Congress’ acknowledged that the degree of violence necessary dépended on the resistance of the bourgeoisie and even pointed out that in certain capitalist countries where the capitalist class and military are strong that “violence was inescapable." He defended the condemnation of the cult of the personality ‘and appealed for unity and the strengthening of the section on unity in the statement. He appealed to the CPC to reconsider its dangerous course and expressed’ the hope that the CPC would. heed the collective opinions of the meeting and carry through the behest .of Lenin concerning unity. |
Εις Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, ‘CPC, Replies, November 24, 1960
--π-ῦς:- ἔοι ττπππΠρ τ΄! --
On ‘November 24, 1960, Teng spoke in response to the November 23, 1960, Khrushchev speech, He strongly defended the CPC and its adherence to the Moscow Declaration of 1957. He agreed with most of the present draft statement but argued for strengthening and improvement . He said that the CPC sees the: need
for vigorous struggle. The CPC is not against peaceful coexistence
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but recognized the need for vigilance. It holds that the possibility for peaceful revolution is rare and therefore the CPC prepared both Ways, for peace and war.
Teng said that the CPC views the “spirit of Camp David" as bad in the struggle against imperialism. He saw a forward step in the draft resolution which in effect says if war does take place it will destroy imperialism. He made a plea for unity, expressed loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and pointed out that the majority of the Parties were in agreement on the draft. He denied that the CPC had fought against unity. te recognized the CPSU as the leading Party but cautioned that the CPSU should not expect support without consultations. Teng said that the CPC rejects the attack on Mao as being’ "separated and divorced from the masses." He denied the CPC was attempting to force its yiews on the majority. He said the CPC could not agree on the sections of the document on factionalism and on the charge of national communism and their position on the 20th and 2ist Congresses. He appsaled to the delegates to delete these sections in the interest of unity.
G. Summary "Several items of pertinence were noted as coming out of these meetings, Two or three days before the conclusion of the meeting in Moscow the delegates to the Congress noted that the CPSU and CPC would not reach agreement. The CPC was surprised at having received little support for its viewpoints at this meeting.
Only the CP of Albania gave the CEC solid support. The CPC
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received support from the Communist Parties of Thailand and Malaya
on the need for militant and mn~peaceful revolutions, The Communist Parties of North Korea, Japan, Vietnam and Australia supported the CPC to the extent that they argued for softer words jin certain sections. of the declaration of representatives of the 81 Parties where the language! seemed to be an indictment of the CPC | and where this might widen the gap between the CPSU and CRC. The Communist Parties of India and Ceylon supported the CPSU.
| The Editorial Commission meeting and Moscow meeting of the 81. Parties was, in fact, a two-month debate on the’main theoret- ical propositions resulting from the 20th Congress of the CPSU. These were; |
1,, That war is not fatally inevitable.
2, That revolutions do not always have to use force and violence, That peaceful revolutions become more and more possible as socialism advances in the world. No real concessions were made to the CPC on these propositions; however, agreement was finally reached at Moscow by giving concessions to the CPC to a point,
Had the CPSU and the other Parties not given these concessions, it would have meant an irfevocable split between the CPSU and the CPC right there and then.
‘The position of the CPC was that there had been a vacuum since the death of V. I, Lenin, The CPC wanted to revive Stalinism
as a step toward making Mao the leader of the international communist
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movement. The CPE has a long perspective, and it appears they were trying to win Commi st and Workers Parties in the inter- national communist movement to their side with Mao, the Chairman of the CPC, as the indisputable leader, |
At the Editorial Commission meeting and the meeting of the 81 Parties, each of many weeks duration, it became clear that the CPC was shocked when it realized the lack of support by the other Parties. On the other hand, the CPSU, as a result of these meetings, now clearly recognized the need to pay more attention to fraternal parties and its relations with them.
Ideological concessions were made to the CPC in order to present to the world a show of unity and to provide a truce or cooling off period with the aim of ironing out remaining differences in one way or another, The ideological concessions made by the CP38sU were? ᾿ | 1. Cutting down the section of the declaration dealing with Stalin's cult of the personality.
2, Leaving out a statement to the effect that the 20th Congress of the CPSU had world-wide significance.
3. Sharpening the attack on the Yugoslay revisionists.
in this regard the CPSU and the Communist Parties of West Europe wanted to compromise differences with the Legzgue of Yugoslav Communists but the CPC did not agree to this. | .
4, Omit from the statement the definition of National ° Communism,
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This statement was ostensibly intended to apply to the situation in Yugoslavia but, in fact, was aimed at the OPC, The - CPC stated that the tenm “national coumunism" was created by the bourgeoisie and was really aimed at the cpc. The CPC was willing
to have the declaration deal with "bourgeois nationalism" but not
with "national COMMIT Ath. ©
5. A. change in regard to the ques tion of factionaligsm and groupings in the international communist movement,
The original draft submitted by the Editorial Commission — in October, 1960, cited the need for strict adherence to inter- national decisions arrived at by conferences of the international communist movement. This was 2, general condemnation of the CPC for factional and group activity. In the final draft there was no condemnation of factionalism, and in its stead there was an appea} for unity in the international communist, movement , )
6, In the section dealing with revisionism and the ntebt canger," dogmatism and seotarianisn, there was some toning down of the emphasis on dogmatism and sectarianism, |
7. In various parts of the declaration there was ἃ sharpening of the janguage. The term "U, S, imperialism" was added in several places due to pressure by the ΟΡ, | | Teng Hsiaonping, General Becretary of the CPC, was their main spokesman at both’ meetings , Liu Sheo-chi, Chairman of the Chinese People’ s Republic, atthough present, did not speak at the
Sl-Party Conference.’
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Teng, in answer to Suslov, a member of the Presidiun, CPSU, said that the CPC could not make a sudden shift in line since discussion of the ideological differences between the Parties had penetrated all levels of the CPC, and its membership had to be consulted.' They could not be asked to make an about face in that discussion, Unlike the CPSU leadership, the CPC had. spread this disagreement with the CPSU widely and, deliberately,
in the opinion of leading CP personalities of several Parties who attended the meetings, the ‘Chinese in the future would | demand material concessions from. the Russians. The unknown factor was the role of Mao in ‘the statement issued in Moscow on December 6, 1960, at the conclusion of the meeting. Lt was felt that the ᾿ Russians would want to see what the Chinese would do in the future, and in the meantime the Russians would emphasize the need for unity in the international communist movement. |
At the same time certain Russian leaders suggested
privately that other leaders of their respective Parties should ibe aware of the differences, This appeared to be. an indication by the - Russians that the CPSU had sone doubt about the future intentions of the CPC. Most of the CPC leaders felt that the differences between the respective Parties could only be solved by a high level “summit type meeting,"
Following the 81-~Party Conference Liu Shao-chi, at the
request of the CPSU-made speeches in Moscow and Leningrad. The
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oad
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speeches, however, were brief, lacked enthusiasm, and were formal in style, IX. 22nd PARTY CONGRESS, CPSU, OCTOBER 17 = 31, 1961 The 22nd Congress of the CPSU was held from October 17- 31, 1961, in Moscow. Fraternal delegates from 80 Marxist-Leninist
Parties were present, with four other nations having guest-_
representatives. The Albanian Party of Labor was not present
because it was not inyited.
All of the proceedings of the Congress were open and the proceedings were recorded and widely publicized; however, some of the public records were in edited form.
A. Briefing of Fraternal Delegates
Upon the arrival of the various fraternal delegations in Moscow, one of the first items of business was the briefing of these delegates by representatives of the CPSU on the "Albanian". . situation. Throughout the following weeks, this briefing continued on ἃ regular basis.
While in the initial briefing and in many subsequent briefings; these leading officials of the CPSU spoke directly οὗ Albania, the inference was clear that their remarks were also intended to apply equally to the Chinese and the CPC. The purpose of the briefings was to impress on the various Communist and | Workers Parties the seriousness of the situation and to determine
the attitude of these Parties toward the Albanians and the Chinese.
— Se eee -
The CPSU pointed out that Enver Hoxha, the leader of the Albanian Party of Labor in October, 1961, placed Albania on
a war footing and openly proclaimed that “Albania would repel a Soviet invasion." Citizens in Albania friendly to the Soviet
Union were arrested. They pointed out that the CPC had become 60 - loud in support of Aibania and its stated positions in their broad .
casts beamed at Latin America that the CPSU was contemplating sending an official delegation to China to demand that the Chinese cease and desist. They pointed out that only eleven Communist Parties had sent greetings to the recent Albanian Party of Labor Congress. They were China, Japan, India, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, Burma, Malaya, Vietnam, North Korea and the CP of Belgium. The latter Party subsequently withdrew its greetings.
Concerning these Parties, the leaders of the CPSU stated that some have their headquarters in exile in China; "the Japanese and Indonesian Parties are in the pay of the, Chinese." Vietnam lives in close proximity to China, and North Korea, while sending greetings to the Albanian Party, in fact, speaks truthfully con cerning Albania and the Chinese. New Zealand and Australia, according to the CPSU, reportedly sent greetings because of material aid in the form of money which they had received from the CPC,
Throughout these discussions, individual representatives of the International Department, CCCPSU, made no direct request
for support of the Parties whom they were briefing, but did attempt
τ΄
7
to influence them to take ἃ stand. The result was that all Parties of North and South America. supported the CPSU,
In private discussions with members of the International Department, CPSU, prior to and after the 22nd Congress, these CPSU
representatives clearly stated that the status of state and Party -—
relations between the USSR and China had continued to deteriorate . since the 81-Party Congress in 1960.
They indicated that attacks were being heaped on the Soviet Union by the Albanian Partyof Labor, which were interpreted
by Soviet officials to emanate from the "Master's Voice Ὁ China,"
They indicated that the Chinese had only given lip
seryice to the 8l-Party Statement of 1960 and were pursuing the
same Old policies, teaching their people that "Negexistence is
impossible ~ war is inevitable." These CPSU officials expressed fear that current actions and utterances of the CPC would some day place the Soviet Union in a situation which could provoke an international crisis. 8. Proceedings of the 2nd Congress, CPSU It could be gathered from the rather complete public reports on the 22nd Congress that the only important speeches, other than that of Khrushchev reflegting the Soviet Union's policies regarding the international situation (especially the German problem), the problem of armament negotiations, and- atomic bomb tests, were those of Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign.
Affairs, and Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, Minister of Defense,
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These speeches were reported in detail and accurately.
At the Congress there were no special discussions on details and tactics regarding the Soyiet Union’s foreign policy.
The Congress itself emphasized the Party's new economic program, placing emphasis on the "building of communism" and on the economic program was based on peace. Stress was placed on peaceful coexistence and on peaceful competition, throughout all of the speeches.
Some time was spent at the Congress on Stalin's ¢alt of the personality. This further exposé was a clear indication that Khrushchey had consolidated his leadership and influence in the OPSU,
The 22nd Congress served as a platform to receiye a public pledge from the various fraternal parties present to the CPSU and to the Seviet Government itself.
All Parties, regardless of size, were given an important place at the Congress and were permitted to express themselyes from the rostrum,
This was extrenely important to the CPSU strategy since the Soviets have no more powerful allies than these Parties.
Because of the existence of China as a powerful rival in the socialist camp with differences that show themselves in the field of doctrine, theory and the practice of Marxism-Leninism, as well as in state relations, the CPSU tried to win the support of the various Parties. As of the 22nd Congress, the CPSU had won the
overwhelming majority of Communist and Workers Parties throughout
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the world to their point of view, yet there continued to exist constant rivalry to influence and hold these Communist and Workers Parties, By influencing these. Parties, the Russians (or Chinese) could further their international policies.
While the CPC was invited and did send a delegation, headed by Chou En-lai, Premier of the State Council of the PRC and a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CPC, the CPC delegation played only a small role at the Congress, Chou En-lai himself departed from the Congress after four days | of proceedings and returned to China. The other delegates . remained, but for the most part were inactive.
Among the nearly 80 Communist Parties represented by | fraternal delegates, possibly as few as ten had any association with the CPC delegation. Those delegates having contact or participating in functions at the Chinese Eubassy were those who by close proximity or circumstances were in the Chinese sphere of influence. |
C. Discussion Between L. L. Sharkey, General Secretary, CP of Australia,
' gnd Leaders of CPC, January, 1962. Contained within the confidential files of the CCCPSU
maintained concerning the differences between the CPSU and the CPC, there is a document entitied "Summary of Talks Between Comrade - 1. Sharkey and the Leaders of the CPC, January, 1962." The | essence of this document is as follows: ΝΣ
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Sharkey could not understand the inflexibility of the
CPC leaders during a talk with them on the way back from the 22nd Congress, CPSU. This inflexibility concerned the CPSU yiswa-vis Albania, and the world communist movement. When Sharkey suggested that this would have a bad effect upon the world commynist movement and other Communist Parties, Teng Hsiao-ping, General Secretary, CPC, said that a split would not necessarily be a bad result. | He stated that Karl Marx split the First International after founding it. Engels started the Second International; and Lenin split away from it because of its opportunism, "but the sky did not fall on account of this." Lenin was a minority, yet he founded the Third international and put the world communist movement ἡ on to the right path. | Today,there are 90 Communist and Workers Parties, but in the opinion of the Chinese leaders, they, including the CPSU, are infected with opportunism and revisionism, and if the world commynist movement disintegrates, "the sky will not fall on account of that either.” Teng said "The CPC has taken a principled stand and no matter what happens, will go its own way." According to this document, Sharkey was shocked by the lack of principles and the Chinese cynicism dismayed him. The manner in which they contradicted their own arguments of a year or two before left him gasping. | According to Sharkey, Teng said that Chou En=lai left the
22nd Congress, not because of work at home, but rather in protest
«a 89 =
against the CPSU's stand on Albania. In the future, Teng said,
the CPC will not send fraternal delegates tq Congresses of other Parties and they will not participate in any international meetings of Communist and Workers Parties, |
Sharkey said that in 1960 the CPC had said that the peace moyement was worthless and even reactionary and that the CPSU's policy of peaceful coexistence will lead to "coneiliatien with capitalism and opportunism."
Further, that during a preyious talk, Teng had said that the testing of a 50 megaton bomb by the Soviet Union had been "harmful" because it had caused confusion among the peace supporters and had brought a split in the unity of the world communist moyement.
Sharkey stated that when economic relations between the USSR and China were discussed, Teng said that the Chinese were paying for everything down to the last screw and were paying a higher price than any other country. That is why, he declared, the Chinese are forced to buy wheat in Australia and Canada.
Sharkey stated that when he wanted to discuss basic problems or principles which centered around the 22nd Congress, the Chinese swept aside all arguments and declared, "Everything the Soviet comrades do is bad."' Teng reportedly added that the Chinese "do not believe a word the Russians say and do not want
to believe them."
τ παρϑῳ ταῦθα
--- κὦὰ ἡ το
Φ 9
Teng then reportedly tried to foist on to the Australian comrades a thousand copies of a book on Stalin written by a Trotskyite which was being widely circulated in the United States and other capitalist countries. Sharkey refused.
Sharkey stated that in order not to listen to any more anti-Soviet tirades of the Chinese, the Australian delegation left China after only 48 hours. He stated that he cannot explain or understand the reasons for the change in the position of the CPC leaders. Although in thei: tailkks..the Chinese exhibited their dis- satisfaction in regard to their economic relations with the CPSU, Sharkey believed that this was not the real reason for their present position.
Sharkey reported to the CPSY that during these talks the Chinese leaders had told him that the Soviet Union provided
China’ with armaments , including submarines and radar installations.
However, according to the Chinese comrades, the Soviet Union had
tried to get control over these armaments and in this way tried
to establish its control over China. For example, the Chinese comrades told the Australian delegation that the Soviet Union had tried to use its submarines to gain control over the Chinese 568: board and to keep operation of radar installations in its own hands, He reported that this suspicion of the Soviet Union by the Chinese in his opinion had its origin in Chinese nationalism and in their
nistrust of all white people, including the Soviet people.
=a 91 ὦ
2 ee ballliaten seein enamel pee Ν RE ee
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X. REPERCUSSIONS MAKE THEIR FIRST APPEARANCE 2N_THE "WORLD MARXIST REVIEW" (1961)
The "World Marxist Reyiew" is the theoretical organ of the international communist movenent,with headquarters in Prague, Czechosloyakia. Representatives of all Communist Parties are assigned to this publication,and its program and policies are formulated through an Editorial Board, which meets regularly,
In late 196] a leading representative of the CP of Czechoslovakia observed that the CPC representatives who were assigned to the "World Marxist Review" were not then regularly participating in any of the publication's Editorial Board meetings. Some leading representatives of the CRC tq this publication were
.then 111; however, the other lesser CPC representatives assigned
to the publication were observed appearing at the publication's offices only long enough to sign in and make their presence known. Infrequently, there were CPC representatives at Editerial Board meetings, but solely for the purpose of taking minutes on the digr cussions. They did not participate in-any of the proceedings of these meetings.
The last concrete contribution made by the Chinese in the way Of material for publication in the "Review" predated the Bucharest meeting of 1960. This Czech official was of the opinion that the relationship between the Chinese and the Soviets was con- tinuing to deterioraté since the meeting of the 81 Parties in
Moscow in November, 1960, However, he opined that the Chinese
= 92 -
Φ Φ were expected to maintain relationships with representatiyes of the "World Marxist Review" headquarters in Prague. ΧΙ, EVENTS QF 1962 CONTRIBUTE TOWARD DEEPENING RIFT
Despite conciliatory overtures to the CPC by the CPSU in early 1962, the vitt between the Parties continued to deepen due,, at least in part, to certain activities of the Governments of the PRC and the USSR, including the aetion of the Chinese against India and the Soviet withdrawal. of missiles from Cuba.
Criticisms and name-calling intensified at international meetings ef. leading mass organizations in the peace and disarmament fields. These occurren¢es affected the relations between the fraternal parties as was shown at their Congresses and in the "World Marxist Review:" All these further sharpened the controyersy | between the CPC and the CPAU and between their respective Governments.
A. Letter. of CCOPSU Ta CRC, February 22, 1962
The CCGPSH sent what was considered a conciliatory letter | to the CCCPC on February 22, 1962, relative to the relationship between the Parties, which in essence indicated that the relationship between the Parties had reached "a high point of deterioration" and that it was most urgent that the two Parties attempt to settle their differences, In essence the letter stated:
"This letter was written to express concern of the CPSU
over the course of relationships between our two Parties recently,
m O93 =
In a frank and comradely way, we would like to express our serigus
anxiety over the fact that friendship and cooperation between the CPC and the CPSU are not being strengthened but weakened to the detriment of the interests of the socialist camp and the world communist movement. All communists and progressives are deeply worried on principle and problems of contemporary development in the world and tactics of the international communist movement.
"These disagreements hamper the anti-imperialist struggle ang prevent the socialist system from conducting and egordinating foreign policy, make more difficult an agreement on disarmament, handicap the colonial struggle, weaken efforts to assist the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the unity of the broad anti-imperialist movement is now in danger,
‘There are no two answers for a Marxist-Leninist, The fraternal interests of socialism and communism require the two Parties to raise themselves over the differences, coordinate policies, and seek the correct way aut of difficult situations and to find solutions.
"Our main task is to consolidate in eyery possible way the revolutionary forces to advance on imperiajiism. We have a good. basis for conducting this single .poFicy = the Declaration of 1957 and the document adopted at the Moscow Conference of Parties in 1960,
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— ee Ee ere =
“~The Moscow Conference adopted a program based on the experiences of the communist moyement as a whale. It outlined ideas ahout the character of today's world, the possibility of averting war, principles of peaceful coexistence, of forms of transitdan to socialism. It stressed the importance of fighting both revisionism and dogmatism. The decisions of the Moscow Conference have withstood the test of time and can successfully save the consdlidation of fraternal parties. We have ta solidify our ranks and avoid arbitrary interpretations of its decisions.
"Since the CPC¢ has stressed its loyalty to the Declaration, . there is every possibility of overcoming existing differences, The CPSU, in this letter, has no desire to raise questions on which we
have disagreements. Rather we emphasize those points which unite
us = leaving aside those which we find controversial, Qur differences
are tactical in character = they cannot possibly overshadow the
objectives of al1 communists.
"We consider particularly harmful carrying of our
differences into the sphere of economic, political, military and
cultural relations among socialist countries,
. “The CPSU expresses again its willingness to resolve our differences in a comradely way, without aecumulating and increasing," The letter concluded by indicating a sincere desire to have friend~ ship and copperation with the CPC for a common cauce τ "the triumph
of peace and communism.”
B. Chinese Viewed by Soviets as Promoting "East is East" Doctrine and Separating "National Liberation Movement" from socialism
Boris N. Ponomarey, Head of the International Department, CCCPSU, indicated in November, 1962, that despite the conciliatory letter of the CPSU, sent in February, 1962, tg the CPC, relations between these Parties were much worse than in the past. The Moscow Conference of 1960 had not caused the CPC to reverse its arguments and its old positions.
In fact, at the World Congress for General Disarmament and Peace in Moscow in the summer of 1962 and at the World Peace Council] meeting in Stockholm earlier in 1962, the Chinese had renewed their old arguments and propagandized that there was no possibility of agreement between socialist and bourgeois states. The Chinese representatives attacked the Soviet leaders who were advocating disarmament, yelling "shame-shame." The Chinese Peace Council had also opposed resolutions of the World Peace Council on disarmament because the United States was not named as the main eneny.
Further, according to Ponomareyv, the CPC is trying to divide the Asian, African and hatin American movements from the other Parties of the world, In this regard, they are trying to implant in these areas the idea that the most important movements are those in Asia, Africa and Latin America, ang also that the center of the revolution has moved to the East, namely China,
They hint that the Russian working class has lost its reyolutionagry
~ 9G =
Spirit and is under bourgeois influence, that the gld Communist Parties of Hurope and North America have degenerated and become
revisionists and opportunists. Ponomarevy related that in.
September, 1962, the Chinese told a visiting Japanese dignitary
in effect that, "last is East; Asians would change world history,"
Ponomarey indicated that the Chinese»India conflict was . Of great concern to the USSR, He pointed out that it involves two countries who play a role in the fight for independence, one being the Chinese People's Republic, and the other "peace-loving India," China wants India to reject neutralism and nonealignment so that the CPC sectarians can prove their theoretical thesis.
Continuing, Ponomarev discussed the role of the CPSU in Cuba in October, 1962. He stated that all Parties, except Albania, approved the CPSU position. Chine occupied a different position, and their objective was to sharpen the conflict. He charged that the CPC press had accused the CPSU of appeasing American imperial ism. In essence, he opined, the Chinese were trying to push the Soviet Union into war with the United States and were using the Cuban crisis to attempt to separate the national liberation moave- ment from socialism and to spread the idea that the national liberation movement should rely mainly on their "own forces,"
Ponomarev indicated that the CPSU is worried about this situation and feels that it should place proletarian international= ism, that is Marxism-Leninism, as against nationalism preached by
the CPC.
o OF ὦ
Ponomerey asked the question, "What does the future
nola?" in reply, he stated that the CPSU leaderys are considering further conferences but feit in the final analysis that they must be "franker than ever before."
Ponomarev also referred to an open letter published by the Fourth Trotskyist International in 1960 and sent to the (PC. This letter reportedly stated that the Fourth International agrees with the Chinese Party in their stand against disarmament, peacefyl cgexistence, etc., that the policy of the Soviet Union created only illusions among the masses. It related that the struggle fox these aims distracts from the real struggle against imperialism and that the Bolshevik Party of Lenin was being destroyed,
It was the thinking of the leadership of the CPSU that the "CPC had initiated" such an open letter through the Trotskyists . Politically, according to Ponomarey, it means the destruction gf the international policy for all Parties and actually constitutes an open doer to destroy all Communist Parties from within.
Vitaly Korinaoy, Chief Deputy to Ponomarey, International Department, CCCPSU, added that the Italian conception of poly- centrism (two centers or regional centers) has grown from a concrete situation in Italy. The CPSU does not agree with this idea and objectively it could bring harm to the communist movement, If pursued logically, Africa, Asia and Latin America could create
their own centers. The slogan, "Workers of the World Unite" could,
= 93 4
turn to "Workers of the World Disunite.'" Reportedly, the Italian
Party did not press their idea of polycentrism and Togliatti claimed he was misunderstood. Togliatti said that if by this it is understood that it would result in dividing into national groupings, the Italian Party would not he for this type of palyx centrism. Korjianov stated that this is the Chinese misinterpye- tation of polycentrism and this being 50, the other Parties will have dropped it.
In discussions in November, 1962, Boris N. Ponomarey stated that the idea of a new conference of Communist Parties had been ruled oyt by the CPSU because it was felt that such a conference would result in an irrevocable split in the world communist movement at this juncture.
C, Speech of N. §,. Khrushchev, October 14, 1962, on the Departure of Liu Hsiao, Ambassador of the PRC to the USSR ΕΝ
An official confidential record of the CCCPSU contains a record of a luncheon speech of N. 5, Khrushchev given on | October 24, 1962, on the accasion of the departure of Liu Hsiao, Ambassador of the PRC to the USSR, which contains the following:
Khrushchev stated that the CPSY attaches great importance to the relationship between the two countries. A strong and durable friendship is the most important gondition for cohesion and unity of the entire socialist camp. The USSR and the CPSU for their part are doing everything necessary to strengthen close
ties and relations with the PRC and the ΟΡ.
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"Y must say frankly that up to 1958 we had very good velations with the CPC and its leadership, Nothing better could be desired; nothing clouded these relations, Since 1958 there has been a change. These relations became colder and that situation continues to this day. In the gapinion of our Party, this does not benefit either our two Parties and gountries or the world communist movement...
"Gur common enemies, the imperialists, are trying to take advantage of the present situation to drive a wedge between | the CPSU and the CPC,. between the USER and the PRC, After 1998, , when relations between aur two countries deteriorated, the imperialists began to foster hopes that it would be easier for them to carry out their aggressive plans against the socialist camp. True enough, our forces hod not weakened by this, no matter what the imperialists think. As individual countries we have
vemained strong. When we are together, however, our forces grow
in geometric progression, It is not merely the arithmetic addition
of two forces, but forces multiplied a hundredfold. We should always remember this...
"lt is quite gbyious that only the imperialists stand to
gain “trom a deterioration of relations between our two countries.
They do not hesitate tq emplay all available means.
"We had a meeting with the French politicians Shnuttlein and Paul Reynaud who passed through the USSR on their way from China, They talked of the existence of the ‘yellow peril’ fron
- 10Q -
the East, meaning China (other countries including Japan were included, I dealt them a sharp rebuff and told them we are united on class lines and Marxism-Leninism, for the prevention of war, against imperialism, and for the victory of socialism... |
"Y can cite facts proving that the capitalist press wants to bring disunity into relations between our two countries and Parties. We must, however, yery resolutely say that there are no grounds, no reasons for disputes and differences between our Parties and countries. We have no disputes over territories and frontiers...
"Our practical work demands ynity and cohesion of our ranks. We know that the present state of relations between the CPC and the CPSU is creating no little difficulties for many Parties, especially those of the capitalist countries.,.fome of our fraternal parties are not strong and find themselves in a serious position, They respect China and the Soviet Union. We ᾿ have to understand this and not provide nourishment for our enemies. Let us open up a clean new page to restore relations as existed before 1958. Let us not rake over old mattexs..,
πος know that we have always supported and still support . the PRC in international aifairgs. When there was a threat of an | attack on the PRC in the summer of this year and earlier, we announced resolutely and confirm it again today that we regard an attack on China as an attack on the Soviet Union and shail
deal the aggressor a crushing blow."
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Khrushchev concluded his speech by stating, "I should
like to repeat once more that there would be much better conditions
for the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world if the cold were driven out of relations between our Parties and our countries and its place takén by warmth,"
D, Eighth Congress of CP of Bulgaria, Sofia, November, 1962; Eighth Congress, Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Budapest, November 20-24, 1962; and 12th Congress, CP of Czechoslovakia, Prague, December 4-8, 1962
Three important Congresses were held in 1962; the Bighth
Congress of the CP of Bulgaria, Sofia, November, 1962; the Eighth
Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, Budapest,
November 20-24, 1962 and the 12th Congress of the CP of Czechoslovakia,
Prague, December 4:8, 1962; which furnished evidence of the — increasing sharpness of developments between the CRC and the cPpsu and the Parties supporting their respective positions.
Officials of the CPSU considered all these Congresses. very important because they gave full support to the CPSU position as against the CPC. Howeyer, the 12th Congress of the CP of Cgechoslovakia was considered the most important and vital of these Congresses.
The importance of the Czech Congress was shown by the fact that this Congress was used most extensively for the purpose of showing solidarity of the Marxist-Leninist international mover
ment, It was also used as a most important mobilization point
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οὐ
φ | φ
against the Chinese position in the ideological rift, The ᾿
leadership of the CP of Czechoslovakia on behalf of the CPSU faithfully and diligently deyoted most of their attention to. the fraternal delegates in order to persuade them to support the CPSU point of view on both the question of Cuba and the CPC, | Sharp words were expressed by Viadimir Koucky, Secretary, CCCP of Czechoslovakia on December 7, 1962. He charged the Albanian Party with slandering the CPSU and Charged China with supporting this slander. He said, "We cannot lg0k upon this group as ‘inside our family’ as the Chinese comrades say." Antonin Noyotny, First Secretary, CCCP of Czechoslovakia, |.
and President of the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia, in ἃ direct reply to an earlier speech of Wu Hsiuechuan, CPO fraternal delegate, charged the CPC and Albania with distorting the facts — ‘of Marxism-Leninism and with adventurisn, particularly on the | Cuban question. |
| Leonid Brezhney, President of the USSR, at the 12th - Congress charged Albania,and by strong indirection China, with wanting to drag the world into the "hell" of a nuclear war and thus "save Cuba,"
E. CPC Severs Connections with "World Marxist Review' also known as "Problems of Peace and Socialism"
The CPC seryed notice on the Editorial Board of the.
international communist theoretical publication, "Problems of
Peace and Socialism" in ἃ letter dated November 1}, 1962, addressed to the Editorial Board. This letter announced the severance of "moral or political responsibility" of the CCCcPC for this publication. This letter indicated the disagreement grew out of policies which had been raised by the OPC as early as November 27, 1961, in letters and exchanges hetween GPC | representatives and the Editorial Board,
The Chinese letter noted the issue was that the iegazine thad published articles attacking x Marxist-Leninist Party, the Albanian Party of Labor, in violation of fundamental prineiples guiding relations between Parties, It charged the Editorial Board with a violation of an original resolution setting up the publication, which noted that if differences of political significance arose they should be settled by consultation of the Central Committees of such Parties. The letter charged the | magazine with interfering with state relations, It set forth details charging that the Editorial Board had published articles | fayorable to the CPSU point of view, while at the same time it. had ‘refused to accept articles of the OPC based on Marxism-Leninism, the Moscow Declaration of 1957 and the Moscow Statement of 1960, ~ It charged the Board with persisting in "splitting measuyes for | which the CPC could no longer bear any public or moral responsibility. The letter requested thet the words: "Chinese Edition" in
the magazine be deleted.
wo 104 α
“-
A series of exchanges of letters took place within the Editorial Commission, making changes in the articles submitted by the Chinese, claiming that they were contrary to the agreed line of the international communist movement and were dagmatic and sectarian, | | In these exchanges of letters, the cc was charged: with
a failure to promote circulation of the publication in China, and
it was noted that since January, 1962, there was no information
available concerning circularization of that journal in China. At the end of 1961 the CPC ceased to hanor its financial commit ments to the journal. In discussing this situation in the "World | Marxist Review," comrade Aleksei M, Rumyantsev, edito: #ifiechie? of the publication, remarked: "The Soviet Union has already decided that this.action by the CPC in regard to the publication constitutes a-split in the world communist movement," F, Status of the Split, December, 1962
The following conclusions were reached concerning the scope and extent of the rift between the CPC and the CPSU as gleaned from contacts with high officials in the international Communist Parties, as well as with leaders in the CCCPSU;
1, The rift between the CPSU and China, according to the CCCPSU leadership, has become much worse.
2, Details leading to this conclusion were based on a
speech of a Chinese delegate to the World Peace Coungil in
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+0 ag eer
eye fe
Stockholu, Sweden, in 1962, where the delegate stated, "There is
no possibility of agreement between sdécialist and bourgeois states.” The Chinese delegates at the same meeting attacked Soviet delegates who were dealing with disarmament and booed them. |
The Chinese in September, 1962, sent a telegram to the World Peace Council, disagreeing with resolutions adopted at the July Congress because the United States was not named as "the main enemy." Thereafter, the Chinese began to renew their qld line against coexistence and disarmament.
3. The CPC is attempting to divice Asian, African and Latin American movements from the other Communist Parties of the
world and to convey the idea that the center of the revolution
has moved to the East, namely China.
4. The Chinese are making efforts to implant the idea in the world that the Russian working class has lost its revolu- tionary Spirit and is under bourgeois influence.
5, The Chinese charge that the oldest Communist Parties of Europe and North America have degenerated and become revisionist and opportunists.
| 6, China, by taking these positions, is placing the probiem of national independence on a racial basis.
The Russian leadership admitted that they had no answer to solving the rift. They had adopted a program of being patient with the Chinese. The Soviet representatives expressed fear of immediate Chinese nuclear tests that "will lead the world to
catastrophe," - 106 «
8 Φ
XII, ECHOES OF THE SINO-SOVIET RIFT IN THE CPUSA (1963)
The CPUSA and its representatives in attendance at international communist conclaves in recent years have given unqualified support to the position of the CPSU in connection with the sharp ideological struggle as well as oan state policies. This support has resulted in a line or program calling for peaceful coexistence, disarmament, support of the Soviet position in Cuba, control of nuclear weapons, etc. This is an understandable position because the American Party is totally dependent upon the CPSU for its existence and many of its leadership have had long experience in dealing with the Russians.
The CPC, hawever, has made overtures to the American Party during the period of the development of this rift in the form of offers of material aid. Of course, such offers and aid would create a Situation requiring support of the policies of the CPC and would cause alienation from the CPSU, and for that reason the American Party leaders haye been most reluctant to accept support from the CPC, material or otherwise. As of January, 1968, there was a certain attraction to the CPO position in the American Party, ‘particularly since the Caribbean events and the Soviet retreat in Cuba. Certain other difficulties have arisen in the international communist movement which help to compound the rivalry between the CPSU and the CPC, and this has affected every CP in the interna~
tional communist movement, including the CPUSA.
- 107 Ὁ
Φ Φ fs SANUALY δ᾽ 1963, National Leadership Meeting
At a meeting of the leading CPUSA national leadars in January, 1963, two reports were given, one by Gus Hall, General pecretary of the CPUSA, Hall discussed the basis of what he terned “bourgeois nationalism of the CPC."" He showed how Mao Tse-tung had depended chiefly upon the peasants and small bourgeoisie in China in his drive for state power. According to Wall, Karl Marx did not differentiate between the peasantry of one state and the peasantry of another, From the point of view of economic position, singe they are owners, the peasantry in any
country, regardless of development, is capitalist in nature. He
supported his position through quotes from Marx, Engels and Lenin. Halli noted that the CPC had given the peasantry special character-=
istics which communists give only to the working class. Therefore,
he stated, according to Mao, the peasantry, if led by communists,
could be persuaded to act in behalf of the communists like
agricultural workers, who are considered part of the proletariat,
Because this thesis is in vielation of Marxist-Leninist laws of development, the commune system failed. These facts characterize the Chinese policy, according to Hall.
The second report given at this meeting was based on consultations with the Leadership of the CPSU and on attendance at several Congresses of other Communist Parties. This speaker noted that the leadership of the CPUSA fully supported the CPSU
on the question of differences with the CPC,
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However, following this report, discussion occurred in
which certain differences came to the fore in the thinking of the CPUSA leadership, in that some of these leaders injected issues into the discussion which would give confidence to the Chinesa,
It will be recalled that the Soviet leadership condemned the Chinese for their use of racism to divide the international communist movement and to consolidate Chinese power in the more backward countries made up of the yellow and black races. The CPSU also condemned the Chinese far giving priority to the national liberation movement over the working class movement of all coquntrics. The CPSU noted that the CPC had been doing this for the purpose of showing that the "center" of the revolution had moved to the Hast, namely China.
It will also be recalled that in the first debate between the CPC and the CPSU held in the Editorial Commission meeting prior to the 61-Party Congress in November, 1960, the Chinese charged the Russians with "big power chauvinism" and these charges haye been repeated by the Chinese on numerous occasions since that time.
Therefore, while the CPUSA leadership unanimously approved both of the reports given in the January, 1963, meeting, the discussions which followed were full of contradictions, for example, Ben Davis, CPUSA National Board member and Negro spokesman for the Party, while agreeing with the two speakers, nevertheless
remarked that had the Chinese not been of the yellow race, they
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would already have been in the United Nations. This argument of Davis has a false premise since many weak nations of Africa haye been admitted to the United Nations; however, on the racial issue, some Negro leaders in the CPUSA as well as a number of Negroes around the CPUSA fighting for sqoial equality, wish to forge a weapon which can be used in this country, These are the people who, instead of saying the'liberation movement" as do the Chinese, call it the "Negro freedom movement." Within the CRUSA, the Negro leader uses this delineation in his drive for power against the white leaders, There are also a few among the white leaders of the CPUSA who for opportunistic reasons are also echoing racial Slogans of the Negroes.
The debate within the CPUSA could possibly expand, There were reports of confusion in the Party regarding the Soviet withdrawal from Cuba. Some Party members raised the question as to whether the Soviet Union went beyond compromise and "surrendered" to imperialism in Cuba. This is the same position taken by the Chinese. |
The rift in the world communist movement could con- celivably find more repercussion within communist circles in the United States leading to further debates, splits, deviations and dissensions within and around the Party. The so-called "left" --€ircles in America, including the publication "National Guardian,"
have given yoice to" this.matter by raising certain questions and
on we Ν, eet
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publishing articles by Anna Lowlse Strong always favorable to China, by publishing articles by Professor Morray on Cuba, and through a series of editorials which all indicate a leaning in the direction of the Chinese policy. In this category also is the "Monthly Review," published by Leo Huberman and Paul M,
Sweezy, which also echoes in articles and editorials the Chinese viewpoint. |
There have been some defections from the CPUSA over views on the Sino-Soviet rift. None of these defections, to date, involve upper echelon leadership. Some of these defectees have organized around the so-called "Progressive Labor" publication of New York, the "MarxisteLeninist Quarterly," the “Anna Louise Strong Newsletter," and the "Far Eastern Review,” all of which echo the Chinese position. The influence of this "left" element on the CPUSA, to date, has been small, but it has great potential appeal particularly to the Negro and to the so-called "revolutionary" intellectual.
Gus Hall on a few occasions has charged that all of these groups and grouplets, as well as their publications,’ are being subsidized by the Chinese and the Albanians since the CPUSA leader~
Ship knows from experience that publication costs are high and these publications are of ἃ kigh quality and appeared suddenly and regularly.
The CPC has enunciated a new doctrine--Marzist~Leninists
inside and outside the Communist Party, This is an open call for
~ JIL =
me πα
Φ 8
asplit. This doctrine was first put into words in the Chinese
editorial "A Comment on the Statement of the CPUSA,' which
appeared in the March 8, 1968, issue of "Renmin Ribao," an official organ of the Cocpc, This editorial attacked the CPUSA and its leadership for embellishing imperialism, acting as stooges for the Kennedy Administration and following the baton of the CPSU.
“This attack on the CPUSA was made public after the CPUSA issued its own Statement at the Sixth Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (German Democratic Nepublic), where besides circulating this statement on January 9, 1968, the spokesman for the CPUSA, Henry Winston, a vice Chairman of the CPUSA, joined in the attack against the CPC from the rostrum of the Congress. : |
B. Hlizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman, CPUSA - Inner Party Document , September, 1963 |
‘$lizabeth Gurley Flynn, National Chairman of the CPUSA, in September, 1965, following the public disclosures by the CPSU and the CPC of their ideological rift,with approyal of the CPUSA leadership, prepared an inner Party document concerning the history and development of the Sino-Soviet rift. The contents of this document were subsequently published in edited form in the November, 1968, issue of "Political Affairs," the theoretical organ of the-CPUSA. Since the rift had now become an open one, it
was felt by the national leadership that such a document should be
= 112 -
prepared in order that the leaders of the Party could be fully
aware of the facts.
Flynn, in her document, indicated that she had:attended a number of the congresses and conferences at which the rift had developed and specifically mentioned the Bucharest Conference of June, 1960, the meeting of the 81 Communist and Workers Parties in November, 1960, and the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961 in support of her position of first-hand Knowledge.
The document deals at length with the disagreements which became evident at the Bucharest Conference in 1960, which she reported resulted in a brief, formal "reaffirmation of ' international policy." She described charges and counter= charges made at this two-day session and stated that the Russian and other fraternal parties set forth a series of complaints against the Chinese, primarily based on procedures and tactics at various recent Mass organization'' conferences where the Chinese criticized the foreign policy position agreed to by the socialist camp, and at which meetings non=communists were present.
Flynn reported that the Chinese behavior at Budapest centered about the publication of two books, one entitled "Long Live Leninism,"' and the other a collection of editorials appearing in the Chinese daily, "Jenmin Jih Pao,” on international policy. The Chinese were criticized for publishing these works without consultation with the other fraternal parties. They were also
charged with using their embassies in the socialist countries as
= 113, =